793.94 Commission/678: Telegram
The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
75. My 71, and 72.76 Sawada, of the Japanese delegation, came to see me this morning stating that he wanted to give me his delegation’s first impressions of the “statement of reasons” and the draft resolution of the Committee of Nineteen. These had been telegraphed to Tokyo for instructions but Sawada thought he could say now that neither the “statement of reasons” nor the draft resolution could be accepted by the Japanese delegation in their present form. His delegation saw the following objections:
1. The Committee of Nineteen was too large for a conciliatory body. The Japanese delegation had envisaged a body which would be composed of those states having an interest in the Far East. This was a practical objection only.
2. The Japanese delegation objected to non-League members taking part. Sawada had previously explained to me the opposition in Japan [Page 438] to our participation on the conciliatory body. He assured me again that while his delegation would be happy to have us sit in he was afraid these views would not be accepted by his Government. He observed that his delegation had already telegraphed three times to Tokyo urging its viewpoint.
Sawada asked what our view was regarding participation. I took this occasion to reiterate to him that we were far from desirous of participating in the Commission; that nothing was farther from our thoughts than to try to press for membership therein; that in any case we would be extremely reluctant to accept; that we would only do so if we thought we could be helpful and only after careful consideration of whatever terms of reference were agreed upon. Later in the conversation I observed that the invitation to participate was not an immediate question with us. The resolution could only be put through with the approval of Japan as I understood it; that if and when the invitation was offered to us we could make up our minds as to whether we could serve any useful purpose in taking part.
Sawada suggested we leave aside for the moment the consideration of the resolution and asked whether we would take any part in this affair if the resolution failed. To this I replied that since the beginning of the Special Assembly and during its course it appeared that the Assembly’s way of thinking was along the lines of conciliation; that if the attempt to conciliate failed by Japanese vote presumably the Committee of Nineteen would discuss the whole matter again in the light of this event. What the Committee of Nineteen might propose at that time was so unknown and so impossible to foresee that I could not in any way answer his question.
3. Sawada said that he noted that conciliation was to be attempted on the rules laid down in chapter 9 of the Lytton report and on the principles enunciated in chapter 10. The Japanese delegation thought that the matter should also be considered in the light of the declarations before the Council of the two parties to the dispute.
4. Sawada then stated that the most important objection of his delegation lay in the final paragraph of the “statement of reasons”. Even though Japan was not asked to vote for this and the Assembly was not asked to adopt it, nevertheless it was a declaration which prejudged the part that would be taken and prejudged in some measure the thoughts in the minds of the conciliators.
I said that I could express no opinion regarding the documents but that certain reflections based on conversations with representatives of some of the smaller states had come to my mind as Sawada had been talking to me. One was that they seemed to have made a very serious effort to be considerate and that the Japanese might have anticipated—and indeed from some of them I knew that they had anticipated—a [Page 439] much more final and definite declaration than the Committee of Nineteen had drafted. Another thought which came to my mind was that the representatives of the powers here, so far as I understand their position, felt that Japan itself had definitely prejudiced the case by according recognition to Manchukuo when the Lytton Commission was still at work. These states had felt that they merely equalized the situation by stating their views now. In other words, these states were making an endeavor not to allow the situation to be prejudged rather than of trying to prejudge it themselves.
Sawada then brought up the statement that the Japanese have frequently made to the effect that if Japan were compelled to vote against a resolution of the character now submitted by the Committee of Nineteen they might have to leave the League because public opinion in their country would be so inflamed. Sawada said that after all what concerned moderate, level-headed people in Japan was rather the relationship between the United States and Japan than the relationship between Japan and the League of Nations. The United States is not in the League of Nations. If Japan has to withdraw it will merely be in the same position as the United States as regards the League of Nations.
But Sawada wondered whether members of the League had appreciated the consequences which might occur to the League through Japanese withdrawal. I said that while it did not become a representative of a nonmember state to speak for the League, perhaps on account of our mutual commissions some of its members had talked to me more freely than to him. From these conversations and from general information it seemed fair to conclude that in the minds of the small states the League is their guarantee of security and peace. For many of them the Covenant is part and parcel of the same treaty which provides for their frontiers and their very national existence. While the small powers would regret the departure of Japan because they like the idea of the League’s universality, yet if it should come to a show-down they would rather see the Covenant of the League in the full meaning of those words maintained intact than they would to maintain Japanese membership in the League, useful as that membership had been. I repeated, in conclusion, that this was merely my own impression gathered from what had come my way during the past months and which I offered to him personally for whatever it might be worth.