893.00 Nanking/154
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
The Japanese Ambassador called this morning at eleven o’clock to discuss with me the proposed note in reply to the answer of Eugene Chen. He said he had received a message indicating that his Government felt that it would be unfortunate for there to be any split between the Powers over this matter, that a failure of the Powers to act together would have an unfortunate reaction upon the Chinese authorities. I [Page 212] assured him that this Government had at no time stated that it would not cooperate with the other governments in Chinese matters; that the question now was as to what action we should take in reply to the note of Eugene Chen. On this matter the United States had stated to Mr. MacMurray that this Government was not willing to join in the note recommended by the Ministers of the Powers at Peking and that was the extent of our instructions. Further we were not willing to apply sanctions or to discuss the subject of sanctions at this time. The Japanese Ambassador said that that was exactly the attitude of his Government. They were not willing, he said, to join in the proposed note and not willing to apply sanctions.
He then proposed a substitute note, which is as follows:
“On 11 April the Representatives of the American, British, French, Italian and Japanese Governments presented in identic notes certain terms for the prompt settlement of the situation created by the outrages against their nationals committed by the Nationalist troops at Nanking on March 24.
“To these identic notes the Nationalist Authorities have not returned an identic reply, but have answered each representative separately and in varying terms which are not calculated to ensure speedy settlement of the incident which has arisen. Not one of the demands made has been accepted unequivocally by the Nationalist Authorities. Reservations have been attached to the acceptance of each.
“The terms presented in the identic notes of eleventh April were not proposals open to discussion but the basic demands which the Powers concerned are determined themselves be carried out.
“Only after the Nationalist Authorities have signified with a plain and unqualified affirmative that they are prepared promptly and completely to comply with these terms can any discussion regarding details take place.
“The Governments concerned therefore feel obliged to request that the Nationalist Authorities will state unequivocally and without delay their intention to proceed to the integral fulfillment of the terms presented.”
In going over the matter, I pointed out to him that the following clause was not strictly accurate as applied to the reply to the United States—“Not one of the demands has been accepted unequivocally by the Nationalist Authorities. Reservations have been attached to the acceptance of each”. I told him that so far as the violation of the American Consulate in Nanking was concerned, the so-called Nationalist Government had admitted the violation, offered reparations whether the violation was by Nationalist soldiers or the Northern soldiers, that the Consulate was upon Chinese territory and was entitled to protection; that I did not consider this clause as unequivocal and that I could not say that reservations had been attached to this statement. Another provision of the reply was that the Chinese Authorities were willing to make reparations for any damage done except [Page 213] where it was caused by the bombardment by the British and American vessels or by Northern soldiers. As the United States did not request any reparations thus caused, we did not consider this reservation as unreasonable. No damage was done to American property by the bombardment and no demand was made for any injury caused by Northern soldiers.
Again, as to that clause which requested guarantee in writing against anti-foreign agitation and demanding protection of American citizens, the reply seemed to us unequivocal and is practically what we asked for. It is true that the reply as a whole was not satisfactory; that we were satisfied the damage was done by Nationalist soldiers; that we did not think it advisable to have a joint inquiry as the United States had made its own inquiry, as had the other countries, and we believe that our facts were accurately stated in the original demands.
I also pointed out to him that this proposed draft stated that “demands which the Powers concerned are determined themselves be carried out”; that this seemed to me as strong a threat as contained in the originally proposed answer. I asked him how the Powers propose to enforce these demands,—whether against Eugene Chen or Chiang Kai Shek or the Nationalist Army; that it was not at all clear whether Eugene Chen could comply if he wished to and Chiang Kai Shek had made no response.
I then told him that while I would take the matter up with the President and give careful consideration to the Japanese proposal, I suggested that it might be wise to wait a short time to see what developed in the South; that apparently there was a break between the Hankow Government and Chiang Kai Shek and, as I had stated before, I questioned the wisdom of sending an answer which was less positive than the original demands as this would be interpreted by the Chinese as weakening; on the other hand to send an answer which committed the Governments further as to sanctions would be equally unwise and between these two points it was questionable in my mind whether the Governments should not wait and see how the result of this split in the Nationalist Authorities developed. The Ambassador was very emphatic that his Government would not apply sanctions and admitted the wisdom of these suggestions which he said he would cable to his Government. I did not refuse to join in this proposal but I suggested these objections.
We then discussed the question of sending troops to Peking and Tientsin. He said his Government was not willing at this time to send any more troops to these places; that they had increased their forces at Tientsin up to 1500. I stated that both the British Government and the United States believed that if an army was to be sent to Peking [Page 214] and Tientsin sufficient to protect those places and the communication to the sea from attack by a regular organized Chinese army, at least 50,000 men—possibly more—would be necessary; that the British Government was only willing to send one brigade—probably 4,000 men; that if the occasion required, the United States would be able to send probably 3,000 more Marines, perhaps more, which we thought would be ample to protect the Legation and the Americans in Tientsin against mob violence. He said he did not believe that any Chinese Army would attack the Legations or the foreigners in Tientsin. In any event, he said his Government was not willing at this time to send the troops mentioned in the British note,66 of which I informed him.