500.A15a3/109: Telegram
The Ambassadors in Great Britain and Belgium (Dawes and Gibson) to the Secretary of State
223. This afternoon Gibson and I had a conversation with the Prime Minister and Alexander which lasted two hours.
First Gibson and I handed the Prime Minister a memorandum which was based upon the pertinent sections of the Department’s telegram No. 206 of August 5. The Prime Minister read the memorandum through and then stated that he considered this a very helpful approach to the problem as well as a most friendly one.
Gibson and I then outlined the problem to the Prime Minister as it appears to us and we urged upon him to explore the possible methods of effecting a material reduction of cruiser needs so that a level may be reached which we could justify as representing a reduction in naval armament. The fact was brought out by Gibson and myself that to grant us a material preponderance in 10,000 ton, 8-inch-gun vessels would perhaps be the most effective manner of bridging the gap between the cruiser fleets of the two countries. Mr. Mac-Donald [Page 184] replied in a most definite manner that so far as the United States and Great Britain were concerned he would have no hesitation in complying and that he would not feel obliged to modify his naval building program no matter how many of these larger vessels were built by the United States, but he called our attention to the fact that neither Great Britain nor the United States could show the same indifference to the building of such cruisers by other nations and that, when the negotiations had reached the point where the five naval powers would be participating, it is quite apparent that Japan would desire to base the ratio of her cruiser strength on that of the navy of whichever country should have the greatest number of cruisers of the 10,000 ton, 8-inch-gun type. Any bilateral agreement which might be reached by the United States and Great Britain must be influenced, of course, by this consideration.
Our first fundamental problem, we stated to the Prime Minister, was to determine what really constituted the lowest level which the British Government considered essential and that up to this time we had only had the assertion of the need for a definite number of 6-inch-gun cruisers without any explanation of why it was necessary for it to have such a large number and that until we knew on what they based their need for these ships it was difficult for us to discuss the justification for such levels. Mr. MacDonald then stated that while he was on his vacation at Lossiemouth he had formulated some figures of his own based upon an independent study he had made without suggestions from the Admiralty. Tomorrow he will submit a memorandum giving explanations regarding the exact use to be made of the various cruisers constituting the force together with the figures which he outlined to us.
A statement containing the Prime Minister’s ideas regarding how parity may be obtained by 1936 will also be presented by him. Mr. MacDonald said that he recognized very clearly the problem which confronted the President and that he is endeavoring to devise some method of meeting him in combining parity and reduction. The Prime Minister anticipates giving definite figures in the memorandum which he will submit tomorrow and these will constitute a distinct reduction over previous figures unless they are modified in the meantime.
During the discussion, it was quite apparent that the political situation in England is giving the Prime Minister much thought in connection with this problem, not so much as regards the naval relations between the United States and Great Britain as those between Great Britain and other nations. Moreover, though the various political parties are each committed to the idea of naval reduction, if they have any ground for it, they will not hesitate to attack Mac-Donald [Page 185] for having made reductions beyond the limit of safety for the Empire. In the course of the discussions, Mr. MacDonald was asked what he thought would be the effect of a visit by him to the President of the United States before the conclusion of a substantial agreement by the two powers and then there should be a failure to reach any agreement. Mr. MacDonald’s reply was that he believed it would be [fatal?] and that his trip to the United States should not be taken until a practical agreement had been reached by the two nations. In the absence of a complete agreement, the trip could be considered only if minor difficulties, which reason upheld as certainly possible of adjustment, remained. On this account, he said, he was most anxious to hurry on the negotiations because if some substantial agreement was not reached by us before the end of September it would be necessary for him to postpone his visit to the United States until after next July on account of Parliament being in session and the number of engagements he has. There is no doubt that the Prime Minister is straining every effort to meet you, and any suggestions whatever as to how this can be achieved he will continue to welcome. He is leaving tomorrow for a holiday in Scotland and arrangements are being made to communicate to him there your comments upon the memorandum which he will give us tomorrow, as he does not expect to allow his holiday to interfere with his full attention to the naval problems presented by our discussions.
- Telegram in two sections.↩