893.512/468: Telegram
The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State
[Paraphrase]
598. Referring to my number 594 of December 2.
- 1.
- On December 2nd the Inspector General of Customs, the Japanese Minister, and I were invited by the British Chargé to discuss with him the introduction of illegal taxes proposed at Hankow. The latter indicated that there is a determination on the part of the British Government to avoid antagonizing the Cantonese regime by a protest, and that if possible the British Government will make its acquiescence the means of having the collection of the taxes entrusted to the Maritime Customs.
- 2.
- Aglen acknowledged that he would welcome the opportunity—to the end that the Customs Service be preserved—of having the collection entrusted to it. However, he reached the conclusion after careful consideration that, without the unanimous consent of the treaty powers, collection could not be undertaken by the Customs.
- 3.
- The Japanese Minister had already referred to his Government, after consulting the British Chargé, the alternatives presented in my telegram, paragraph 2, cited above. He now declared that, until he received new instructions, it must be his position that protests against the levy of illegal surtaxes must be continued by his Government despite the fact that such protests may remain futile until the time when it may be possible and expedient by forcible measures or otherwise to make the protests good. He insisted particularly on his Government’s view that the levy of the surtaxes the Washington Customs Treaty has in view was to be only upon conditions which [Page 905] were to be determined by the Special Conference and therefore that to accede to those surtaxes or similar ones would be impossible except upon the fulfillment of such conditions.
- 4.
- The contemplated action of the Canton Nationalists, the British Chargé d’Affaires pointed out, and Aglen and I agreed, would create a situation in which there would actually be levies of the Washington surtaxes in every port controlled by Nationalists and inevitably elsewhere in China within a short time, without the remotest possibility that the Chinese could be brought by the other signatories even to discuss any of the considerations or the conditions the treaty contemplated. Realizing we are not prepared to insist that our treaty rights be respected, the Nationalists have maneuvered us around to where talk about the Washington treaty obligations being mutual is academic. We have a choice only of allowing the Nationalists to destroy the Customs organization and the treaty system of trade, or of giving the benefits of the Washington surtaxes to the Chinese without conditions.
- 5.
- I suggested that the best exit from the dilemma was the third alternative I mentioned in paragraph 4 of my telegram cited above. I urged that it differed intrinsically very little from the British proposal, and that we should consent to the surtaxes, explaining as well as we could that after all these surtaxes were an equivalent of the Washington surtaxes. Our taking the position of carrying out our Washington obligations is vastly different from yielding to a violation of our treaty rights and afterward referring to the treaty by way of excusing our weakness. This suggestion was very earnestly supported by Aglen, who agreed it would make an appeal to the Chinese as being a course of action which was much more worthy of the powers and consonant with their dignity. The British Chargé, O’Malley, said he himself was able to see little practical difference between this method and the other but that he would be ready on the strength of the opinions of Aglen and myself to recommend it to his Government. Yoshizawa, the Japanese Minister, was not persuaded to commit himself beyond stating that he would consult with his Government.
- 6.
- We were all in agreement in thinking that a definite crisis regarding the whole system of trade with China will be brought about by the Cantonese attempt to levy these surtaxes at the port of Hankow. Excepting Yoshizawa, who did not commit himself, we also agreed that to anticipate this action by the Nationalists through a declaration by the powers—which in effect would allow the Washington surtaxes to be levied throughout China for the benefit of whatever authorities happened to have control at the various ports, without a quid pro quo and without conditions except that the levy of such surtaxes [Page 906] would rest with the Maritime Customs—offered the sole possible way to make a substantial salvage out of the wreck.
- 7.
- I undertook a further discussion of this matter yesterday afternoon with O’Malley. We were both wholly convinced that in the possibility of action by the powers practically at once along these suggested lines lay our best hope of avoiding a disaster to the trading interests of foreigners. We feel that as a practical means to this end we should continue to discuss the matter with Yoshizawa, during which we might phrase some concrete, simple formula, the adoption of which might be requested of the remaining foreign delegations to the Special Tariff Conference. In our opinion most, if not all, of the powers less interested would likely follow our lead comparatively readily, particularly were the Japanese Government to give approval to the proposal. However, we feel that the position which Japan may take presents the greatest danger to the project, though their position is not hopeless. In view of this we agreed that in asking his Government for authority to proceed upon the indicated lines, each of us would request his Government also to have its Tokyo Embassy press upon the Foreign Office there the fact that the crisis is imminent and that, confronted by the practical and immediate dilemma facing us, it is futile to try to impose conditions or bargain or argue the interpretation of the customs treaty.
- 8.
- I have said on the basis of your 278 of November 23d,90 that I had hopes of your giving approval to unconditional implementation of the Washington Treaty by unilateral action on the part of the powers, excepting China. It is my earnest hope that the Department will give me authorization, in anticipation of the extraordinary crisis likely soon to confront us, to proceed without delay in this matter according to the indicated course, and that it will authorize that support of this plan be given at the Japanese Foreign Office by the Embassy at Tokyo cooperating there with the British Embassy.
- 9.
- Inasmuch as startlingly rapid developments have taken place in the situation since my telegram 566, November 20,91 seeming to rule out every alternative from consideration with the exception of the powers granting the Washington surtaxes of their own volition immediately and unconditionally, I am not making any other reply to your 278, November 23.
- 10.
- This telegram and my 594 repeated to Tokyo, December 4, 9 p.m.
MacMurray