Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1926, Volume I

723.2515/2187: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Arica (Von Tresckow)

[Paraphrase]

Washington, April 24, 1926—3 p.m.

For Lassiter.

1. Your telegram of April 23, 11 a.m., reached me too late yesterday evening to make possible a reply. This morning my associates, Mr. Hughes, and I again carefully reviewed situation in light of your earnest recommendations.

2. We conceive that first duty for all of us is to safeguard and protect impartial position of this Government and of the Arbitrator. Even the parties to the controversy themselves, on any statesmanlike view of their own interests, are bound to regard this condition as fundamental and indispensable. Firm adherence to this guiding principle can not possibly entail slightest embarrassment to anyone, and it would be, we should suppose, in the highest degree gratifying to you as president of the Plebiscitary Commission. No matter how we may differ over details of procedure we can not feel that there ought to be any difference of opinion on this pivotal point on which our policy must turn.

3. Through the exercise of good offices, a conscientious and by no means hopeless effort to adjust the controversy is being made. Nobody can tell, at present moment, what will be the result. We are in the middle of the stream and undeniably the situation is critical. As far as good offices are concerned, the responsibility rests squarely upon us, and I can assure you that we feel it keenly. We want and we greatly appreciate your wholehearted cooperation in seeing this business through; and in fixing conditions to promote success of the good offices we are obliged to do the best we can, basing our judgment on all information we have at our disposal, much of which can not as a practical matter be weighed and appreciated except at place where the negotiations converge and are controlled. As far as good offices and conditions favoring their continuance are concerned, we consequently accept the entire responsibility.

4. Our considered judgment is that all attempts either to prejudge the issues which affect the suspension, termination, or eventual celebration of the plebiscite, or to deal with contingencies which have not yet arisen, are both unnecessary and dangerous. For the present, the only safe and proper course is for us to cross each bridge as we come to it, and to cross it with the utmost caution, avoiding any step which at this juncture need not be faced. Precise question before us is whether the present registration period shall be extended 25 days from and after April 26. Whatever is done about this extension will, naturally, be capitalized by both sides for purposes of argument. It seems to us that on this subject we do not need to concern ourselves with any idle speculation. The simple test is what course will disturb the existing situation the least and will least prejudice the normal progress of good offices; we are convinced that on the whole it would be most unwise to permit a technical termination of this vital plebiscitary process, thereby placing a new weapon in Chile’s hands, closing door to Peru, at least temporarily, and gratuitously introducing new legal complications which we must regard as serious. For these reasons we must insist upon request made in my telegram April 20, 2 p.m.,⁶⁸ and renewed April 22, 2 p.m.

5. We mean to press this effort to settle by negotiation to the very limit. Negotiations will not terminate until and unless either Chile or Peru or both take the responsibility of bringing them to an end. If good offices should not succeed, then one of three things might happeitem:

(i) It is conceivable that both parties to the controversy might go ahead with the plebiscite. In this kaleidoscopic situation it is impossible to predict what might be exact position of the contestants at that moment. Of course if both want plebiscite to continue, your duty will be plain.

(ii) It is also conceivable that both parties might refuse to proceed. Should that happen, your duty would likewise be plain; there would be nothing to do but to suspend or abandon the plebiscite.

(iii) Chile might insist that registration be completed and the plebiscite celebrated, with Peru refusing to participate and perhaps withdrawing. It is in that contingency, and only in that contingency, that issue of going through with unilateral plebiscite or some form of termination or suspension would be definitely presented. Several lines of action would then have to be considered. Possibly your duty would be to make one last attempt to bring Peru back in by exaction of new guarantees pledging honor of Chile and by placing before Peru another opportunity to try out plebiscite again under guarantees of that nature. Should a plebiscite be held under such guarantees and they were to prove ineffectual, the chances of having before us, as a basis for a finding on the question of frustration, something more definable and conclusive than we have now would be increased. On other hand, if Peru refused to accept these guarantees and withdrew from plebiscite, the issue would be a unilateral plebiscite or nothing. At this point we confess to a feeling of disappointment regarding state of the evidence bearing upon Chile’s alleged frustration. We have already stressed importance of having a record on this subject adequate to sustain any finding that may be made. To make a flat declaration out of hand with nothing to point to but sweeping assertions and general opinions and statements which have been taken in course of ex parte investigations, strikes us as being altogether inadequate. An indictment of a sovereign state can not be drawn in this manner. Chile would clearly be entitled to a hearing. We are not in a position to determine and it would not be proper to prejudge action of Arbitrator who must act ultimately as a judge upon record before him. It might be necessary for the Arbitrator, in order that case might be fully heard and his final determination made as invulnerable as possible to attack, to order up the evidence, possibly to take additional evidence, and to provide for an appropriate hearing. In determining his course the Arbitrator must reserve complete freedom of action.

Kellogg

68. Not printed.