Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1929, Volume I

500.A15a3/105: Telegram

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Dawes) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

London, August 4, 1929—2 p.m.
[Received August 4—7:10 p.m.²⁷]

220. This morning I received the following from Gibson:

“General Dawes has furnished me copies of all cable correspondence including the Department’s Nos. 195 and 196 of July 31. If the President and Secretary had been present at our last interview on July 29th I am confident that they would feel differently on the subject. Some misapprehension, it seems to me, has arisen due to our being able to telegraph only definite facts, while we have no means of conveying adequately the atmosphere of the conversations and an understanding of the spirit. It is my belief that the Prime Minister is in no way trying on behalf of his Admiralty to put over anything on us; on the contrary, we must remember that he is a novice as far as this problem is concerned and has no knowledge of details. For this reason he has to rely on his Admiralty for his figures and in the process he inevitably becomes indoctrinated with the general Admiralty views to some extent. I believe, by the same token, that he is open to our suggestions and guidance to an almost equal extent.

It must be borne in mind, furthermore, that the proposals which he made very tentatively and which, as he clearly stated at the time, were merely for the purpose of starting the ball rolling and of discovering what points we could talk about, are by no means a return to the program of the Admiralty at the Three-Power Conference at Geneva. We never were able at that, conference to squeeze their minimum demands for cruiser strength into a limitation of 400,000 tons and to keep them within that tonnage. Their figures went well above 600,000 tons at times. The old Birkenhead program was revealed in its entirety in every alternative proposal which they put forward as soon as its disguise had been removed. Not only did they, in other words, insist on preserving the effective cruiser force they then had together with a complete replacement program, but they also were adamant in their demand that they should be able to carry out their entire cruiser building program including such portions of it as had not been made public. Although we realized at the time that you would be disappointed by the present proposal, it constitutes nevertheless a considerable modification of their old position inasmuch as the abandonment of all new construction is envisaged by it.

While it did not undertake to abandon the replacement of small cruisers, it seemed clear to me that this would not constitute a final rejection of such abandonment but rather a hesitation, on the part of men who were aware of the limits of their knowledge, to commit themselves. This revolutionary change apparent in the spirit and attitude toward the whole naval question between our two countries was to my mind the one essential thing. The Prime Minister and Alexander, when making their suggestion for a slight preponderance on the part of the United States in 8-inch-gun ships, added that they did not care how great our preponderance in these ships would be. This is in complete contrast with Bridgeman’s blunt repudiation of any idea that Great Britain could view our possessing a superior force of such ships with equanimity. MacDonald and Alexander both emphatically stated that as far as they were concerned they were acting on the conviction that the naval forces of the two countries would not be used by either one against the other and that to ascertain their minimum needs in relation to other powers was their only preoccupation.

Although from our standpoint the first tentative figures are plainly quite inacceptable, I do not feel for a minute that the cruiser problem constitutes an insuperable obstacle, particularly in view of the sincere desire of the Prime Minister to effect a reduction. The question how ever cannot be settled by simply demanding that Great Britain, in order to avoid the necessity for us to build, must come down to a specified level. They hold to the belief in a certain ‘absolute need’ as a minimum, rightly or wrongly, but it is my conviction that the gap between us can be bridged by a careful examination of real needs combined with the exercise of ingenuity and resourcefulness. To my mind it is important that before the undertaking of any general conversations the British be asked to study various possible means of combining parity and reduction in the cruiser class. One or a combination of the following methods might achieve this:

1. Certain new construction already under way might be scrapped.

2. An agreement might be concluded to the effect that between 1931 and 1936 no replacement shall be made of small cruisers which become obsolete.

3. It might be possible to agree that obsolete small cruisers be replaced by new vessels carrying 4.7- or 5-inch guns, thus making it possible to include these cruisers in the tonnage of their destroyers. The basis for this suggestion is the contention of the Admiralty that of these small cruisers a large number are required for work of a police nature but that their habitability and sea endurance must be greater than are afforded by destroyers.

4. It is conceivable that they would accept the idea that we should have a considerable predominance so far as eight-inch gun cruisers are concerned, a proposition which offers the best hope, I believe, for the following reasons:

(1) As I have already attempted to explain, MacDonald takes the attitude of disregarding any possibility of an Anglo-American conflict and therefore concluding logically that it is unnecessary for him to worry about exactly balancing the combat strength of the two fleets.

(2) If we had a predominance of treaty cruisers, in part at least arrived at if possible by British scrapping, the application of the yardstick to differentiated tonnage would be made easier.

(3) Inasmuch as such an arrangement would be founded on a practical carrying out of the anti-war pact between Great Britain and the United States, it would find strong political support in both countries.

We might submit to MacDonald for his consideration other possible expedients which would be combined with those already outlined. In asking him to study these suggestions, we could point out that the successful application of the yardstick would be materially facilitated by British acceptance of concessions of this sort in a reasonable measure.

