791.003/24
The Minister in Persia (Philip) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 2.]
Sir: In confirmation of my cable message No. 19 of April 27—12 noon reporting a public statement by the Shah to the effect that he had instructed his Government to take steps to bring about the abolition of the capitulations, I have the honor to report that this announcement gave rise to much comment and speculation on the part of my colleagues and the foreign nationals in Teheran.
The fact that the Shah’s statement appears at first to have been construed in many quarters as a virtual declaration that he had taken definite action to abolish the capitulatory rights enjoyed by foreign nations in Persia, or that he was about to do this, had the effect of enhancing the concern of several of the foreign representatives.
A meeting of the diplomatic representatives of the capitulatory treaty states was called by the German Minister for the afternoon of the 28th instant.
[Page 568]The morning of that date I happened to have a conversation with the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs. He confirmed my own impression that the Shah had availed himself of the opportunity of opening the judiciary departments organized by the new Minister of Justice, Mirza Ali Akbar Davar, to announce his desire to bring about the freedom of Persia from the capitulatory treaties. Mr. Pakrevan stated his conviction that his Government had no intention of acting with precipitation in the matter, and that all due consideration for the foreign governments concerned would be exercised in taking steps toward the end desired by all Persians. He also said that the Prime Minister had the intention of making public a statement on the subject at an early date.
Later in the same day I was engaged to lunch with Mr. Abdul Hussein Teimourtache, Minister of the Court, with whom, and the Belgian Minister, I had a conversation on that occasion.
Mr. Teimourtache spoke with great assurance and decision concerning the policy of his Government in the matter of the capitulations, though he did admit that there was no intention of taking any immediate radical action in their regard.
Briefly, he asserted that he believed the abolition of capitulations would be an easy matter and that his Government will bring this about by the simple process of giving official notice of its intention to terminate the existing treaties on the expiration of the interval mentioned for that purpose in the several pacts.
He went on to say that Poland, Russia and Turkey are now without capitulatory rights. France and Spain have perpetual treaties.24 The capitulatory rights of Great Britain are guaranteed by the “Most Favored Nation” clause in its Treaty.25 The treaties of all other nations having relations with Persia provide for their cancellation at the will of either party.
Mr. Teimourtache stated that Persia could if necessary break relations with France should that Government refuse to agree to the suppression of its capitulatory rights. To the question of the Treaty with Spain he did not attach importance as the relations with that country were practically nil. The notification to all remaining governments that Persia desired to terminate her treaties with them would then leave Great Britain in the position of having no capitulatory rights, owing to the absence of any “Favored Nation”.
The energetic Minister of the Court further insisted that Persia either has in force, or is about to initiate modernized codes of laws; and that she is now completely reorganizing the departments of Justice; [Page 569] that Persia is determined to free herself from the capitulatory bonds with which she is one of the last nations in the world to be tied, etc. He added that of course Persia hoped and expected to have the friendly co-operation of the Powers in this step, and that as soon as it had the assent of the majority of foreign governments he was sure the others would follow their lead.
My Belgian colleague appeared to be greatly impressed by this conversation and argued at length in regard to various phases of the situation which might arise as a result of such action. I said that I was not prepared to discuss the matter at that time but that I would only say that I was certain that my Government would sympathetically receive and consider any proposals that might be advanced by Persia in the future. At the same time, I expressed myself as quite sure the Persian Government had no intention of approaching the subject in a hasty and brusque manner, or in one which might react to its disadvantage in other directions.
All the chief diplomatic representatives of foreign Governments in Persia, save the Russian, the Turkish, the Polish and the Japanese representatives were present at the diplomatic meeting which was held the afternoon of the 28th instant.
It may be mentioned that the Japanese representative now here is not yet accredited, but is on special mission, with the stated object of negotiating a treaty with Persia. I have been told that one of the chief difficulties which has been encountered in these negotiations has been the desire of the Japanese Government to be granted similar capitulatory rights as those enjoyed by the nationals of other powers in Persia.
The business of the diplomatic meeting consisted of an informal discussion of the situation arising from the Shah’s statements at the opening of the Ministry of Justice. Several of those present, including myself, had received many inquiries from their various nationals engaged in business in the country, regarding the possible effect of drastic action by the Government. I said that I had replied to such inquiries in the sense that I saw no occasion for alarm of any kind and that I had received no intimation of any impending or drastic action on the part of this Government in connection with the capitulations. The Belgian Minister repeated the conversation we had had with Teimourtache, and both he and the German Minister impressed me as being somewhat apprehensive, perhaps, lest the Shah’s statements might be the prelude to a sudden move to abolish extra-territorial rights at once. No others seemed to share that view. The British Minister, who was present accompanied by the Oriental Secretary of the Legation and the British Consul, took practically no part in the discussions. I said that I saw no reason for action of any kind on the part of the diplomatic body as the outcome of [Page 570] the Shah’s statements, and that I did not consider those of the Minister of the Court either as official or as an indication of a decision by the Government to take immediate action to abolish the capitulations. I asked the British Minister if he did not agree with me (as the others seemed to do). He said, he did; and that he had heard nothing whatever from the Government of any such intention.
The meeting terminated after a short discussion as to the validity of certain rights, guaranteed by the former “Tourkmantchai” Treaty with Persia of 1828,26 concerning criminal trials, etc. In this connection was cited as an analogous case the trial of an American citizen for criminal assault upon another American having been held in an American consular court, subsequent to the abrogation of the Tourkmantchai Treaty. There was likewise a discussion as to whether the treaty provisions governing the administration of the estates of foreign nationals dying in Persia were to be defined as capitulatory or treaty rights. The Italian Minister maintained that they would not be affected by the abolition of the capitulations.
I have the honor to state that my despatch No. 330 of May 2, 1927,27 particularly mentions the address of the Shah at the opening of the reorganized Ministry of Justice on the 26th instant.
I am unable for the moment to discern anything more serious in the situation than a public expression by the Shah of a very general national ambition in Persia. Yet I feel very certain that there are influences strongly pushing the Shah to early and determined action in the matter of foreign capitulatory rights.
The Soviet Government, it may be taken for granted, is not backward in this. And I feel assured that pressure is being brought in that quarter to cause Persia to act.
I have been informed also that the attitude of the Turkish Government is one of impatience over the delay on the part of Persia in abolishing all foreign capitulatory rights (as was done by Turkey), following a tacit agreement mutually to waive such rights for Turkish and Persian nationals in the territories of each Government.
It has been likewise rumored here that Great Britain, in testimony of her continued friendship for the dynasty of Reza Shah, has given some intimation of sympathy in anticipation of a decision by Persia to throw off the capitulatory yoke. In regard to this I have received as yet no definite information of a reliable nature. But I will report anything of seeming importance in this connection.
A somewhat interesting side light is thrown upon the attitude of Persia in this matter of capitulations by an item of information which came to me recently from a seemingly reliable source. This was to [Page 571] the effect that the actual reason for the continued refusal of the Persian Government officially to recognize Iraq is due to the refusal of the latter Government to accord to Persian nationals in Iraq the special status in the civil court suits that is extended to the nationals of other foreign powers there.
I have [etc.]
- Treaty of July 12, 1855, between France and Persia, British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xlv, p. 869. Treaty of March 4, 1842, between Spain and Persia, ibid., vol. lviii, p. 592.↩
- Treaty of March 4, 1857, between Great Britain and Persia, ibid., xlvii, pp. 42, 44.↩
- Treaty of February 10/22, 1828, between Russia and Persia, British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xv, p. 669.↩
- Infra.↩