711.94/21622/14
Memorandum of a Conversation
The Japanese Ambassador called at the Secretary’s apartment at 8:30 by appointment made at the Ambassador’s request. He was accompanied by Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa.
The Ambassador said that when he had examined our draft of May 31 he had felt that our respective views were close together, and he went to New York with the feeling that the “drafting committee” would be able to carry on the work of ironing out the details. He therefore regretted that it was necessary to trouble the Secretary about the matter.
The Ambassador and Colonel Iwakuro both emphasized that not only they individually but the Japanese Government were sincerely desirous of concluding the understanding as speedily as possible. They thought that perhaps there had been some misunderstanding on our part as to the attitude of the Japanese Government. They felt convinced that even Matsuoka, notwithstanding his part in the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, was sincerely desirous of establishing amicable relations with the United States, and that such an attitude was clearly revealed in their instructions.
The Secretary replied that he was glad to hear this; that he had no doubt whatever in his mind about the complete sincerity and the real purpose of the Ambassador and his associates present. He said that he felt that at this juncture when the world was on the brink of collapse our two Governments ought to be able to get together and achieve something to save the world through providing for the restoration of world trade on a sound basis.
The Secretary discussed our desire to lay the foundation for peace in the Pacific, with which question were involved the relations of our two countries to Europe. The Secretary went over again the position of this Government in regard to self-defense. He emphasized our determination to prevent Nazi Germany from getting control of the seas. He expressed the view that Japan in our position would take the same attitude and he added that if Japan were situated where England is we would in the interest of our self-defense feel it necessary to help Japan as we are helping England.
The Ambassador asked whether it would not be possible for the President, having in view not merely America’s own interest but a wider interest in the peace of the world, to act on his own initiative in proposing to the Chinese Government that it enter into negotiations with Japan. Colonel Iwakuro added that this suggestion was prompted by the idea that it would better befit Japan’s dignity as [Page 466] a great power if there could be avoided any appearance that Japan was coming around to the United States in a suppliant attitude asking the United States to help in settling difficulties between Japan and China. He thought that we might feel the same way about going around to England and asking England to help straighten out, for example, a dispute that might arise between the United States and Panama.
The Secretary replied that in his opinion the President should have an agreement of the character we had in mind to stand on before undertaking to make an approach to the Chinese Government. He dwelt on the need of drawing up the proposed agreement in clear-cut and unequivocal terms so that the agreement would speak for itself. He said that this was especially important at this time when the world has had so much experience with bad faith in international dealings and when there was so much skepticism and suspicion among the public in regard to matters concerned with international relations. The Secretary emphasized that he would like an agreement which would stand out as a monument to wise and farsighted statesmanship and that he was not interested in an agreement of a temporizing character which would not contain promise for future stability along sound progressive lines. The Secretary then reviewed briefly our reactions to the revisions proposed by the Japanese on June 4, along lines set forth in the attached copy of an oral statement40 the original of which the Secretary handed to the Ambassador. The Secretary referred specifically to the proposed omission both in the section relating to China and in the section relating to the Pacific area of clear-cut provisions in regard to non-discrimination in international commercial relations. He referred also to the weakening effect of the proposed revisions upon the emphasis which we had desired to place upon a pledge of peace in the Pacific area.
The Ambassador and Mr. Wikawa read over together the oral statement and told Colonel Iwakuro of the gist thereof. Colonel Iwakuro then said that he himself was very much surprised to learn that we felt that the two sides were not approaching closer together on a meeting of minds. He himself had felt when he left us on June 4 that we had crossed the mountain and the valley which separated us and that only a ditch remained to be bridged. He wondered whether there was not some misunderstanding on our part as to their attitude and he was now forced to ask himself whether the valley and the mountain had been crossed as he had hoped. The Ambassador said that he had had many talks with the Secretary and felt that he understood perfectly the Secretary’s views in regard to the principles [Page 467] and that the Ambassador and his associates were in general agreement with the Secretary in regard to those principles. The Ambassador said that what he now proposed to do was to examine carefully our oral statement which we had given him and review the proposed revisions in the light of the oral statement.… No arrangement was made for any further meeting.
Colonel Iwakuro in an aside to Mr. Ballantine made reference to Mr. Wakasugi’s having been brought into the meeting on June 4. He said that Mr. Wakasugi had been brought back from retirement by Admiral Nomura. Mr. Ballantine took what Colonel Iwakuro said as a hint that the Colonel feared that perhaps Mr. Wakasugi’s presence might have been prejudicial rather than helpful.
- Infra.↩