817.00/4720: Telegram
The Minister in Nicaragua (Eberhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:40 p.m.]
107. Following from Stimson:
“Developments of the last two days amply justify the assertion on the military situation expressed in my cipher telegram 105.45 While insurgents thus far seem to be avoiding decisive battle they are appearing in larger numbers than anticipated, organized and in good morale, and taking initiative in movement. On the other hand pessimism growing in Diaz circle. The underlying fact in situation is that owing to constant recruitment and desertions from both sides the country is full of armed men and groups of actual or potential bandits. In this sense it is rapidly nearing anarchy and no settlement, would be of value which did not begin with general disarmament. Neither side would disarm on faith of other’s disarmament alone and the only way it could possibly be peacefully accomplished would be through and presence of marines acting as custodians of arms.
Another important feature is necessity of peace before June in order to secure any crop during coming year.
After repeated discussion with men of both parties Diaz placed yesterday in my hands signed outline of terms of peace to which he would agree to as follows:
- 1.
- Immediate general peace in time for new crop and delivery of arms simultaneously by both parties to American custody.
- 2.
- General amnesty and return of exiles and return of confiscated property.
- 3.
- Participation in Diaz cabinet by representative Liberals.
- 4.
- Organization of a Nicaraguan Constabulary on a nonpartisan basis commanded by American officers.
- 5.
- Supervision of elections in 1928 and succeeding years by Americans who will have ample police powers to make such supervision effective.
- 6.
- Continuance temporarily of sufficient force of marines to make foregoing effective.
Thereafter four prominent Liberals, two being members of Liberal National Party Committee, transmitted to Sacasa through naval wireless following:
General Stimson, personal representative of President Coolidge, is here. We have exchanged impressions with him. He tells me [us] informally and unofficially that after discussing the political situation with Señor Diaz he is confident that Diaz would make a [Page 327] settlement on the following basis. Here follow Diaz peace terms as above. The suggested settlement is on the basis of Diaz in office until 1928. With the approval of General Stimson we transmit the following [foregoing] to you. Mr. Stimson stated to us that he would be glad to confer in Managua with a representative authorized by you. We request that you reply to us at once as he desires a prompt reply to make to Sacasa [sic].
Other Liberals had previously wired Sacasa urging appointment of representative to talk with me. I have been careful to state repeatedly to both sides that I had no authority to promise acceptance of responsibility by President Coolidge. I think it very astonishing if Sacasa will accept Diaz overture but all this will put him on record against what is manifestly and on its face a generous offer.
The chief hope of acceptance lies in fact that this is first time Diaz has offered to disarm on his side, and recognition by Liberals that this protects them against Diaz control of 1928 election. Organization of a Constabulary under temporary American command as well as instruction seems to be absolutely essential to make successful supervision of election possible and could probably be justified within the limits of Executive power by invitation of Nicaraguan Government, passage of Nicaraguan law and general doctrine of good offices as in Tacna-Arica case. Creation of such Constabulary would eventually greatly reduce number of marines necessary to guarantee stability. Presence of naval forces now highly necessary as controlling factor to stabilize situation and make any settlement possible. If they are removed I believe country would break up into anarchy unless dominated by another country. The general distribution of arms is a new factor in situation not present heretofore. If Sacasa refuses to settle I fear only alternative will be between leaving country to such anarchy and a forcible disarmament of the insurgents by the marines. Minister and Admiral concur in this cable. Stimson.”