793.94/2697: Telegram
The Minister in China (Johnson) to
the Secretary of State
Peiping, November 16, 1931—11
a.m.
[Received November 16—4
a.m.]
944. [From Engert.] Following has been received from the Minister at
Nanking for transmission to the Department:
“November 15, 3 p.m. Please send following to Department:
- ‘1. I find no evidence in any of the reports
reaching me from Tientsin, Mukden, Harbin or
Tsitsihar, of any intention on the part of the
Japanese to withdraw from the stand which they have
taken in Manchuria.
- 2. On the contrary, all information reaching me up
to the present indicates that the Japanese are
continuing their efforts, evidently studied,
completely to destroy the prestige of Chang
Hsueh-liang (and this means that [of] the Nanking
Government with which he has closely cooperated) in
Manchuria. These efforts now extend to the ousting
of representatives of his control in Tsitsihar and
Tientsin.
- 3. So thorough has this effort of the Japanese
been that I am convinced that it would be impossible
for Chang Hsueh-liang to reestablish his control of
Manchuria either by himself or with outside aid.
This applies equally to the establishment of the
authority of the Nanking Government for it has no
one to put in Chang’s place.
- 4. All of which lends color to the growing belief
that Japan intends to create a situation in
Manchuria which will make it possible for the
setting up of a puppet government, nominally
independent but actually under and subservient to
Japanese control similar to that which Soviet Russia
has established in Mongolia.
- 5. Chinese people looked upon Manchuria as part of
China. Even C. C. Wu and Eugene Chen,26 with whom I talked in Shanghai,
and who expressed themselves as believing that
direct negotiations and a settlement with Japan were
possible, insisted vehemently that China could never
concede Manchuria to Japan nor could a Chinese
Government ever concede the validity of the 1915
treaties.
- 6. It is therefore difficult here to see how
League can find a settlement of the issues between
China and Japan that will be a settlement and at the
same time satisfactory to both.
- 7. I find an increasing feeling of pessimism over
the situation here.
- 8. China has placed all of her reliance upon
League action. What
[Page 452]
will happen when the League
fails to provide a solution of the problem
satisfactory to the Chinese is a matter for
pessimistic speculation. It is generally felt here
that the authorities cannot much longer hold the
people in check. The prestige of the Government is
suffering and it is generally believed that when it
is realized that the League can do nothing to stop
Japanese aggression the people will take matters
into their own hands. I am convinced that this will
result in chaotical conditions throughout the whole
country.
- 9. I assume that there is no way of bringing home
to the Japanese Government a sense of their
responsibility for such a situation so fraught with
danger to the interests of everyone.[’]”
Repeated to commander in chief.
[For the Minister:]
Engert
