500.A15A4/1356: Telegram
The Acting Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 21—11:27 p.m.]
359. Our 353, July 20, 11 p.m.58 Davis and I had a talk with Nadolny today and told him that we were really worried about his statement that he would vote against the resolution unless it contained a definite recognition of the principle of equality of rights which he also informed us the French had refused to concede. We told him that we felt a most unfortunate impression would be created all over the world, if, after demanding general disarmament ever since the war, Germany took the first occasion when there was a definite move in that direction to prevent progress; that as regards feeling in America the present resolution was so tied up with the President’s plan that the impression would clearly be that Germany had chosen the first moment of hopefulness to torpedo the President’s plan. We said we felt it would be disastrous from the German point of view and that before acting on his instructions he really ought to consult Neurath further and at least limit himself to making a reservation as to the question of equality of rights just as the French felt they were already doing in the provision in the draft resolution that all political questions were reserved. We told him that we had talked this matter over with Herriot who had shown an extremely reasonable attitude and had said that in the interest of agreement he had withdrawn any demand that the French plan for security and an international force be considered as a condition precedent to disarmament and that he felt that in view of this Germany would be warranted in withholding her claim to equality of rights both of them reserving the privilege of bringing forward their views when they could judge as to the value of the treaty to be concluded and the progress made in disarmament.
In conclusion I told him that during the first 2 years of the war I had on a number of occasions pointed out to the German authorities in Belgium where they were taking a course that would have a deplorable effect on public opinion; that on each occasion they had scoffed at this and later had admitted that I had given them sound advice. I then said that on this occasion I had no hesitation in saying that if the adoption of the resolution was rendered impossible by the action of Germany they would be making a tragic mistake.
Nadolny said he would communicate further with Neurath and see what could be done. He was, however, not encouraging.
- Not printed.↩