817.00/4727: Telegram
The Minister in Nicaragua (Eberhardt) to the Secretary of State
Managua, April 26,
1927—noon.
[Received 9:30 p.m.]
[Received 9:30 p.m.]
109. Your telegram No. 75.46 Received following from Stimson:
- 1.
- Yesterday47 Sacasa agreed to appoint representatives to come to Managua to discuss informally and unofficially with me “the adequate means for a pacific solution of the present conflict.” While his message is not entirely satisfactory as to his readiness to compromise question of Diaz legitimacy, his action considerably raises my hope that on arrival of his representatives a settlement may eventually be found possible.
- 2.
- This, however, I believe to greatly depend upon maintenance of a firm military attitude by the United States in the face of improving insurgent military position. It now seems reasonably clear that Moncada has probably effected a very considerable concentration not far from Tipitapa and is in position to threaten either Managua or Granada. Diaz forces formerly facing Moncada now reported to have left their positions and withdrawn southward.
- 3.
- Admiral has shown me his despatch of yesterday asking authority to hold insurgent advance if necessary at Tipitapa River.48 I think his request should be granted. Believe it comes within the scope of general purpose of instructions under which he has been acting. Advance of the insurgents across river would constitute [Page 329] serious menace to railroad now guarded by naval forces and also to American and foreign lives and interests in the principal cities of Managua and Granada.
- 4.
- From the standpoint of my own efforts at a peaceful solution by settlement, believe such action by Admiral if taken would be decidedly helpful. On the other hand if insurgents are allowed to cross the river not only will peaceful solution on just lines be rendered more difficult but the severities of this brutal and bitter war will be extended into an important area hitherto substantially exempt.
- 5.
- In the light of foregoing development of the situation, would answer questions in your telegram 75 as follows: Very prevalent opinion among Nicaraguans that our military attitude thus far represents a covert intention to intervene selfishly on the side of Conservatives but that we are held back from decisive action by vacillating and timid policy. The most responsible Liberal military leaders like Moncada, however, do not desire or intend to fight the United States. On such men the manifestation of a firm policy to give them a fair election in 1928 and for that purpose to now disarm impartially all parties would in my opinion probably terminate organized resistance to our action not later than first contact of the forces. On the other hand think it probable that some guerilla bands would continue active and make trouble for considerable period in the more remote districts. Believe that the more thickly populated districts of west coast probably could be rendered tranquil and protected before July first. Forcible disarmament probably could be accomplished by present forces in this country but could be rendered more speedy and certain by reenforcement of 800 men. If it were authorized within my discretion to intimate to Sacasa the alternative of forcible disarmament, believe it would facilitate chance of settlement particularly if it were backed by simultaneous or previous announcement from military commander, when necessary, that insurgents would not be allowed to cross river. Whatever effect upon Sacasa, believe it would greatly affect many of his more practical military associates.
- 6.
- Minister and Admiral concur; and detailed answers to your questions by Admiral Latimer after full consideration by him with General Feland,49 upon which foregoing summary largely depends, follow as part 2.50
- 7.
- Strongly suggest that Department hereafter use less complicated code in view of rapidly changing situation and necessity of prompt and accurate information. Stimson.”
Eberhardt