I think it would be, wise that time for study be given to the Prime Minister. Information furnished him by his Admiralty people and tempered by his desire to take our point of view into consideration and by the independence of his own mind, will of course serve as a basis for his study when completed. It is necessary that the question of the best method of procedure be now considered. The telegraph is not the best means of conducting negotiations between two leaders of courage and independent mind; it causes numerous irritations and errors which direct discussion can largely eliminate. For that reason I am wondering whether it would not be the most practical course for us to present a set of proposals for MacDonald to study, at the same time informing him that it is the desire of the President that these questions be reserved for oral discussions at the time of the Prime Minister’s visit to the United States.

Our problem, fundamentally, is to discover some means of reducing the cruiser strength of Great Britain in cooperation with a man who, if its political practicability can be demonstrated to him, is honestly willing to carry it out. He is naturally cautious on account of the great responsibility resting upon him. I am nevertheless convinced that it will be possible, without endangering British security, to reduce British cruiser strength and that, by dealing directly with MacDonald, you and the President can give him this same conviction.

It will be the expectation of every political party in England that an agreement with us be reached before the November meeting of Parliament. It is obvious that MacDonald realizes this pressure and it is unlikely that so auspicious a time for negotiations will present itself again. For this reason I feel that this problem should be taken up directly and as soon as possible by the two leaders. Gibson.”

With reference to the above letter it is obvious that comments from me as to the constructive technical suggestions made would be unnecessary. However, I would say that the letter evidences the in-dispensability of Gibson’s technical and general advice not only to myself but to the Prime Minister, which he is giving at a cost in inconvenience, resulting from the detail away from him of his effective diplomatic staff, the extent of which I doubt the Department of State fully realizes.

Concerning Gibson’s suggestion that the most practical course now is for us to lay before the Prime Minister a series of suggestions for study and say to him that the President would like to reserve these questions for direct discussion during the visit to Washington of the Prime Minister, I am somewhat undecided. Though I agree emphatically with him as to the courage and independence of mind of the two leaders in these negotiations, I do not recognize that any danger exists. In my view certain irritations may be anticipated from a continuance of this long-range written discussion between them. An exchange of comment has already been indulged in which might irritate men of lesser calibre, with only the effect of the better precipitation of the crux of the question and the demonstration of the mutual high purpose to find the real solution which depends upon a mutual understanding of the limitations which circumstances impose upon each party. Disregarding the question of the wisdom of a personal meeting between the President and the Prime Minister for a direct discussion of unsettled vital differences before the meeting of Parliament, my contacts with the Prime Minister compel me to think that the present method of discussion is the most useful, for the time being, to him. The Prime Minister’s great desire for agreement to which his high purpose and idealism as well as political expediency make contribution, tempts him to quick expression of purpose before the technical difficulties have been comprehensively and completely studied. After he has given such an expression of purpose, technical difficulties are advanced by a determined Admiralty and the political opposition, with the result that the Prime Minister’s attitude becomes too conservative, an attitude which is often the result of a perception of a new set of facts. Following this reaction, his constructive purpose leads him to another which results in some advance along the right lines. As an instance of this may be cited his letter addressed to me which was forwarded in my No. 211, July 30, and which was induced by his own reflections upon the position of his Admiralty.

It would appear advisable, therefore, that the Prime Minister should meet the President when he is familiar with all the facts which in a proper final attitude should have been taken into full consideration by him. In my judgment, the diplomatic exchanges which are now taking place are educating him as to the facts much better than any other method would at the present time. It would be a mistake, in my judgment, to have the negotiations postponed until the meeting of the Prime Minister and the President. Since I am myself technically ignorant I am a good judge of the methods that best contribute to a gradual emergence from that unhappy condition. Though the fog which surrounds the Prime Minister is not so dense as it is in my case, when I sympathetically read to him directly the sentence in your No. 196, July 31, which reads as follows: “There is no evidence that we can see that he has any understanding of the figures so far,” he remarked upon the excellence of your understanding. In explanation, and parenthetically, I read the sentence in your telegram No. 196 to the effect that “matters to be called to the Prime Minister’s attention end with this paragraph,” as leaving to my judgment what preceding parts of the telegram might be transmitted to him for his assistance.

According to my belief it is just as important that the President and the Prime Minister reach an understanding before the time of their meeting has been decided, as it is that there should be substantial agreement between the two countries before a preliminary conference is called with the other powers.

Finally: I am afraid that MacDonald’s attitude, which Gibson assumes means that a material preponderance of the United States in large cruisers is an accepted matter, will later be modified by the Prime Minister as another instance where his constructive purpose induced temporary thoughtlessness in some of the things said at our meeting. When I suggested that the Prime Minister’s statement should propose for the United States 18 or more large cruisers and for the British 45 or less smaller cruisers it met with the immediate opposition of Alexander and this opposition was encouraged by MacDonald himself. There is not the least doubt in my mind that Gibson realizes this and also realizes that for purposes of negotiation we should assume the statement in MacDonald’s letter to be his ultimate decision in the matter.²⁸

Dawes

27. Telegram in four sections.
28. For substitution for two last sentences, see telegram No. 221, August 5, from the Ambassador in Great Britain, infra.