Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1932, General, Volume I

500.A15A4/1149

Memorandum by Mr. Norman H. Davis of a Conversation With M. Edouard Herriot ¹²

[Geneva,] May 22, 1932.

M. Herriot received us in the Restaurant Carrilon at Lyons today for lunch.

Concerning Internal Politics he said that he could not tell yet what the basis would be for his Cabinet, because that was still dependent on whether the Socialists formulated or reiterated certain demands which they now seemed to be making upon him as a price of their participation. M. Herriot might be willing to make large foreign concessions, but he would not pledge himself in advance to a twenty-five per cent reduction in the military budget until he had examined the thing and was satisfied that that was practical and safe. He had tried working with the Socialists in 1924 and felt that sometimes the price to be paid for their participation was too high.

M. Herriot raised the question that has so often been put by prominent French politicians—“What is the cause of the hostility in the American press towards France?” Mr. Davis replied that when the first struggle in 1919 became evident between President Wilson and M. Clemenceau, the French press began to slam Mr. Wilson. The American press retaliated. Then followed the battle for the ratification of the Versailles Treaty and the Presidential election, in which all those who were against the Treaty poured oil on the fire of reproaches against the French. Then rose the question of the debts and France’s failure to give any evidence of an appreciation of what we had done and her apparent reluctance to pay her obligations. Then came the attitude of France towards coupling debts and reparations together, as if they were on the same basis and the failure to receive payment from Germany warranted France in disregarding her obligation towards the United States. Then there was the general impression that France had been an obstacle to nearly every endeavor to reestablish normal conditions in Europe, that it was militaristic and insisted upon a dominating place on the Continent. Mr. Davis explained that many reasonable and thoughtful people realized that not all of these charges were grounded, but M. Herriot had asked for a frank statement and this was his view.

M. Herriot replied at length in seriatim. He said that foreigners were often misled by the Parisian press into thinking that that press reflected the attitude of France. This was not so, as the recent elections had shown. “Mr. Wilson remains an infinitely greater figure in the eyes of the common people of France than M. Clemenceau; indeed, the municipality of Lyons has just erected a beautiful new bridge called the ‘Wilson Bridge,’ while not even a street is named after Clemenceau.”

Concerning debts, he stated that he had voted against the ratification of the debt agreement with the United States unless it was accompanied by a safe-guard clause providing for its nonfulfilment in case Germany defaulted; nevertheless, the agreement was ratified without the safe-guard clause and was the law of France. When, therefore, people told him that if Germany defaulted France would have to default to us, Herriot has always replied that that is not true, that the two obligations are separate and distinct and that France as an honorable debtor is morally bound to the United States under its contract. He will continue to preach this doctrine, and has always deplored the contrary one.

Concerning reparations he believed the German contention that they would not pay further reparations was an unmoral one; that she did not recognize the sanctity of the obligation they had repeatedly undertaken; that France had a just and righteous claim for the restoration of her devastated regions. He (M. Herriot) from his own personal opinion, would be willing to have the question examined by neutrals as to whether what Germany had paid covered the devasted regions. What he could not admit, however, was the iniquity of Germany signing a series of documents and then coolly repudiating them.

I shall group under one paragraph a subject which repeatedly came up in this conversation, namely, that Herriot was deeply under the impression of the Stresemann letters recently published in the Illustration. He used such phrases as “Briand’s body is not yet cold before they lay on his tomb the Stresemann insults!” He went at length into his own experience with Stresemann in London. He told us how, when arrangements had been made for Chancellor Marx and himself to meet, Stresemann attended the conference instead of Marx, and that he (Herriot) had not been at all responsive because of this. He had never liked the man, but had said nothing of his feeling because he had judged that he was really and sincerely working with Briand for the restoration of better conditions. This led us into a discussion of an appreciation of German character. Mr. Davis offered the view that the French would have to study with the utmost care what concessions they could make to persuade the mass of German people, who after all desire to live in peace, that France is disposed to treat them fairly, and at the same time avoid offering concessions that would make the Germans think they had France on the run and could ask for anything. M. Herriot said that the German always regarded the man he was dealing with either as a master or servant; that they still thought in public affairs along the lines of the Bismarck school; that it is extraordinarily difficult to deal with people in whom you could not have confidence. He pointed out that they had evacuated the Ruhr, that they had evacuated the Rhineland, that they had agreed to the Dawes plan¹³ and the Young plan,¹⁴ and he was convinced that the Germans on signing the Armistice said, “Now let’s wipe all this out as soon as possible and get rid of them one by one[”]; as soon as reparations are settled the Germans will then turn to the Polish corridor, thence to Danzig, and then to the colonies, etc. M. Herriot informed Mr. Davis confidentially that he had reached a month ago the conclusion that the Germans intended to pay no more, because they were backed by the British in their desire to sponge off the account; he had even heard that the British were saying that such was the desire of America. Mr. Davis said that he, having been informed that the British Government favored cancellation of reparations partly on the ground that this would be pleasing to the United States, had reported this to Mr. Stimson who had subsequently seen Mr. MacDonald and told him that while this was not a question in which the United States could have an official view, that his own opinion was that there was no reason why Germany should be entirely released from her obligations, and that Germany as well as the rest of the world must contribute towards the restoration of normal conditions. Mr. MacDonald had subsequently informed Mr. Davis that he thought this view was reasonable, but Mr. Davis issued the caution that English financial interests took the contrary view and it must not be supposed that Mr. MacDonald would necessarily hold to this conviction.

