500.A15A4/1127: Telegram
The Acting Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 15—11:42 p.m.]
253. In conversation today Boncour gave Davis his ideas as to future procedure of Conference and matters susceptible of being immediately considered.
As to procedure he agreed that informal conversations be resumed on Monday44 on his return from Paris between the British, French and American delegations and broadened as soon as possible to include Germany and Italy.
He indicated readiness to consider the suppression of certain aggressive weapons mentioning heavy artillery and heavy tanks. Suppression of heavy artillery he indicated might necessitate some provision with respect to large guns on battleships. Further he suggested that heavy bombardment planes might be abolished but opposed the idea of abolition of aerial bombardment directed against purely military objectives, he advocated total abolition of gas and bacteriological warfare.
Foregoing restrictions on certain types of arms should be supplemented by corresponding limitation of expenditure.
He suggested that certain suppressions might be gradually effected by allowing existing material to become obsolete rather than by immediate destruction, since existing army formations were organized with certain material and its destruction would necessitate costly army equipment.
[Page 176]While admitting this possibility of suppressing certain aggressive arms, he stated that France still considered that her thesis of placing these arms at the disposition of the League was the proper solution, and that they proposed to advance and support this position. However, if it was rejected they would not close the door to certain measures of suppression. Davis made it entirely clear that we were disinterested as to any plan with respect to internationalization or the formation of an international armed force which the members of the League might agree upon as among themselves and Boncour said that he quite understood our position.
Regarding effectives Boncour stated that as Minister of War he could not today assume the responsibility for accepting a reduction in the French Army. Pie emphasized, however, that this did not preclude action after the question had been studied in further detail. His objection was not to our proposed formula for effectives; it was due to the fact that a reduction in effectives would require a reorganization of the French Army which would take time. He stressed the fact that France since 1921 had reduced the period of service from 3 to 1 year thereby reducing the conscript effectives maintained under arms to 220,000. Any further reduction would presumably be effected through further cutting the period of service. He stressed that soldiers called to the colors were only of real value after their first 6 months of training and that hence the effective size of the French conscript army apart from its permanent and colonial forces was only around 110,000 men and that as Minister of War he could not now assume the responsibility of further reductions. He said that he was endeavoring to find some method for filling the gaps which would be caused in a few years due to the low birth rate during the war. Davis stressed the fact that failure to bring about any reduction in effectives would have most unfortunate effect upon public opinion; that Boncour’s own statement showed that the number of effectives which would be available for the coming years would be substantially less than the present contingent and that if the treaty only gave effect to these inevitable reductions the popular reaction would be very different. He further pointed out that the elimination of certain so-called aggressive arms would seem [mean?] that countries like the United States and Great Britain, which had already accepted far reaching naval limitation, would be called upon to bear a disproportionate share of the reductions and that it was only through some contribution by the land powers with respect to their effectives that political appeasement in Europe could be hastened.
Boncour, with evident earnestness, stated his difficulty was that he could not say today or even within a few weeks exactly what he could [Page 177] do with respect to effectives; possibly within 6 months he could do so. His idea was that, after drawing up as promptly as possible a treaty covering certain arms budgetary limitation, et cetera, as suggested above, the Conference should adjourn and a committee could be set up to consider the means of bringing about the limitation of effectives.
Davis suggested as one of the important results which should come from the Conference, the completion of the London agreement45 by France and Italy, to which Boncour raised no specific objection but was rather noncommittal.