500.A15a4/410
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Dawes) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 26.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s strictly confidential circular instruction of August 13, 1931 (500.A15a4/326),32 requesting confidential reports from time to time on any developments of interest relating to the disarmament problem in this country.
Since the date of the Department’s instruction a most serious financial crisis has broken upon Great Britain. The Labor Government has been superseded by a so-called “National” Government, formed to deal as swiftly as possible with the emergency and supported by the Conservative and Liberal Parties with but a mere handful of Labor Members of Parliament who remain loyal to Mr. MacDonald. The Ministers of the “National” Government have been drawn chiefly from the Conservative and Liberal Parties. The new “National” Cabinet which decides all questions of high policy is composed of four Laborites, four Conservatives and two Liberals. It includes Prime Minister MacDonald, the erstwhile leader of the Labor Party; Mr. Baldwin, the Conservative leader; and Sir Herbert Samuel, the acting head of the Liberal Party during the absence due to illness of Mr. Lloyd George. Mr. Arthur Henderson, the appointed President of the 1932 Disarmament Conference, has broken with his former chief, Mr. MacDonald, to become the leader of the Labor Party in opposition to the new Government. His place as Foreign Secretary has been taken by the Marquess of Heading, a Liberal, a former Viceroy of India, and former British Ambassador at Washington.
The hard facts responsible for Great Britain’s present financial and economic situation and for this almost overnight change of Government to handle it, are the sole preoccupation of all Englishmen today. Normally, the subject of disarmament would receive considerable favorable attention. At the present time, however, the questions dominating all else in this country are the maintenance of stability of sterling; the effect of the National Government’s stringent administrative economies and heavy taxation measures, including unemployment benefit (dole) cuts, to balance the Budget; the unfavorable trade balances and the necessity for the imposition of a tariff to remedy them; and the prospect of a general election.
With this background of the confused political situation here, it will be understood why the latest developments in the disarmament question, such as the recent speeches at Geneva of Signor Grandi, [Page 527] M. Briand and Herr Curtius, have not as yet evoked much comment. Indeed, the times are so pressing that Lord Reading could not attend the recent meeting of the League Assembly at Geneva, and Lord Cecil was left to speak for Great Britain on that occasion.
It goes without saying, however, that the success of the Disarmament Conference next year is of great importance to Great Britain, whichever political party or combination may be in power at that time. While no information is as yet available concerning the principal British delegates to the Disarmament Conference, it is certain that they will be prominent members of whatever Government is in power at that time, some of them undoubtedly of Cabinet rank. The civilian branch of the Government is likely to dominate in appointing and preparing instructions for the British delegation. The continuity of British policy regarding disarmament has been maintained in a measure by the continuance of Lord Cecil as the British spokesman at Geneva. Lord Cecil, whose zeal for the cause is well known, has represented Great Britain in the disarmament discussions there during a Conservative, a Labor and now a “National” Government.
The National Government has announced that it was definitely opposed to any postponement of the date of the Conference, and that it was keeping in close touch with Lord Cecil regarding the resolution submitted to the Assembly by the delegations of Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland,33 following Signor Grandi’s speech on September 8,34 calling upon Governments to abstain, pending the result of the Conference, from any measures leading to an increase in the present level of their armaments. So far as an earnest of British interest in the disarmament problem is concerned, the results of the London Naval Conference and the subsequent Anglo-French-Italian naval negotiations, so patiently conducted under the auspices of the late Labor Government, have been approved by the Conservative and Liberal parties and supported by the country at large.
But it is a conviction common to most Englishmen that Great Britain has now reduced her own armaments to a point beyond which she cannot go unless further disarmament is accompanied by equal and concurrent reduction on the part of other nations. She believes she has already contributed amply to naval reduction. Mr. Mac-Donald, when Prime Minister of the recent Labor Government, expressed this view with vehemence in the House of Commons, during an important debate on disarmament on June 29, 1931. In subsequent [Page 528] speeches both Mr. Baldwin, the Conservative leader, and Sir Herbert Samuel for the Liberals echoed Mr. MacDonald’s sentiments. I venture to call the Department’s attention to this debate, particularly to Mr. MacDonald’s speech, as an exposition of the British attitude on disarmament, (Embassy’s despatch No. 2067 of June 30, 1931).36
Apart from concurrent reductions by other nations, the question of cost alone would seem to be the principal factor in forcing Great Britain to make further arms reduction. As pointed out in the Embassy’s despatch No. 2229 of September 1136 on the new Budget, the urgent need for immediate administrative economies has obliged the National Government to include a total reduction, including reductions in pay and pensions already specified, in the Estimates for the Defence Services in 1932 of £8,600,000. When pressed in the House of Commons on September 14 to explain what modifications of the warship building program were intended in view of the present financial situation, Sir Austen Chamberlain, the First Lord of the Admiralty in the National Government, stated that he could not say until the Board of the Admiralty, including himself, had had time to examine “the various methods by which we can contribute to the necessary safety”. He continued,
“I can assure the honorable and gallant gentleman that we should be extremely reluctant to interfere with a programme which is well within the terms of the London Naval Treaty37 and which was fixed by the late Government, and by the right honorable gentleman who preceded me, as the minimum that we ought to undertake in order to be in the position which it was recognized by those with whom we negotiated that we ought to be in at the period when the London Treaty terminated.”
