Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927, Volume III

817.00/4714: Telegram

The Minister in Nicaragua (Eberhardt) to the Secretary of State

Managua, April 20, 1927—7 p.m.
[Received April 21—1:10 a.m.]

105. Following from Stimson:

“In the past four days have conferred repeatedly and fully Minister, Admiral, and other military officers also Diaz and several members of Government, with many leading citizens including chief Liberals not now in exile, with American financial advisers and some foreign diplomatic representatives. In view of Department’s 72, April 15, 6 p.m., deem it important to give first strong impressions, concurred in by Minister and Admiral, who have approved all statements herein.

• First. Military situation. Deem Department overoptimistic as to Diaz power to bring about early peace; has won substantial success but has not destroyed organized rebel forces; even if he should destroy them indications are that protracted guerilla warfare may ensue; Moncada reported as very bitter and determined to continue such warfare in absence of proper settlement. Has not been captured and Government wholly ignorant as to whereabouts and plans. Only $400,000 left of Diaz present loan⁴⁰ and at present rate of expenditures this will only last 6 weeks, after which Government will have literally no financial means for defense. In short, quite clear that no Nicaraguan leader is able by arms and without United States or other foreign assistance to restore and maintain peace.
• Second. Have made it quite clear in all conferences that the United States will not reconsider recognition of Diaz; that all discussion with me must begin with that fact; that to all Americans Diaz is legitimate chief magistrate until end of term 1928. Department need not have slightest concern as to this being fully and universally understood. Have then expressed myself ready to consider and report any suggestions of settlement from any source starting with this initial fact.
• Third. Following this, all with whom I conferred without any exception have stressed the absolute necessity of 1928 election being supervised by United States. Importance and bitterness of Diaz legitimacy arises directly out of fact that in Nicaragua, as in all other Central American countries, Government regularly can and does control result of election. Present Conservative or Liberal control of Government machinery will determine result of 1928 election in favor of respective party unless free election is assured by the United States.
• Fourth. Furthermore Washington conferences of 1907⁴¹ and 1923⁴² have made question of free elections very heart of Nicaraguan problem as well as of general Central American problem. Owing to government-controlled elections the only way to accomplish change in party control of Government is by revolution or coup d’état. By forbidding latter, Washington conferences have strongly tended to make existing party control permanent and the United States as strongest sponsor of the said conferences becomes target of hatred of opposition. In dealing with Central American situation those conferences have thus treated the symptom and not the disease.
• Fifth. While reserving final conclusions, am now strongly impressed that the greatest inducement that can now be offered to Liberal leaders to agree to early peace would be the knowledge that the United States would supervise elections of 1928, exercising sufficient police powers for that purpose. Both the Government and Liberal leaders have spontaneously and without exception indicated to me that they would gladly request such police power. Furthermore, believe that such supervision could be continued with similar consent in subsequent years and thus be made means for gradual political education of Nicaraguans in self-government through free elections. Believe that such action by the United States would appeal far more strongly to both American and Latin American public sentiment than naked military intervention in support of Diaz and against Liberals which may otherwise quite probably become necessary to bring about early pacification of the country. Such a naked military intervention in 1912, with no vigorous attempt to improve political methods of Nicaragua, proved to be wholly barren of permanent political benefit and peace lasted only 25 days after withdrawal of marines. Therefore believe we should endeavor to carry out a more constructive effort now.
• Sixth. In the light of personal experience in Tacna-Arica affair,⁴³ am fully alive to dangers and difficulties of supervision of elections and am studying carefully details and lines of approach with view to limitation of American Executive power, and presenting matter in most favorable light for senatorial and congressional ratification in case that becomes desirable.
• Seventh. In view of foregoing, earnestly hope President will not crystallize mind against election supervision until I can report finally. If that possibility excluded, should deem my visit here of comparatively little use. Please show him this cable. Unless immediately notified to the contrary shall assume that request for American supervision of elections made by Nicaraguan Government and leaders of Liberal opposition would be at least most seriously considered by the President. Stimson.”

Eberhardt

40. See post, pp. 406 ff.
41. See Foreign Relations, 1907, pt. 2, pp. 665 ff.
42. See Conference on Central American Affairs.
43. See Foreign Relations, 1926, vol. i, pp. 260 ff.