500.A15a3/172: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Dawes) to the Secretary of State
272. I received your telegrams Nos. 247 and 248 of September 14 yesterday. Realizing the bearing of these cables upon a meeting with members of the British press which I knew the Prime Minister had arranged for this afternoon, I had a conference with him yesterday evening and submitted your Nos. 247 and 248 to him. The Prime Minister will probably send me a written reply which I shall promptly transmit to you.
MacDonald and I had quite a conference over your cables. I have felt concern over the concession you make in your No. 247 in answer to Prime Minister’s suggestion relative to the wise policy which you stated in your No. 245, September 12, 5 p.m. I expressed myself freely when MacDonald asked for my views with regard to effect upon public opinion of acceptance of his suggestions especially as your acceptance might involve taking a British naval representative with him to America. In reply MacDonald said that selection by him of naval officer to accompany him might cause trouble with rest of Admiralty staff, with which his relation is difficult.
I shall give you the run of my mind, as I gave the Prime Minister, regarding effect, if knowledge became public, of discussion between him and President personally of remaining technical difference with view to its settlement before Conference is convened. If this small remaining difference is not adjusted by exchange of telegrams before MacDonald leaves it would then be twisted and magnified out of its true significance. As result of methods of negotiation pursued to present moment, together with the able official public statements made at Washington relative to its insignificance, this difference is no longer regarded by the public as serious. Then why run risk of changing public’s state of mind with regard to its insignificance, thereby making its final settlement by compromise more difficult?
On previous occasions I have fully expressed myself to you and to MacDonald as to the dangers of the latter’s visit to the United States prior to a successful conclusion of the preliminary naval negotiations [Page 233] between the United States and Great Britain. In my judgment the reasons I voiced then would fully apply in this instance were it not that the present agreement is now publicly considered as an accomplished fact, even though a small technical difference is left for the conference to adjust.
Both in England and in the United States such wide public interest attaches to the Prime Minister’s visit and his forthcoming personal conference with the President that the possible repercussions may be tremendous either for good or evil. Inasmuch as the public considers that the two countries have arrived at a substantial agreement and that the remaining difference is insignificant, there is grave danger of creating the impression that the small remaining difference is of such importance as to make it necessary for the Prime Minister to come to this country for the purpose of arriving at a settlement. Should this impression get out, what would be the effect of an announcement that they were unable to settle it after conference? And what is likely to be the reaction upon the naval personnel of the two countries as to the importance of their relation to a final agreement? Furthermore what is likely to be the reaction in Parliament and in the Senate, those breeding grounds of imaginative and ingenious deviltry of the rarest order? To my knowledge an international settlement has never before been guided more directly and personally by those first in authority than has this one by the Prime Minister and the President. The substance being assured, why should we endanger it by risking the appearance that might cause the visit to be regarded as an approaching joint debate on technical questions—a debate in which agreement or disagreement would equally present an invitation and an excuse for misrepresentation on the part of British and American demagogues—rather than an evidence of the constructive purpose to further the peace of the world.
Throughout all these negotiations I have kept most closely in touch with Japanese Ambassador and up to this time the Japanese Government feels that it has been properly informed. Last night at my house, however, when I was going over the present situation with Matsudaira, the Ambassador stated that his Government desired to have same direct informal conferences as those in which the American and British Governments have been engaged relative to large cruisers extended now to Japan; and that if relationship of Great Britain and the United States as to large cruisers is agreed upon in discussion between President Hoover and the Prime Minister with their naval assistants, then his Government could only regard the matter as a fait accompli to be presented Japan for either acceptance or rejection without the latter’s having had opportunity to present and to have considered its political and technical [Page 234] requirements in the proper sort of informal preliminary discussion such as the United States and Great Britain have had. Pressure of work upon MacDonald has been such that to date he has had but one short interview with Matsudaira and that was at Geneva. He will see the Ambassador very soon, however, and I think that now is the time when informal preliminary discussion between the United States, Great Britain and Japan should begin.
- Telegram in two sections.↩