500.A15a3/79: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Dawes) to the Secretary of State
[Received 2:35 p.m.]
204. The statement of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons yesterday had a fine reception and the few questions which it evoked were well handled by him. Immediately after he was through with his statement on the floor, at his request, I met the Prime Minister and at that time he again expressed the hope that the President’s statement would appear before Friday. The fact that this fine statement of the President appears in the morning London papers, together with the statement of the Prime Minister of yesterday, is unquestionably a great satisfaction to him, although I have not seen him as yet today.
[Page 160]This morning had long and satisfactory interview with Matsudaira whom I am keeping informed. His mind runs parallel to ours, except for the Prime Minister’s proposition to abolish entirely submarines to which he will dissent. He hopes in the eventual agreement to have a slight increase for Japan in the 5–5–3 ratio, this to apply only to ships other than capital ships.
Answering your No. 189, July 24, 5 p.m., I give below the letter received from the Prime Minister this morning:
“My dear General: I was hoping that we might have been able to proceed with a yardstick examination and test in accordance with the lines of our conversations, but the despatch you handed to me yesterday raises the whole question of tonnage in its old absolute form. A failure to escape from this led to a breakdown of the Naval Conference at Geneva. Your Government is of opinion that the differences in cruiser tonnage held or contemplated by the United States and Great Britain are so great as to defy the successful operation of the yardstick plan straight away. It gives figures to prove this and concludes that we must as a preliminary to further progress agree ‘at what spot Great Britain is willing to check its cruiser strength and establish parity.’ When that is done ‘the yardstick can be effectively used to make fair an evaluation of the two cruiser fleets and the apparent difference in the tonnages will be lessened.’ In order to save time I was hoping that we might have cleared this up at the same time as we were considering the effect of the yardstick which you were to propose, but I see that the figures of absolute tonnage upon which your people have been working do appear to be a formidable obstacle and I am anxious to remove these and any other difficulties which lie in our way.
In a previous note I warned you not to work upon an old white paper outlining our building program of two or three years ago because the plan there laid down has not been carried out by my predecessors. In the course of conversation over the despatch which deals with the ingredients of the ‘yardstick,’ I also referred to the variety of ship included in cruiser category and I shall now state what information I have gathered since I saw you yesterday and the day before.
Large cruisers: We have 22, not 24, built and projected, the total tonnage being 216,200 not 231,000. From the original program upon which Washington seems working, our predecessors dropped 3 eight-inch cruisers and that has been announced for a long time and we ourselves are holding up laying the keels of other three—two in the 1928 and one in that of 1929.
The relative values of classes in the cruiser categories raise details which can best be discussed and settled over a table with authorized representatives dealing with the points there and then. But in this note I point out by way of illustration that the Hawkins group laid down for war purposes in 1916 cannot either in their present condition as ships or in their armament of seven 7.5-inch guns, hand-worked and throwing a projectile of 200 pounds instead of 250 pounds, really be valued on displacement tonnage alone. We regard them as being nearer to the modern six-inch cruiser than to its eight-inch companion. [Page 161] This is preeminently a case for the yardstick. The despatch I am now considering includes their total tonnage of about 40,000 in the large cruiser tonnage.
Smaller cruisers: Of these we have 40 classed as six-inch with a tonnage of 179,270. But here again we really need a yardstick because the tonnage value requires to be adjusted. I am told for instance that your Omaha class, of which you have 10 carries 120 six-inch guns and are of a total tonnage of 70,500. They cannot be compared to our ‘C class of which we have 24 carrying 109 six-inch guns and of a tonnage of 100,250. Here again is a case for an examination round a table not of service experts in command but of statesmen working upon material supplied by service experts.
To sum up I give you a table as I have received it in reply to inquiries I have made since I have had your despatch.
- Eight-inch cruisers: British 15 ships, 146,800 tons; 3 projected, 30,000; total 176,800. United States 13 building, 130,000; 10 projected, 100,000; total 230,000.
- 7.5-inch cruisers: Great Britain, Hawkins class 4, 29,400. United States none.
- Six-inch cruisers: Great Britain 40, 179,270. United States 10, 70,500.
That is a somewhat complicated tangle to unravel but I am sure we can do it if we go about it in the right way and keep political and not service hands in control. When I say this, I must add that I have found my service advisers most anxious to come to an agreement. Still we must remain in control.
My view is that it will not be helpful for either of us to begin by stating absolute limits but rather to examine the present condition, working out parity within it, total the results and see what happens, examine the total and if it be satisfactory take it as the absolute limit, if it be unsatisfactory return to an examination of why it is so and continue this till we are satisfied. For I will not assume that there is any doubt about our Agreeing. I have had some experience with these negotiations and all urge me to come to close grips with details and from an examination of details to come to comprehensive conclusions. We begin by assuming that our countries each has an absolute minimum enforced upon it by the present state of the world and that the settlement of details must conform to that general requirement. If the settlement of details when summed up get beyond it we must reduce the categories; if it gets us under it we must expand them. As we are both determined to agree I feel pretty strongly that that is both the surest and the quickest way to set to work.
Yours very sincerely,
J. Ramsay MacDonald.
Postcript:
Since I wrote this note we have agreed to have a meeting on Monday with Mr. Gibson present, so part of it is out of date. So fast does the world move in these days! I send the note however for its figures particularly.”
I have wired Gibson to meet me here Sunday.