711.3512Anti-War/16: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina (Bliss)
46. I received your despatch of September 10th enclosing a copy of a speech of Senator Molinari. The speech is a very able and interesting one. I think the Senator has some misapprehensions about the negotiations and effect of the Treaty.
I fully appreciate what he says about the pacific intentions of Argentina. I know, of course, that the Government and the people of Argentina are devoted to the principle of world peace and that it is not necessary for Argentina to sign a treaty not to go to war in order that its influence may be cast on the side of peace and justice. No country has gone further to demonstrate this than has Argentina in her past history. She has gone further than most countries in making arbitration treaties which are intended to settle difficulties between nations without resort to war. Argentina can undoubtedly add great weight to the Multilateral Treaty by signing it. She is one of the great nations of the Western Hemisphere and influential in world affairs.
There are some suggestions in his speech which I think I can demonstrate spring from a want of knowledge of our local conditions. The Treaty was not proposed or signed with any idea of affecting our local political conditions or the elections of 1928. M. Briand proposed a bilateral treaty in exactly this same language in 1927 and the negotiations have been going on ever since until shortly before the signing. I am sending you some copies of the pamphlet which contain all the negotiations between the countries on the subject of this Treaty. There were no secret papers or conversations. Everything was made public as we proceeded. The principles of the Anti-War Treaty were endorsed both by the Democratic and by the Republican National Conventions and it is not an issue in this campaign nor has it been mentioned by either party as it is generally understood [Page 223] to meet the approval of all political parties. It is true the United States did not ratify the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations. It is unnecessary for me to review the history of this struggle which did to some extent become a political issue. One thing might be said in passing—that the United States was unwilling to commit itself to the application of sanctions or to use force against any belligerent country, that is, it cannot pledge its armed forces in advance. There were other objections to the Treaty which do not in my judgment bear upon the present Treaty at all.
A brief history of these negotiations might be useful to you although I présumé you are very familiar with them. As you know, M. Briand made a public speech in April, 1927 in which he announced that France would be willing to enter into a treaty agreeing that the two countries should never go to war with each other. On June 27, 1927, he sent me a note containing the form of a treaty proposed which is exactly in the language of the present Treaty with the exception of the preamble and such changes as were necessary to make it applicable to all the nations of the world. This proposition was given the most careful consideration not only by myself but by the President and many Senators, especially those of the Foreign Relations Committee, and on the twenty-seventh of December, 1927, I replied to Briand’s note accepting the principle but suggesting that it be applied to other nations. The intention then was and always has been that the Treaty should ultimately, if possible, be signed by all countries in the world thus making a notable declaration against war as a means of settling international disputes. I think some misunderstanding has occurred by reason of the fact that negotiations were not opened with all the countries in the world and especially with the leading nations of South America. There were no secret communications between the French Government and the United States or between the United States and any Government pertaining to this Treaty. I did not then believe, and do not now, that there was the necessity for such a treaty in Central and South America as in Europe. That was the seat of the last great war and the seeds of war were existent in Central Europe to a greater extent than in any other place in the world. I think it is an acknowledged fact that there is little danger of war in South America or anywhere in the Western Hemisphere. Nevertheless, it was my opinion then, and still is, that a declaration signed by all the countries in the world would have a greater influence, especially a greater moral influence, than one signed only by European countries. I did not think it was practical to undertake a negotiation with sixty-five nations. The time consumed in correspondence and discussion of various points would have made the project difficult if not impossible of solution within a reasonable time. I believed that if a treaty [Page 224] could be entered into between the principal Powers of Europe which was simple and did not involve any complicated system of sanctions or agreement to punish violators, that it would be readily accepted as a principle of international law by all the world. It was, therefore, thought wise to select six of the Powers involved in the last war—to wit, Japan, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and the United States—and accordingly negotiations were carried on with these countries. It is not a fact that Great Britain was the country which suggested that the Treaty be open to adhesion by all countries. That was my proposition originally and acquiesced in by France before Great Britain was called into the negotiations.
The only suggestion of extending the original signatories came from Great Britain and France in this way. Great Britain, as you will see, informed the United States that it could not sign for its Dominions and requested the United States to invite the Dominions directly sending the invitations to Canada and Ireland which countries had Ministers in the United States, and the other invitations to go through the British Government to the various Dominions. I realized that under the British Dominion system this was necessary and readily assented. I think, as I have explained to you before, France and Great Britain also raised the question as to whether the Treaty would be inconsistent with the obligations of the treaties entered into by Great Britain, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, known as the Locarno Treaties. Under these Treaties the countries agree not to go to war but if any one of the Powers should violate the Locarno Treaties, the other Powers agreed to come to the assistance of the aggrieved State and as this was construed by some of the countries to include armed assistance, a question was raised as to whether an absolute agreement not to go to war would be inconsistent with this obligation. In substance my reply was that if all the Locarno Powers signed this Treaty and they break the Locarno Treaty, they would necessarily break this Treaty and the other Powers would be released as to the belligerent country and would thereby retain their freedom of action. For that reason and no other, Belgium, Poland and Czechoslovakia were asked to sign and readily did so.
Senator Molinari suggested that the notes indicated that the Treaty was not inconsistent with the various treaties of neutrality and other secret treaties in Europe. I know of no secret treaties on this subject at all. All of the League Powers agree to file their treaties with the League and I believe we have all treaties bearing on this subject. The European Powers abandoned any idea that there was any inconsistency between their treaties guaranteeing neutrality and the Multilateral Treaty. Of course, all these Powers having [Page 225] signed the present Treaty, there could be no inconsistency because it is perfectly true that if any one violates the Locarno Treaties or any treaty guaranteeing neutrality, they would violate this Treaty also and the nations would be free to exercise their own volition as to the belligerent Power. Certainly this Treaty does not guarantee any other treaty in the world. It supplements the efforts made by other countries to maintain peace by a pledge of the nations of the world to this effect.
There are those who will undoubtedly claim that the best way to maintain peace is by military alliances, agreements between countries to punish a violator of the treaty, to apply sanctions or to use military force to put down any conflict between nations. That is not my opinion. I do not think military alliances have conduced to the peace of Europe. I do not believe independent nations will delegate to any authority the power to call for military forces or to require a nation to go to war for any purpose.
[Paraphrase.] I realize that this is an important step which should be carefully considered by the Argentine Government, and I do not wish to press Argentina in the matter. I would be very much pleased if all Central and South American countries adhered to the treaty. It would, I think, add greatly to its influence in the world, although I know the present world opinion is that South America is, as a whole, inclined to peace and not so likely to engage in war as other parts of the world. There is no objection to your conveying to Señor Molinari the substance of this message should you consider it wise, but I should not care to have it left as a memorandum. [End paraphrase.]