500.A15A4/1266
Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation32
Gibson : Hello, Mr. Secretary, this is Gibson. For the last three days we have been told of this statement that Baldwin is telling today in the House of Commons and, after putting us off on one pretext or another, we have just been handed a copy of it.33 It begins with a good deal of very friendly comment on the plan in general. The land part is all right. The part on air armaments is unsatisfactory [Page 273] but it is not sufficiently important to bother you with now. Now we come to the naval business which is really dreadful. That proposes for immediate adoption by international agreement the following proposal relating to the Navy [1] to reduce the maximum size of any future capital ship to 22 thousand tons and maximum caliber of guns to 11 inches; (2) to reduce maximum tonnage of cruisers hereafter constructed to 7 thousand tons and maximum caliber of guns to 6.1 inches; (3) if international agreement on point (2) cannot be secured, the Government of the United Kingdom would still urge that the maximum size of capital ships be reduced to 25 thousand tons and the guns to 12 inches as a maximum; (4) reduces the maximum for aircraft carriers to 22 thousand tons with 6.1 inch guns. (5) abolishes submarines; (6) reduces destroyer tonnage by approximately one-third depending on the abolition of submarines; (7) if submarines cannot be completely abolished, their maximum is 250 tons with a strict limitation both of total tonnage and also the number of units. Now we had considerable argument on that. The most striking thing is that their plan is a greater tonnage reduction than that suggested by the President because it will completely rebuild the fleets of the world. That is going to be released at four o’clock here, that is in a few minutes.
Norman Davis called up Simon on the telephone and told him Ave were very unhappy about this as it showed that there was no express desire to get together with us merely a counter-plan—a rival plan to that of the President without any expression of desire to sit down with us and reach an agreement. He said that this would seem pretty well to nullify the value of the resolution we are working on together but it is too late to change the thing now but Simon in transmitting a copy of it says he will put in his letter a statement that this is a statement of his views, but of course they want to sit down with all powers and work out an agreement but that is all they have been able to do about it so far.
Now, Mr. Secretary, what line do you want us to take with the press. Do you want us to try to deal with the argument or minimize the significance of this and express confidence in trying to get together.
Secretary: I should think something of the latter point. I should take the latter course as far as possible. Of course this proposition is, on its face, quite impossible at once. You see what I mean?
Gibson : There is no immediate relief in it at all.
Secretary: No, it involves an enormous expense.
Gibson : It means completely rebuilding all existing fleets.
Secretary: Yes, and that means that it cannot take place for a [Page 274] great many years anyhow. Therefore, it cannot be understood as an immediate practical proposition.
Gibson : Exactly.
Secretary: Nobody is going to rebuild their fleet at this stage of the world. They are going to hang on to their fleets as long as possible.
Gibson : I think we can take a line based on that but, in the meantime, we hope to press for some immediate relief.
Secretary: Yes. Now let me ask you a question. They do not make any cut in the number of the battleship unit?
Gibson : No, they don’t suggest any reduction in the numbers anywhere.
Secretary: What do they do with gross tonnage?
Gibson : They don’t mention it. By rebuilding everything, they will effect a total tonnage reduction similar to that suggested by the President. That is rather humbug.
Secretary: Of course, that is really not practical at all. Well, I think you have got as good an idea of how to handle it as we could suggest to you. Treat it in a friendly way so far as possible, but of course do not prevent any newspaper people from knowing its limitations.
Gibson : We will express confidence in our ability to work together for some more immediate relief and give some consideration to the fact that we are not ready to comment on the British proposal for later relief.
Secretary: After all, we must remember that they have a right to their own views about a navy as much as we have. We put out our views without consulting them and they are doing the same thing by putting their views out now.
Gibson : In responsible quarters in England there are a great many people who are getting together on the basis of the President’s plan and there has been a great deal of attack on this general British conception of reducing unit size, but I think they will have to moderate that very shortly.
Secretary: We will find that out.
Gibson : Do you wish me to give any message to the Prime Minister?
Secretary: No, except that you can say to him that he knows my views already about the necessities of our American Navy so well that it is unnecessary for me to restate them to him.
Gibson : How would it do to suggest to him also that you hope very much that he will avoid having any position taken which will prevent our sitting down and ironing out our different points of views?
[Page 275]Secretary: In my opinion, it would be quite impossible for us to undertake to do this properly at any time, certainly now.
