711.4112Anti-War/29: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Houghton) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:05 p.m.]
95. Your No. 108, May 2, 3 p.m. This morning I spent the better part of two hours with Chamberlain who expressed his great surprise that Chilton51 should have so misunderstood your attitude toward a meeting of Foreign Secretaries for the consideration of differences of opinion. Proposed meeting of jurists was in accord with Locarno procedure and he had favored it; but in view of fact that you did not, and as without American participation it would be useless, Chamberlain will do what he can to call it off.
He then said that your Washington speech52 had been most helpful. We went over each paragraph of it together and he seemed unable to find any weak link in your statement. He brought up the Monroe Doctrine again and asked what reply he could make if some member of the House of Commons should ask him if the treaty would alter the Doctrine’s status in any way; he referred to his own recent pronouncement to all the world in regard to Egypt. Were both declarations left undisturbed by the signing of the treaty or did it mean that enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine or of his declaration on Egypt would be by the use of force if either were violated? I replied that I could say no more than to repeat what I had said before. Were he to put the question to me seriously and to ask for an answer, no doubt it could be given. The position of the American Government relative to the Monroe Doctrine, however, I thought had been made fully clear. One question of this sort, I pointed out, brought on others, and soon we should find ourselves traveling a long and difficult path directly away [Page 50] from the goal which we both desired to reach. I was emphatic on the point that we were not conducting an inquiry aimed to ascertain in advance how far each of us could go without war being brought on; instead, by agreeing to renounce war we were making possible thereafter the solution of actual difficulties, as they arose, along peaceful lines. War was still possible. Any nation knew how to bring war about, if it wanted war. We held the belief that if we signed the treaty we meant to maintain it, not break it; that a fine-spun investigation of all the ways by which it could or could not be broken was not helpful or advisable.
To all this Chamberlain had no response to make except by manifesting an evident sense of uncertainty. He again referred to the commission of jurists, and said that by bringing them together he thought he was really forwarding the acceptance of the treaty. I inquired what on earth there was for the jurists to decide. The question was not juridical but political. No doubt each nation would examine its treaty obligations to ascertain whether or not the proposed treaty ran counter to them, just in the way Germany had done. Unless he had some questions of interpretation, I said, besides those that the French and Germans had raised, I frankly was unable to see what there was left to discuss.
Chamberlain then said that he did not think that the German reply indicated that Government’s unconditional acceptance of the proposal. He had sent a cable to Stresemann asking him to hold back his answer until Chamberlain could discuss it with him, but that Stresemann had answered that the Government’s reply had been accepted by the German Cabinet and could not be delayed. Chamberlain added that in this reply he had been relieved to note that the position of the German Government was very much like that of the British. He disagreed completely with the modifications proposed by the French. He said that the whole situation had been cleared materially by your Washington speech. I then asked him what he thought the net result of your treaty, if it were accepted, would be in Europe. Would it turn out to be an additional bulwark to the work that had been accomplished at Locarno as well as to what the League of Nations had done in a more general way for safe-guarding the peace, or would it damage in some way what had been accomplished? Chamberlain unhesitatingly replied that of course it would strengthen what had been accomplished. I said that if that were true, I could not think of any nation with more to gain by coming out quickly and accepting it than Great Britain, unless perhaps it were France. He replied that if he signed the treaty he must be sure that no possibility existed that difference on some action taken at a future date by Great Britain which the British felt to be within the treaty and which the United States did not, [Page 51] could not be resolved. That eventuality would open way to a very dangerous dispute. I said that I thought that a much greater danger would be suspicion among people of the United States that after Great Britain had been offered an opportunity to preserve the peace, she had preferred, for ulterior reasons, to maintain her right to break the peace. I urged him with great seriousness not to be the last to accept your proposal; there was too much at stake between us. Chamberlain thanked me and said that our conversation had been of valuable assistance to him, and had cleared away many of his difficulties. At the moment my impression is that Chamberlain has not a leg left to stand on, and that the public statement which you made last Saturday night has achieved its purpose fully.
When I rose to go, Chamberlain again referred to Mr. Chilton’s misunderstanding of your views. I said that while of course I did not know what was in your mind, it was possible that in order to give the treaty greater emphasis, if it were accepted, but not to discuss it, you might have thought that a meeting of the Foreign Ministers would be useful. He responded warmly that undoubtedly it would, and that he hoped that if the meeting were held, it would be in Washington, and that he himself would like to be present.
Please let me know if I am cabling these interviews too fully. I am anxious that Chamberlain’s thoughts be placed clearly before you, and that cannot be done briefly.
Apropos of the foregoing, the French Ambassador told me last night after dinner, when I had inquired regarding Briand’s health, that the Minister was recovering, and that had he not been ill the most recent French note would not have been sent. The Ambassador wishes to talk with me; and, unless you see some good reason why I should refrain, I think I shall see him within the next day or two. I think that to go over your Washington statement with him might be very effective, for, as you know, he is a close personal friend of Briand.