760C.6215/555
The Ambassador in Poland (Willys) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 30.]
Sir: Confirming my telegram No. 105 of October 15, 6 P.M. I have the honor to report that much concern is felt by the Polish Government over the attitude of the American press in respect of Polish-German frontiers. Recent articles in the Baltimore Sun, the Washington Star and the New York Times, have particularly wounded Polish sensibilities.
In conversation with M. Lipski, Acting Polish Director of the Foreign Office (he discussed the matter with me on behalf of M. Zaleski, who is ill), I reminded him that there was no effective means [Page 598] in the United States of controlling expressions of opinion on the part of the press. Mr. Stimson, I continued, had, however, only recently informed press representatives at the Department of State that the question of Polish-German frontiers was a purely European problem, in which the American Government had no direct interest. I professed to be happy though to comply, for whatever purpose it might serve, with M. Zaleski’s request that I appeal to the Secretary for his intervention. I thereupon despatched the telegram referred to above.
The Polish Government is afraid that repercussions in the Polish press from American newspaper articles favoring the revisionist thesis, may have a disturbing effect on Polish public opinion.
The belief obtains in Poland that the United States is so concerned over the security of its financial commitment in Germany that American influence is being aligned on the side of the Reich as against Poland.
Press despatches from America reporting that conferences had taken place between the President, Secretary Stimson and the late Senator Morrow, in which the “Corridor” was discussed, were looked upon in Warsaw as confirmation of these forebodings.
The fact that adverse American publicity on the subject of the “Corridor” has so immediately preceded the departure for Washington of M. Laval, has also contributed to Polish preoccupation over this visit. It is obviously expected that the “Corridor” may form one of the subjects of conversation at Washington.
Polish reserve in respect of France’s policy and doubtless knowledge too that France would joyfully be rid of responsibility in respect of the Polish Western frontier, coupled with suspicion of the American attitude towards Germany, contribute to make Poland somewhat cautious in respect to what may take place in the United States in the course of the present Franco-American discussions.
Poland, however, doubtless maintains the hope that despite an obdurate attitude against any concession therefor, a political “detente” with Germany may eventually become possible. It is moreover, only natural that Polish policy will be directed to obviate all possible risk of a “bargain” for an Eastern “Locarno” or even a political truce being struck between France and Germany at Poland’s expense.
As political relaxation between Poland and Germany is so widely accepted as one of the primary requisites for any effective Franco-German cooperation, it is expected in Poland that in course of time France and perhaps also the United States will find it advisable for the general good to make such concessions to or exert such pressure on Germany as will eventually induce the Reich to accept a stabilization of the East without Poland’s being called upon to make any sacrifice.
The Polish attitude towards general European problems which concern both Poland and the former Associated and Allied Powers derives [Page 599] from the success with which Poland formulated its national aims during the Peace Conference, the ability with which Poland drew advantage from divergent French and British policies and the sanction which Poland was able to obtain in respect of the status of both Eastern Galicia and Vilno. Moreover, Poland takes pride in the fact that the national economy has been stabilized on such a low level that the country is practically immune from financial pressure from abroad. La faiblesse fait la force! Therefore, to induce Poland to yield, if only in respect of direct Reich–East Prussian communications, would require adroit manipulation and strong French pressure. Any change in cartographic coloration, with the possible exception of Danzig, would hardly be feasible in any contemplated compromise. Probably even an internationalization of the Danzig–Lauenburg railway would be denounced in Poland as another partition of the country.
For such interest as it may present, I may add that the new Italian Ambassador, Signor Vannutelli Rey, is devoting energy and attention to a study of the “Corridor” question.
In conversation with a member of the Embassy, he stressed the importance for the world in general and Franco-German relations in particular, of a solution of this problem. Signor Vannutelli Rey added that he had been assured on all sides that Poland would sacrifice its last drop of blood to defend the “Corridor” from any encroachment whatsoever. He quite accepted these protestations but only up to a certain point. Asked what this point was, he laconically replied: “Money”.
Respectfully yours,