500.A15a3/105: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Dawes)
206. We have read Gibson’s communication transmitted in your No. 220, August 4, most sympathetically and we are willing to accept your joint judgment of the negotiations of the Prime Minister and what he is trying to bring about. We do not, however, believe that to leave to any personal or later conference the determination of the [Page 182] point at which parity is to be reached would be wise nor do we believe that to call a consultation until that point shall have been arrived at between us is advisable. The present method of conducting the negotiations is generally satisfactory to us. On this side there will be the greatest difficulty in obtaining approval of any agreement unless it could be demonstrated that there had been an arrangement for quantitative parity between the fleets. A personal conference may smooth out all other difficulties once that has been arranged for. We should regard it as a disaster of the first magnitude to the cause of reduction in armament if a personal meeting or a general conference were held which failed to reach that result. The advance of peace for years to come would in fact be jeopardized by the acerbities which would now follow such a failure. We urge you for that reason to press for further consideration along the lines which have been pursued hitherto.
We suggest in view of the suggestions contained in your No. 220 that you explore the possibility of Great Britain’s ability to reach an agreement with us as follows:
Not to replace the cruisers becoming obsolete by 1936, possibly to scrap one or two more large cruisers which are being constructed at present and to consider also the inclusion of a political clause which would say that if before 1934 any substantial naval war or large increase of armament by any power were to take place, Great Britain might delay the scrapping of 60,000 displacement tons or the equivalent according to the yardstick of such 60,000 displacement tons or that Great Britain might lay down replacements for an equivalent amount, giving the United States a similar right to construct the equivalent tonnage in the same period at the same time. We are trying to suggest roughly speaking that the cruiser strength be checked at 250,000 tons parity to be reached in 1936 with what is tantamount to a condition that if the conditions of world armament as viewed in 1934 tend to justify the belief of the British that their needs for small cruisers were absolute needs, Great Britain at that time may have the option to move the point at which parity should be reached up by 60,000 tons displacement more. A similar option would be given to the United States. We are trying to do something which will make it easier for the Prime Minister, although we should much prefer the bolder course of a flat agreement checking the cruiser category at about 250,000 tons.
The purpose of this proposal is not indirectly to make 300,000 tons the point of parity but to make sure that if a British need for cruisers should develop in five years to be real, the Prime Minister will not by the action he takes irretrievably fail to meet it.