893.0146/722
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
The Japanese Ambassador called at my request. I said that in the light of our recent conversations, which emphasized his desire, and in a general sense of course my desire, to improve relations on a basis of friendliness and fair play between our two countries, just as between ours and all other countries, I was genuinely surprised to receive a copy, through official channels, of the notice given to the British and French to take their naval vessels out of Shanghai waters and their guards out of the Shanghai area, and presumably out of all other localities in China where they are stationed. I then spoke orally to the Ambassador from a prepared manuscript, substantially as follows:
The American Government has received from the American Embassy in Tokyo a text of the note presented by the Japanese Government to the governments of belligerent nations, in which the Japanese [Page 13] Government advises the belligerents to withdraw their troops and warships from regions in China which are under the control of the Japanese armed forces, a copy of which was handed to the American Chargé for communication to this Government for purposes of information.
I find it necessary to bring to the attention of the Japanese Government the fact that the advice thus given to the governments of belligerent powers directly affects rights and interests of the United States. For the moment, I shall speak only of the situation at Shanghai. At that port several foreign countries, including both Japan and the United States, maintain landed armed forces. These forces are there for the purpose of assistance in the protection of the lives of the nationals respectively of the various countries concerned, and, in connection with that duty, the maintaining of order in general. The powers have in that connection both individual and common responsibilities. In the opinion of the American Government, the fact that some of these powers have become belligerents in other parts of the world affords no more sound a basis for advice by Japan that those powers withdraw their forces from Shanghai than would the fact that Japan is engaged in hostilities afford for a similar giving of advice by some other power to Japan that Japan withdraw her forces from the same area. In passing, I may point out that no such demands were made by any power in 1914, at which time Japan was a belligerent.
If, in the presence of the Japanese advice, the British and the French forces are withdrawn, it will create a situation fraught with extreme difficulties of many practical kinds both for Japan and the United States.
I proceeded to speak orally from a supplementary manuscript, substantially as follows:
The International Settlement at Shanghai has grown up in consequence of efforts and activities begun by nationals of various powers—prominent among whom were and have been Americans, British subjects and French subjects—more than a century ago. The foundations of the port were laid and its prosperity was developed long before Japan began to take an active interest in world commerce. The International Settlement is an area wherein persons of all nationalities reside and which is governed by the locally created and locally maintained agency whose officers are elected by and are responsible to its own taxpayers regardless of nationality. Interests of the various powers there are interwoven. Not since the middle of the nineteenth century has any one power claimed a right of preponderance or predominance of influence there. The United States has its rights and interests there just as has Japan. The respective rights and interests of the various powers there are interdependent. Shanghai is [Page 14] international. For several other powers to be forced out would mean to the United States that all powers are being forced out. The American Government cannot and does not admit any right on the part of any power to force it out. The rights of the United States have in many ways been impaired by acts of Japanese authorities during recent years. There are many ways in which the United States is capable of taking action of retaliation. The American Government would view with great regret and disapproval action by the Japanese Government in consequence of which the international character of the port of Shanghai would be destroyed.
In further conversation, in addition to the foregoing, I re-emphasized the utter lack of right or reason or consistency on the part of the Government of Japan to order these other Governments out of Shanghai and to break up the International Settlement and its government—for, I added with emphasis, the proposed action of Japan would result in just that—and I said, therefore, he must understand that my Government is very much concerned with respect to the definite rights and interests thus threatened. I said that in view of the action of the Japanese military authorities in China in insisting on exclusive occupation of the Yangtze River to all practical intents and purposes, with its immense deprivation of commercial rights and interests of Americans, and similar action in many cities and localities throughout China, and in the light of the so-called Japanese preachment of “a new order in Asia or eastern Asia”, this Government must make clear its conclusion that the purpose behind the Japanese notice to the British and French is not a mere innocent, friendly purpose, but a purpose further to exclude first one set of nationals of another country, and then another set of nationals of still another country, until the Shanghai situation would be on a parity with the Yangtze River situation and others like it in China. I then said, “How does your Government expect us to prevent the Congress and the country, if we should attempt to do so, from taking up the question of our monetary and financial and trade relations with your country and dealing with it in a way that you can well imagine in the light of all the circumstances?”
The Ambassador made no defense except to quietly suggest that Japan through friendly motives was giving this notice for the avoidance of possible friction in China. I re-emphasized what I had already said in relation to this phase and stated that we could not possibly give that interpretation to the notice.
I stated that I would like to have an indication of the Japanese Government’s reaction in the light of the exposition of the subject which I had made to the Ambassador, as recorded above.