M. Herriot said that neither debts nor reparations were in his opinion the fundamental difficulty, that those were matters of material fact and could be dealt with and negotiated as could any other material fact; the fundamental difficulty was how could an arrangement be drawn with a country in which you could not place trust. Mr. Davis agreed that it was extremely difficult, but pointed out that the apparently insurmountable nature of the difficulties with which we were confronted made it the more imperative to attack them with determination and sincerity; that just because these difficulties were so threatening the world had lost confidence; that the restoration of confidence was the most essential thing at the present moment; that any achievement towards the settlement of the reparations problem or in disarmament, even though partial, would bring about increased confidence and thus release credits and start the normal flow of trade. For all these results, in spite of the overwhelming nature of the difficulties, we all had to dedicate ourselves to the accomplishment of something real and tangible in the way of bringing peace to this continent and to the world.

Herriot said that he believed himself to be a man of liberal conceptions. He did not consider that a status quo was a rigid and fixed thing. He could even envisage the necessity for change in any treaties, including the Treaty of Versailles, provided such changes came about by peaceful and legitimate means. He could also envisage a change in the Covenant of the League of Nations, especially in the direction of a more democratic interpretation to that document, perhaps by rewriting Article 19, but all such changes presuppose the existence of a court to which appeal can be made. Just as in civil life contracts may legally under certain circumstances be voided, entered into and terminated, only because a court is in existence to which appeal can be made in case of injustice, so in international life must there be a court to which similar appeal can be made in case an injustice is claimed or contemplated.

M. Herriot said that there were really only three nations in the world which could sit down and talk to each other as we were now talking, namely, the United States, England and France, because they had mutual trust and respect, and this made it essential that these three nations should consult frequently and frankly and work together for restoration. In disarmament, for instance, nothing was more clear to him or seemed more vital to him, than that these three nations should stand shoulder to shoulder for real accomplishment. Both Davis and Wilson assured M. Herriot that no wish was dearer to them, and that indeed for the past months we had taken few steps, indeed no steps of any importance, without collaboration of the most intimate kind with the French Delegation. Wilson then added that as the Navies were important in our considerations, and as the failure of the French and Italians to complete their agreements had paralyzed all further efforts along the lines of the Navy, it was very much to be hoped that the accord could be completed so that this point (not to us of the highest importance directly) should be eliminated and there would be nothing left to prevent our working in the closest harmony of purpose. Wilson added that it had always seemed easy to win the friendship of Italy, that he made this statement with some diffidence, as it was not strictly speaking his affair, but that it did seem that France had very little in the way of concessions to make to turn Italy from an extremely doubtful neighbor to a friendly one. M. Herriot laughed and said “the trouble is you will find Italy on the opposite side in war from that which she takes in peace.” He went on to say that Italy was like a somewhat difficult woman—you might gain her good will for a short period by giving her a gown or a jewel. He did not know how negotiations had progressed between France and Italy. Both Davis and Wilson stated that it was their understanding that very little stood between them, and that indeed it looked as if the item of the interdepend-ability of armaments was the one thing which had prevented the concluding of an accord before this time. M. Herriot said he would bear this matter in mind.

Continuing the subject of disarmament, he asked for views as to the state of affairs and what might be done. We then sketched briefly certain things that might be possible of immediate achievement, such as an agreement to abolish big movable guns, to cut effectives, and agreement to abolish bombing planes and submarines—at least large ones, one on gas, tanks, all of which should be reflected in reduction of expenditure. We asked M. Herriot what would be his view as to the advisability of bending all energy on the achievement of limited objectives such as these, writing a treaty during the summer on this basis in order to give an immediate spur to world confidence, and leave the balance of the disarmament question for discussion some months later, after tangible proof had been given that a measure of disarmament was possible. M. Herriot replied that he must make all reserve on the question until he had studied the matter more thoroughly, as he did not yet know what was possible, nevertheless the idea was sympathetic to him.

