817.1051/280
The Minister in Nicaragua (Eberhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 10.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose a copy and a translation of the amended Guardia Agreement as passed by the Nicaraguan Congress on February 21, 1929, and signed by President Moncada.
As the Department was informed in my telegram No. 68 of March 7 (3 p.m.), I have reminded President Moncada that the bill, being in the nature of an international agreement, cannot go into effect unless and until approved by both parties to it. He stated at that time that that would be his attitude toward it, although, as a matter of fact it was law as soon as published. I have not since discussed the matter of the legality of the amended agreement with him since he has shown no disposition to try to enforce it.
Budget
The new budget carries a provision for $689,132 for the maintenance of the Guardia, or the sum needed for the maintenance of the minimum strength provided for in the original agreement. President Moncada has promised in addition to make available from surplus revenues a sufficient sum to raise the total for the maintenance of the Guardia to $1,000,000.
General McDougal
General McDougal, who relieved General Beadle as Chief of the Guardia has lately completed a tour of inspection of the northern area, during which he has been able to form certain impressions concerning the Guardia which conform in the main to those already formed by the Legation.
Volunteers
General McDougal, in the first place, is convinced that President Moncada’s force of Volunteers has no place in the military system as envisaged and provided for by the Guardia Agreement.
Both he and Colonel Dunlap, at present commanding the Brigade, agree that certain advantages have followed the operations of the Volunteers. In the first place their activities have given the Nicaraguans resident in the affected area a feeling that the Nicaraguan Government is firmly behind the Marines in their campaign against the bandits. In the second place the Marines have acquired from the Volunteers much useful information. Thirdly, operations of the Volunteers have released many Marines for work in other sectors.
[Page 623]On the other hand these same advantages would have accrued to a greater or less degree had a corresponding additional number of Guardia been provided for with the funds used for the maintenance of the Volunteers and the application of the funds to the Guardia would have been productive of more permanent good. This was the opinion of General Beadle and is that of General McDougal. The Legation concurs in it fully.
General McDougal has pointed out to President Moncada that the Volunteers are themselves potential bandits. He foresees possible difficulties when large numbers of them are released without money, employment or adequate clothing. It would be difficult even now to prevent groups of them from deserting and themselves engaging in bandit operations.
Mobile Battalion
General McDougal has obtained the President’s consent to the formation of a Mobile Battalion of 200 to 250 Guardia to be used in active operations against the bandits. General Feland, prior to his departure, consented to an arrangement under which this Battalion would assume the responsibility for operations against bandits in the dangerous Peña Blanca area.
The Mobile Battalion will be placed under the command of Colonel Lowell, G. N., and the Brigade will cause to be withdrawn from the area affected all Marine officers not junior to Colonel Lowell so that the latter will be the senior officer present and, therefore, in charge of combined Marine and Guardia operations.
It is anticipated that the new Mobile Battalion will be given a period of sixteen days intensive training, commencing April first, and that they will proceed to the Peña Blanca area immediately thereafter. General McDougal intends to use the Mobile Battalion as an entering wedge with which to bring about the eventual elimination of the Volunteers. Practically all of the $45,000. appropriated for the maintenance of the latter has been expended and a large number of the Volunteers themselves are being withdrawn at their own request. One group of forty-seven have resigned and turned in their arms during the last few days.
Hacienda Guards
General McDougal agrees with the Legation that the system of Hacienda Guards is vicious and calculated to detract from the effectiveness of the Guardia.
These men are disorganized and not uniformed and on at least one occasion lately a patrol of Marines narrowly escaped from firing on a group of them which they met on a trail, under the impression that they were bandits. The danger of an accidental clash between [Page 624] the Marines and the Guardia, on the one hand, and the Hacienda Guards, on the other is always present.
The Conservative Party and press justly observe that the Hacienda Guards constitute a Liberal Army subject only to the will of the Executive. The possibilities of abuse of power by the Executive through these Guards are evident.
Opinion of Legation
There can be no doubt that both the system of Volunteers and that of the Hacienda Guards are in direct violation of the Guardia Agreement, which provides in Section II that “The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall be considered the sole military and police force of the Republic, clothed with full power to preserve domestic peace and the security of individual rights”.
It is very apparent that President Moncada has been permitted to violate the above section of the Guardia Agreement in an open and flagrant manner.
It is likewise apparent to observers in Nicaragua and especially to those who have had experience in similar situations in other countries that such flagrant and open violation of the letter and spirit of the Guardia Agreement, if allowed to persist, will largely destroy the effectiveness of the Guardia and will place the United States in the position of lending its men and influence to maintain in force a regime which is violating its international agreements and the obligations it solemnly incurred toward both the United States and the people of Nicaragua.
It is too early to say that it is General Moncada’s purpose to definitely evade the responsibilities which his Government incurred under the Tipitapa Agreement and later promises, although the Minister of Foreign Affairs in his discussion of the Guardia Agreement before Congress early in February stated in so many words that the Tipitapa Agreement could no longer be considered to be binding. He explained to the Congress that the Tipitapa Agreement, entered into under the very special conditions existing in the country at that time, created what might be called an extraconstitutional status of law, and it was by virtue of this special status that the original Guardia Agreement was entered into. This special extraconstitutional status was terminated when the supervised elections of 1928 were successfully completed.53 At that time the country returned to its constitutional status and the Tipitapa Agreement ceased to be binding upon the Nicaraguan Government. It followed, therefore, that the Nicaraguan Congress should look into the Guardia Agreement with a view to determining whether it might not be necessary to make certain amendments to it to make it conform to the reestablished constitutional status.
[Page 625]It is believed that in the beginning of his administration President Moncada received and followed bad advice, and his insistence on the maintenance of the Volunteers and the Hacienda Guards may arise from that circumstance rather than from any firm purpose to defeat the agreements entered into by the Nicaraguan Government. Indeed, in many ways, he has lately shown a real desire to exert his influence to enhance the prestige of the Guardia.
It is not believed, however, that this circumstance should in any way induce the Department to agree to any compromise calculated in the long run to defeat the purpose of our cooperation, such as the continued co-existence with the Guardia of such military organizations as the Volunteers and the Hacienda Guards.
The Legation has preferred not to discuss these matters of late with President Moncada largely since the latter is naturally waiting for the re-action of the new administration in the United States and the Legation has believed it best that the Department’s decision with reference thereto be presented with all the force of a permanent policy arrived at by the new administration after mature and careful study.
It is believed that the Tipitapa Agreement and the original Guardia Agreement form a basis on which the United States can effectively cooperate to promote security and permanent progress in Nicaragua. No radical departure therefrom or serious compromise tending to weaken the authority of the United States should be contemplated. The authority of the United States derived from these agreements represents in the opinion of the Legation the minimum under which the United States can work with reasonable hope of accomplishing permanent good and without fear of actually using its power and influence to perpetuate and emphasize the very weaknesses in the Nicaraguan system which those agreements seek to remedy.
I have [etc.]
- See Foreign Relations, 1927, vol. iii, pp. 350 ff.↩
- File translation revised.↩