Gibson : Yes, I agree with you.
Secretary: In so far as ultimate battleship size, it is not impossible that we might come down somewhat, as you know, but not as far as even their second suggestion.
Gibson : We haven’t got our minds closed on the whole subject. I think that is a good deal to give them.
Secretary: We feel in frankness, it is necessary to point out that on the cruiser radius which they necessarily impose, they strike right at the heart of American policy.
Gibson : Norman Davis has just returned from talking to Simon on the telephone and I will have him report to you about it.
Secretary: All right.
Davis : I told him that it seemed to me, personally, an unsatisfactory way to approach it and he said that made him quite upset because that was the last thing in the world that he wanted to do. He said it was too late to change that statement, in fact he couldn’t do it. He said that the Minister for Foreign Affairs can make a statement in his letter to Henderson circulating this statement from Mr. Baldwin and he is prepared to put in his letter the following, written by us:
“The document which I am circulating contains the views of my Government on various types of armaments and on the points in which it represents a divergence from the proposals of the American Government. We are, nevertheless, prepared to discuss in friendly fashion the methods of reconciling these differences and obtaining our common purposes of effecting a further substantial reduction in armaments.”
Secretary: Well, that is all right, I guess that is as good as you can do.
Davis : What he just said to me is this:
“Now look here, it hasn’t occurred to us that Mr. Baldwin did not bring out clearly the fact that while this was the British point of view, the way in which they would like to approach this problem was to reconcile the views between the two Governments and they feel satisfied that by the proper spirit and good-will which prevails between the two Governments, they could do so.”
But it appears to me now that this is decidedly the spirit of the whole Cabinet and he thinks it would be unfortunate if the impression should be given to our newspapers that this is anything except a friendly action on their part because it might make it more difficult and he is very anxious for us not to allow the wrong impression to get over because they are quite disturbed now about it, just as we are, [Page 276] and they say they have given us every assurance that this is no rival plan and that the object is that we will get together. That is about all.
Secretary: Yes, I see. All right, I think you have the right line of handling it there. We will have a little more difficulty here.
Davis : Yes, I am afraid you will. I think you are going to have more trouble in our own country from all we can hear. It is not going to help them. I think it is going to make our plan stand out in wonderful relief.
Secretary: I think a good deal of background talk may come out from over here because every newspaper man now knows enough to work out the impossibilities of their plan as a practical proposition.
Davis : Of course, there is no immediate relief in their plan and we are not happy over it at all.
Secretary: What I mean is, this is so impractical that it is going to assume the appearance of an entirely future and theoretical proposition rather than a practical one and, therefore, it may not look quite as bad as if it had been put out as an immediate counter-plan to ours.
Davis : That is perfectly true. It is an excellent point. There is one answer he gave me, when I said it looked to me as if they were upholding the Japanese point of view instead of ours; he said, “we don’t mean that at all, because as a matter of fact, we are not proposing to do anything right now.”
Secretary: I don’t quite follow you there, but this plan of the British will be looked at just as an aspiration rather than an immediate proposal.
Davis : That is right; that is an excellent point. I think that is the way to deal with this. He said it does not conflict with ours because ours is for something now and their plan is for the future. But what he really had been intending to say is that the British would have preferred to approach this from our point of view but, as our proposal was out, they naturally had to recognize that and tried to fit in with it in some way. If the wrong impression got out to the press, he said we could depend upon him and MacDonald to do everything possible because it is their most earnest desire to go right along with us.
Secretary: All right. I am glad to know he feels so but it does not make it any easier.
Davis, I said to Gibson and I am not sure that he heard me, this fact: the British proposal both in battleships and in cruisers strikes at the heart of our naval needs because it, in both cases, limits the cruising radius.
[Page 277]Davis : I understand and quite agree with you.
Secretary: That is the whole trouble and it is particularly important now in the present situation in the Pacific.
Davis : That is right. I told him that in effect, but he said, “Goodness, we are not doing anything right now, it is something for the future.”
Secretary: That is what I say. It is merely a British aspiration.
Davis : They have been embarrassed and they are trying to run to cover and I am afraid they are going to be more embarrassed than ever as a result.
Secretary: I will have to reflect over that. That is enough for one morning.
Davis : We are going up to the meeting of the General Commission now. Good-by.
Secretary: Good-by.