Mr. Davis then told M. Herriot that work had been continuing for some time with the French General Staff on the matter of the effectives, and asked whether M. Herriot would have any objection to our continuing such work, and indeed whether it might not be possible in the near future, and even before M. Herriot took over, to discuss in General Commission certain technical problems with which the General Staff had expressed already a certain sympathy. M. Herriot replied that in confidence he had been requested to proceed to Paris on Tuesday next, the 24th of May, and at that time he would go over some questions with Tardieu and while he had no constitutional power Tardieu would perform the acts with his acquiescence, which ought to enable us to proceed along the lines suggested.

Mr. Davis then told about the conversations at Bessinge, that he had subsequently gone with Gibson to London, that they had returned and seen Tardieu in Paris and that the latter had stated that he thought M. Herriot would perhaps form a Left Government, but that nevertheless M. Herriot and he were not so far apart on foreign affairs and he believed they could proceed shoulder to shoulder on these questions.

Mr. Davis then spoke of the tremendous responsibility which confronted M. Herriot, and the great opportunity which he had of giving a decisive turn for the better to world affairs, stating that he was thankful that two such men as MacDonald and Herriot, both knowing and appreciating each other, could now work together in this sense. M. Herriot replied that it was indeed a heavy responsibility, and that he counted on the closest co-operation between the British, French and ourselves; that he hoped we would deal with him in all frankness, criticise him when necessary, and that he himself would take the same line with us; that we must have repeated conversations of this nature and keep in the closest contact.

Mr. Davis then asked M. Herriot if he might raise a suggestion, and perhaps if M. Herriot thought well of it, convey the suggestion to Mr. MacDonald, namely, that those two should come to Geneva for a few days before the Lausanne Conference to give the necessary impetus to the work of the Disarmament Conference, since it was vital that this definite spur be given in the near future. M. Herriot replied that the only difficulty was the calendar. He doubted whether he could get a vote of confidence before the 10th or 12th of June, that after that if things went well he would be entirely disposed to come to Geneva for this purpose, and indeed recognized the importance of doing so. He further said it might be well to contemplate the adjournment of the Lausanne Conference for a few days if necessary to render this possible: We both expressed great gratification at this decision.

I neglected to state above that Mr. Davis informed M. Herriot of the conversations with Mr. Bruening, in which Mr. MacDonald was emphatic on the question that no new German competition in armaments could be envisaged and that equality of armament could not now be considered. In the same conversation the idea was proposed and discussed sympathetically by Bruening of writing the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles in the new disarmament treaty with a foot-note to the effect that Germany voluntarily accepted this obligation.

Mr. Davis, returning to the subject of the Far East, said that the American public some time ago had had the impression that the French Government was sympathetic to Japan in the Sino-Japanese dispute, and that there existed some secret agreement between France and Japan which gave the latter a free hand in this matter, and indeed a certain reluctance on the part of France to take determined steps in the early part of the proceedings gave color to this belief. Herriot interrupted to state that such had never been the desire of the parties of the Left, and that no agreement existed. Mr. Davis continued by stating that we in Geneva who had followed the matter closely, realized that to a large extent this impression in America was erroneous, and we knew that Mr. Paul-Boncour had been trying earnestly to get something done. He continued that the hope of getting a satisfactory solution of this matter lay in united action on the part of Great Britain, England [sic] and France, and that such unity of purpose was indispensable. It was essential for the preservation of the entire structure of peace which had been so laboriously worked since the war, that no one nation should destroy any portion of this structure. It was even important to the preservation of the Covenant and the peace structure of Europe that no precedent of violation should be admitted in the Far East. Mr. Herriot was entirely of this opinion and assured us that such was his conviction.

Summarizing, I received certain definite impressions:

(1) Herriot is convinced that Great Britain, France and ourselves must work together in the frankest and friendliest way;

(2) That he himself is really determined and has the real intention of trying to perform some tangible piece of work in the near future;

(3) That he is deeply under the impression of the Stresemann letters, and is in the depth of disillusionment in regard to Germany;

(4) That in this state of mind any accord with Germany will have to be worked out with a great deal of Anglo-Saxon help.

12. Hugh Wilson, another member of the American delegation, was also present.

    Transmitted to the Secretary of State under cover of a memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Boal), June 8. A telegraphic report was sent to the Department in telegram No. 198, May 23, 8 p.m. (not printed).

13. See Foreign Relations, 1924, vol. ii, pp. 1–139.
14. See ibid., 1929, vol. ii, pp. 1025–1083.