711.94/2624
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)
I called on the Foreign Minister this afternoon at his request and during the long conversation which ensued he emphasized to me the intention of Prince Konoye and himself to leave no stone unturned to arrange the suggested meeting at an early date between the Prime Minister and the President and to ensure the success of that meeting since, should it fail to achieve its basic aim, he was afraid that further efforts would be useless. Having in view these objectives, the Government of Japan is prepared to state its intentions with complete frankness and to undertake provisionally certain commitments and to set forth, likewise provisionally, certain reciprocal undertakings which the Japanese Government would expect from the Government of the United States. These reciprocal commitments would then serve as a basis for discussion at the proposed meeting between the representative heads of the two Governments. Admiral Toyoda informed me that he had this afternoon cabled this proposal to Admiral Nomura at Washington but he requested that I also convey it to my Government by telegraph in order to obviate any possibility of inaccuracy which he feared might arise through misunderstanding of the English language.
The Foreign Minister stated that the Japanese Government was prepared to accept the points on which a tentative agreement had already been reached in the informal and preliminary conversations which had been carried on in Washington and he pointed out, furthermore, that points (c), (d), and (e) of the proposals set forth below furnish a basis of agreement for three of the chief points which had not been disposed of in these preliminary conversations. The Minister laid particular emphasis on the importance of point (c) by reason of the fact that it contemplates an interpretation of Article 3 of the Tripartite Pact at variance with the interpretation which Mr. Matsuoka had given thereto. The importance that the Foreign Minister attached to this point is revealed by the fact that he returned to it several times during the course of our conversation.
The Foreign Minister then handed me in writing the Japanese proposals, which are copied below. He requested me urgently to transmit these proposals to Washington in our most secret code and they were accordingly closely paraphrased for transmission to the Department.
After a brief examination of the Japanese proposals, I told the Minister that I personally felt that certain of the points outlined would appear to be susceptible to very broad interpretation. The [Page 594] Minister in reply stated that of course these suggested commitments would be discussed at the proposed meeting, from which I gathered that they were being advanced by the Japanese Government primarily as an indication of the sincerity of Japan’s efforts to work out a basic settlement.
The Foreign Minister then proposed that the reciprocal undertaking as finally agreed upon should be embodied in an agreement to be kept secret, and that following the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister a statement in general terms would be agreed upon and released to the press. I explained to the Foreign Minister that under our democratic system of Government it would be difficult if not impossible to conceal from the people of the United States such results as might be achieved at the proposed meeting, but we did not pursue the subject.
Admiral Toyoda told me that while he understood that the President had received the Japanese Ambassador again yesterday he had had no report as yet from Admiral Nomura on this subject. I told the Minister that likewise I had received no information on this reported conversation.
The proposal of the Japanese Government follows:
[Here follows text of the draft proposal printed on page 608.]
- This was transmitted to the Secretary of State in telegram No. 1384, September 4, 1941, 9 p.m. (711.94/2449).↩