Having no Army to speak of, Great Britain has no quid pro quo to make towards a solution of the vexed land forces reduction question. A most important interest with her, however, is the matter of air force limitation. The Department will recall that during the large peace meeting held at the Albert Hall last July, Mr. Baldwin, the Conservative leader, stressed the point that air forces were today the most dangerous form of armaments against peace, and that England’s former security from attack had disappeared with the modern development of air armaments.
The Department will also remember that it was during the June 29 debate in the House of Commons that both Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Baldwin in their speeches went out of their way to plead that Englishmen [Page 529] should remember French history and endeavor to understand French psychology. Mr. Baldwin stated,
“Let us show France that sympathy that she needs and deserves, and, as the Prime Minister said, try to bring her along with us and to convince her that, difficult as the path to which we are all pledged may be, the difficulties and dangers of any other path are greater still.”
This gesture to France is an evidence of the realization here that France, admitted to be the most powerful European nation today, with a financial position as yet unimpaired and with a ring of small European countries to support her, holds the key to a successful Disarmament Conference next year, a key which in other days Great Britain might have held. An interesting point of view is now being expressed in London that during the coming winter France will feel the pinch of world depression through decreasing exports and increasing unemployment. This factor it is argued may tend to bring her to a more conciliatory frame of mind during the Disarmament Conference, provided she is not pin-pricked before that date into a position from which her pride will not permit her to recede. Should the latter happen, it is feared that France might even appeal to her citizens to protect “la patrie” and that the French spring elections might center on armament rather than on more normal local issues.
While Great Britain “lines up” on the side of those countries which regard some measure of arms limitation as one of the principal factors of security, her policy has always been, and will probably continue to be, to bring a change of attitude on the part of those countries, particularly France, which are opposed to further arms reduction without additional security agreements, by patient persuasion rather than by active opposition. To the English mind the question of security is bound up with international political and economic problems, such as economic rivalries, war debts, and other legacies of the war years. Great Britain enthusiastically accepted the President’s proposal for a one year moratorium on all war payments, not only for its hoped for effect on the financial crisis in Europe, but for the benefits it would give in establishing that feeling of security which is so essential to a successful Disarmament Conference. Indeed, the reports (chiefly from the Times correspondent writing from Washington) of alleged agitation in Washington to replace the one year moratorium by a five year moratorium, are the only reports from abroad which at the moment arouse a deep interest. Such a relief is believed by many here to be inevitable.
Regarding general public interest in disarmament, the Embassy’s despatch No. 2104 of July 13, 1931,38 reported on the July peace [Page 530] meeting at the Albert Hall. An audience estimated at 10,000 persons crowded into the hall to listen to the speeches of Mr. MacDonald, Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Lloyd George. The meeting was sponsored by over sixty organisations representing the three political parties, the churches and religious bodies, and educational, Bed Cross and other movements. The enthusiasm which this meeting evoked last summer would be more evident today if, as I have pointed out in previous paragraphs, the British public did not have so much else to worry about.
There is of course a small explosive group in England, chiefly to be found among the Die-Hard Tories, who remember the days of Britain’s might and demand a firm stand against all forms of pacifism (in which category they place disarmament). Mr. Winston Churchill and Lord Lloyd may be mentioned as two of the outstanding members of this group. It was during the June 29 Commons debate on disarmament referred to above that Mr. Churchill voiced his opinion that England had descended into a position of unpreparedness and insecurity such as it had never previously experienced, that Germany and Russia were putting themselves into a position of superior preparation, that the British fleet would soon be inadequate to afford protection against the “rapid and formidable growth of French submarines”, and that Great Britain should regain her naval freedom at the earliest moment. Mr. Churchill may be considered the self-appointed spokesman of the “give-no-quarter” fire-eaters. His militant views it is believed are not generally shared either by the leaders of thought in the three political parties or by the English public as a whole. The usual comment on Churchill’s theories is that they might have worked in the days of Marlborough, his ancestor, and Wellington, but that they are decidedly out of date in 1931.
In conclusion I venture to point out that if the next general election should return a Conservative Government, British policy in regard to disarmament would probably be in line with the nationalistic tendencies of the other European governments of the Right. On the other hand, a purely Labor Government would presumably lend itself more readily to that international cooperation which might be expected from more liberal governments of the Left. Should, however, as seems most likely now, the present National Government seek reelection from the country, its policy in matters of disarmament would presumably be influenced by considerations of the moment rather than by a definite conviction.
Respectfully yours,