500.A15a3/92: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Dawes)
196. Reference is made to telegram No. 195, July 31, 1 p.m., to which this is supplementary.
It is very difficult to tell you how keenly disappointed we are over the proposal made by the Prime Minister. We prefer no agreement in preference to his proposal, as we now see the situation. It is our belief that he has been won over by the Admiralty who have returned to all the demands originally made by them. There is no evidence that we can see that he has any understanding of the figures thus far. The only ray of daylight which we see at this time is the statement contained in his letter which you quoted in your telegram No. 211, [Page 169] July 30, that he wishes to secure reduction all along the line. It is obvious that his proposals which you quoted in your telegram No. 209, July 29, call for increases in the cruiser categories both for the United States and Great Britain and not for reductions. It is suggested that you call to Mr. MacDonald’s attention the fact that, in proposing 15 and 45 as the number of cruisers he desires, he is proposing, as against 52 cruisers which are in service today, a total of 60 cruisers. Lines of communication apparently have been ably maintained by the 52 cruisers in commission at this time. The nub of the difficulty seems to have been correctly stated in our telegram No. 186, July 23. You might call to Mr. MacDonald’s attention that in that telegram we stated:
“The position as we see it and as we explained in our telegram No. 182, July 21, is that if parity in cruisers is to be arrived at without necessitating the completion of the whole cruiser program of the United States, Great Britain must not only check her present program of construction but must also decide practically to give up until 1936 all further building of cruisers. MacDonald will know best in what manner to prepare the British public for such a decision; however, unless the Prime Minister is able to reach such a determination as far as he himself is concerned and unless British policy is to follow these lines, we are afraid that all the significant progress thus far achieved may be of very little avail.”
The United States, you may inform Mr. MacDonald, has found itself with rapidly increasing armament costs both for its Army and its Navy and this Administration has made the statement publicly that it has set itself the task to cut these costs. Should we accept the program suggested by the Prime Minister we should find that our actual Navy costs instead of falling were rising and should we reach an agreement based on the program suggested by him it would become the laughing stock of those who, in the spirit of the Kellogg Pact, seriously desire disarmament. For this reason and because it is so apparently unfair, the proposals made by the Prime Minister fall far below the legitimate expectation which we had concerning the question. Frankly, we do not believe that Mr. MacDonald realizes that, in adopting the theory advocated by his Admiralty that Great Britain must almost match us in large cruisers and needs in addition 45 units of small cruisers to protect its long lines of communication, he is departing from the fundamental conception that the naval needs of nations are relative, which is the whole basis of our efforts to reach an agreement. It seems to us that if Great Britain needs and must have such a large number of cruisers of small calibre, which are not desired by the United States, Great Britain must be willing that the United States should have a great preponderance in cruisers of ten-thousand-ton calibre. We consider that the preponderance suggested by Mr. [Page 170] MacDonald in this type of cruiser is so small as to be of no importance whatever.
Should Great Britain cease building cruisers, any fair yardstick which measures the value of tonnage, as of say 1936, in the cruiser category and makes a fair allowance for age would rate the old units of the British fleet as of less value than the newly built units of the American fleet; but if Great Britain is to continue building, it is apparent that the yardstick will not have that effect because the two fleets resulting from this would be of substantially the same age and to ascertain parity we would be back to a displacement tonnage basis. The Prime Minister will recall, should our position seem to be harshly stated, that the reason for this is that we feel so keenly that he has not given due consideration to what would be the results of the proposals made by him. Matters to be called to the Prime Minister’s attention end with this paragraph.
Is it conceivable, we have been wondering, that the Prime Minister, in order to try us out, has been presenting the old Admiralty programs? Let us know what you personally think regarding the truth or falseness of this.