500.A15/318: Telegram
The American Delegate on the Preparatory Commission (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 12 (?)—12:38 a.m.]
40. I have conversed twice with Chamberlain, at his request, on the work of the Preparatory Commission. He expressed the view that course pursued by our delegation had been sound and practical. Although he was not wholly familiar with details of the proceedings, Chamberlain feels that there has been regrettable departure from practical considerations by the Preparatory Commission as a whole and that outlook for progress is dismal. He said that the British delegation had lost patience and had requested him to instruct them to take a strong stand for constructive work. He had felt that he was unable to give instructions without first consulting the Cabinet and possibly Council for Imperial Defense. It was also his feeling that he could not take action without conferring with Lord Cecil, who has the entire charge of matters which bear on the Preparatory Commission.
It was my impression that Chamberlain was reluctant to press this issue at present in view of other differences of views with the French, who have asserted vigorously their position that any disarmament must hinge upon security resulting from previous knowledge about help to be expected against an aggressor state under article XVI of the League Covenant.97 A series of proposals calculated to expedite action under article XVI had been introduced in the drafting committee by the French delegation. On the ground that these proposals were not within the competence of the Preparatory Commission, they were referred to the League Council.
In recent meeting of the Council Chamberlain insisted that consideration of those proposals go over until Council’s September session. He told me, however, that he had not been able to state his real reasons which were that the opposition in Germany to entering the League was based principally on article XVI; that any action tending to give new interpretation to that article at present time might arouse renewed opposition in Germany and he felt it imperative, therefore, to put off any discussion on amending the Covenant until Germany was in the League.
Chamberlain said he had told Briand that he thought the French proposals futile, that no government [garbled group], that the degree [Page 109] of help to be given under article XVI would be determined for each state by circumstances of each case, by the identity of aggressor and of the state attacked, and by the interest of the contributing state; that, deplorable though it might be, nothing would change the fact that no government would write a blank check for the League to use in dealing with any hypothetical case of aggression which might arise. He had tried to persuade the French that they were pursuing a course from which they could not obtain any benefits and that it would be much better to get down to realities and deal with visible armaments, and to leave such questions as security, national resources, etc., to be handled later as influencing factors in any general scheme of disarmament. He did not seem to be of the opinion that his arguments had made any impression.
I spoke of our attitude toward premature adjournment of the military subcommittee. Chamberlain agreed that our position was sound but appeared to be uncertain what British attitude would be. Later I was told by one of the British delegation that Chamberlain had expressed himself as impressed by bad effects of adjournment as I had stated them, and that it was hoped that on his return to London he would arrange to have the British delegation take firm stand against any general adjournment.
Edouard Beneš in talking with Dulles expressed the view that no progress was to be expected in matter of disarmament until Germany had entered League of Nations and until the Locarno pacts had been tried out and found to be effective. He seemed to feel that when that had been done some measure of disarmament might be achieved.
- See Senate Document No. 46, 66th Cong., 1st sess., p. 21.↩