Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924, Volume I

893.00/5814: Telegram

The Chargé in China (Mayer) to the Secretary of State

Peking, December 3, 1924—3 p.m.
[Received December 3—1:30 p.m.]

468. My 466, December 2, noon, and 465, December 1, 4 p.m.

1. Chang’s sudden departure from Peking has further complicated situation which is very obscure. Numerous rumors, very few facts. Chang has returned to old headquarters at Tientsin. Military attaché reports all Fengtien troops at Peking moving toward Tientsin. Feng Yu-hsiang remains in vicinity of Peking and from all accounts refuses to grant interviews or discuss politics and insists on resigning despite efforts by Government to dissuade him from; such action. Ex-Emperor took refuge 29th in Japanese Legation where apparently still remains. I have it from best authority that ex-Emperor originally desired take refuge in British Legation but was dissuaded therefrom. His action a complete surprise.

2. Judging from statements made to me by Chang Tso-lin, as reported my 465, December 1, 4 p.m., and fears entertained rather generally that Feng Yu-hsiang is subject to Kuomintang and Soviet influence as reported in fifth paragraph my 459, November 29, 6 p.m., and persistent statements that Feng Yu-hsiang, Hu Ching-yi and Sun Yao still continue to recruit and have all told about 100,000 men in immediate vicinity of Peking, it seems rather logical to conclude that principal reason for Chang’s sudden departure from Peking was his realization that his position here was untenable if not dangerous to his life. He either had to bring to Peking all his troops from the vicinity of Tientsin, judged some 40,000 in number, or retire to vicinity which strategically is far better for him than Peking. Chang possibly may have suddenly decided to be in Tientsin to meet Sun Yat-sen to see if he could associate himself with Sun. This is not likely.

3. Out of all the welter of rumors and the few facts, straws in the wind, such as Chang Tso-lin’s sudden departure, the ex-Emperor’s unexpectedly seeking refuge in Diplomatic Quarter, Feng Yu-hsiang’s continuing to remain at or near Peking, although having stated he wishes to go abroad, and Sun Yat-sen’s imminent arrival, a grave apprehension arises that extreme Kuomintang and Soviet influence may dominate Peking. Except by good fortune and unless the foreign powers are able to devise some defensive action in the circumstances, the chances seem to be that the radical wing of the Kuomintang Party and the Soviets are to have their day in Peking. Tuan Chi-jui’s continuance in power seems dependent upon his ability to control allegiance of the various discordant factions. The mere fact, of course, of Chang’s withdrawal to Tientsin does not necessarily spell his abandonment of Tuan, since if Chang desires to oppose Sun Yat-sen and the Red element in China he can do so very effectively from Tientsin as a base. However, as I observed, the outlook is far from bright.

4. Feeling, I believe, even more pessimistic than I do in the above regard, the British Minister called upon me yesterday to suggest an informal meeting of the representatives of the Washington Conference powers for the purpose of discussing and exploring into the question of the advisability of recommending to our respective Governments the immediate joint issuance of a statement. This statement would inform the Chinese authorities and people of the continued desire of these powers, as evidenced at Washington Conference, to make [take?] up with China, at the very earliest moment that she puts her house in order, the question of treaty revision, and that these powers to this [end?] would support in every proper way any government in China which would show a capacity for undertaking the task of restoring law and order in the country. At the same time the statement should definitely disclose the decision of the powers concerned not to recognize or have truck with any administration which might be set up in Peking by those Peking leaders in China who in the present as in the past have been and are seeking to incite the Chinese people against the friendly attitude [of the] powers.

5. I readily agreed to attend any such informal conference of representatives of Washington Conference powers which is scheduled for morning of 4th. Some such action as suggested by the British Minister might be effective in opposition to extreme nationalist and Bolshevik trend of events in China, although a double-edged weapon with both good and bad potentialities.

6. After my conversation with Chang Tso-lin, reported in my 465, December 1, 4 p.m., Chinese secretary had a long conversation with General Wang, chief of the Manchurian military foreign, affairs department, who appears very close to Chang and who was present both when Chang called on me and my return visit to him. To Peck’s inquiry regarding exactly what assistance Chang considered foreign powers could be to the conservative element in China at the present time to help them oppose the Soviets, Wang stated that Marshal Chang had in mind an announcement by the foreign powers of their sympathetic willingness to discuss treaty revision just as soon as a government was established in China capable of giving effect to any international arrangements which would result from such a discussion. Marshal Chang feared that Sun and his Red adherents prompted by Karakhan would raise louder and louder the rallying cry of “down with the unjust treaties” which being a national issue the conservative leaders in China would not be able to oppose. An announcement by the powers as suggested above by Marshal Chang would [,he] believed, cut under this Bolshevik propaganda and enable him and other conservatives to make common cause with the foreign powers against Soviet influence in China. I venture to invite Department’s attention to paragraph 6, my 465, December 1, 4 p.m., expressing the possibility that some such idea as there described was in Chang’s mind during his conversation with me on November 29th. Repeated to Tokyo.

Mayer