793.94/2864: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

792. From Ambassador Dawes: The substance of your 589, November 23, 6 p.m., I have communicated to Sze. He is telegraphing his [Page 553] Government about your attitude as I explained it, stating it in these words:88

“We have been given to understand by Ambassador Dawes that the attitude the United States at this juncture with particular reference to the proposal of a commission of inquiry is this. The United States is inclined to welcome the fundamental idea of the League draft resolution as embodying a very important principle of future utility. If such a principle is now laid down it would be the first time that the underlying idea of conciliation treaties known to the Western World has been recognized in international relations in the Far East.

In essence the proposal contemplates a neutral commission which would lay the basis for ultimate negotiations between the interested parties themselves leading to an adjustment of all their differences and the establishment of permanent peace between them. In this sense the resolution is commendable.

Construing the resolution by its four corners and referring particularly to the reaffirmation of the Council’s previous resolution of September 30, it means (first) the cessation of hostilities and (second) the withdrawal of the Japanese forces as speedily as possible. When the commission of inquiry reports or possibly at any time the ground would be prepared for negotiations between the two parties. There would be a better chance for successful negotiations in the light of the report of the committee on inquiry than without it. It is believed in these circumstances the element of military pressure leading to the imposition of unfair terms would be less operative. On the whole the resolution is regarded as perhaps the most effective solution that can be practically arrived at in present circumstances; and carries with it a great presumption in its favor so as to involve serious responsibility in its rejection.

With regard to the counterproposal of China the United States unhesitatingly states that even from the point of view of China’s own interest it is not considered that this proposal is as effective as the one which in substance has been reached by the Council. Moreover, several provisions in the counterproposal strike the United States as entirely impracticable.”

In addition, Sze asks his Government if it wishes, in view of this American attitude, to change its instructions that he file his former proposal, transmitted by Minister Johnson to you. Sze also recommends to his Government the elimination of references to the United States in the event Nanking still desires this former proposal to be filed by him. He says he will let me know when he receives his Government’s reply.

In regard to your sentence “The ultimate settlement of this problem must be reached by negotiations between China and Japan”, Sze wished me to say to you that he believes there could be no ultimate settlement unless the negotiations between China and Japan were conducted in the presence of neutral observers, as at the Washington Conference conversations on Shantung.

[Page 554]

Now I interpolate a report on what I have done regarding a call from Sweetser who came while this telegram was in preparation, and thereafter I will indicate the reasons for my message to Briand. Sweetser said that before the Council this morning Briand suggested it would be a useful contribution for the United States to reveal its attitude on the draft proposal and, if it were approved, to inform the Chinese and Japanese accordingly. Briand stated also that he hesitated to request the American representative to see him until the Council had some decision and that perhaps the best course would be to have Drummond try to see the American representative this afternoon in order to ascertain whether he were able at this decisive moment to lend any assistance or cooperation. So I sent, confidentially by Sweetser, to Briand the following suggestions:89

  • “(1) The United States is active with the parties.
  • (2) Will gladly come to see Briand when answer to Sze’s despatch is received by the Council which will be some time tomorrow. Parenthetically, Sze has informed the League that he has sent cables to his Government on the situation to which he expects an answer tomorrow.
  • (3) Mr. Dawes feels that the United States is not able to express an opinion respecting the negotiations of the Council until the text of the resolution is at least published.”

You say in your 589: “When you have discussed the foregoing with Sze and have had his reaction to it, you may then, in your discretion, inform Briand that the Council’s proposal has been considered by this Government”, etc. I consider it to be absolutely essential, as was suggested in your telephone message, to permit no public reference to the United States’ cooperative attitude and action in this matter pending publication of the League’s proposed resolution. Under the League’s normal procedure, the resolution cannot be valid before it is presented at a Council meeting and is there agreed to by both China and Japan. If prior to publication of the resolution I should inform Briand of the American demands and action, he would inevitably use this information, in spite of anything I might say, in continuing his efforts to bring the two parties together, and this cannot be effective unless their former attitude, as expressed to Briand by the Chinese and Japanese, has been changed by your messages from Washington to them. This fact, together with a total lack of effective protection from publicity in confidential League meetings, might mean then that the press would represent the United States as engaging in the League’s discussions of plans to apply the League’s own machinery. Again, I want to be certain that, in connection with this particular resolution’s presentation, the Council members are agreed among themselves.

[Page 555]

While Briand favors continuing conciliatory negotiations with the two parties, Simon stands for the League’s closing the whole business this week at a public meeting, for which he is, I understand, preparing a statement. Therefore, if the attitude and action of the United States should become public prior to publication of an agreed-upon resolution, the United States might be represented not only as taking part in a matter involving application of League machinery, but as taking a position on the question of applicability, upon which even the members of the Council are not yet agreed.

At this stage, when some time will elapse until China’s reply to Sze’s telegram arrives, I am turning over in my mind at the moment the following: As Council President, Briand may perhaps be able to give to the press, well in advance of the Council’s public meeting, the text of the agreed-upon resolution to be presented by him for consideration. If so, then you or I, as you prefer, might make a statement regarding the favorable attitude of the United States in principle to the method which the resolution recommends. I reflect, on the other hand, that it is possible the Japanese will neither stop their march toward Chinchow nor withdraw from Tsitsihar; that it is problematical if Japan will agree to the resolution; that it is also possible, as Sze says, that if the Nanking Government does agree, it will collapse, with chaos resulting in China; and therefore that it is possible the negotiations of the League may by tomorrow have gone for naught, with its further deliberations ceasing to have immediate, practical interest for the world.

In this event should the United States, after doing everything possible independently by positive act and attitude to bring success to the League’s negotiations, advertise publicly its participation in the failure of the League, tending thus to lessen the prestige derived from the independent American position? Since there remains at least until tomorrow morning for consideration of this question, may I have your comments? If they do not reach me, I shall use my discretion, as your telegram suggests. At present my inclination, unless you instruct me otherwise and subject to changes occurring hourly in this situation, is to leave in abeyance this matter of publishing the nature of American cooperation with the League until Sze has received Nanking’s answer.

I shall promptly telegraph you when it is decided whether the Council resolution will be published or not. If published, I assume you will yourself make the statement from Washington of the attitude of the United States to it or, if you wish me to make a statement, you will furnish me with suggestions in regard thereto. [Dawes.]

Shaw
  1. Telegram in five sections.
  2. Quotation not paraphrased.
  3. Pars. (1) and (2) not paraphrased.