500.A15/271: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (MacVeagh)
43. The representative in Geneva of the Associated Press reports that the Japanese delegation has a complete program for the limitation of both land and naval armaments; that it prefers treating these questions separately; and that it would be willing to participate in a naval conference at Washington, even if only Great Britain, the United States, and Japan were to attend.
In regard to this report, our delegate, Minister Gibson, commented to Department yesterday as follows:
“I made inquiries of the chief Japanese delegate, Matsuda, concerning this report. He agreed with the statement that the Japanese Government was disposed to discuss either in Washington or elsewhere the question of naval reduction and he empowered me to report this confidentially as emanating from him. He said that he felt it was impracticable to attempt to find a formula for naval reduction which should be applicable to the entire world and that if anything could be accomplished, it could only be between the powers most vitally interested. He said that he believed that we all should take part fully and sincerely in the discussions of naval affairs by the Preparatory Commission but that some ground might be found in the meantime for direct agreement between the naval powers most interested. He likewise said that while his Government was ready to come to Washington, if a naval conference were necessary, nevertheless, he thought an agreement might be reached at Geneva without a prolonged international conference. Moreover, the favorable effect on popular opinion might be considerably increased if such an arrangement could be concluded quietly and without arousing previous expectations through the complicated methodology of an international conference.
Lord Cecil in his opening speech on Tuesday alluded to the fact that the Washington Conference had not provided for the limitation of submarine and cruiser strength and stated that he felt that supplementary agreements might be concluded with regard to these types. I deemed it wise to speak to Cecil informally of this matter rather than to allow him to hear of it through the press. He said that he would consider unfortunate any undue publicity to the notion of a separate naval conference at Washington just at the time the Preparatory Commission was getting under way, as such action might be interpreted [Page 105] as an attempt to undercut the work of the Commission, but he added that he was under no illusions as to the possibility of reaching universal naval reduction and that he felt the sole hope lay in direct agreement either at Washington or at Geneva between the interested naval powers. He furthermore said that while it might be in the general interest to minimize public talk of a separate conference for the present, this should be without prejudice to our right to consider holding such a conference or concluding an agreement at Geneva when the Commission had had its chance to show what it could accomplish and if it should fail to make a beginning for a general naval agreement.”
If the Embassy has any information which might throw light on the Japanese attitude set forth above, the Department would like to obtain it.