Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924, Volume I

893.00/5804: Telegram

The Chargé in China (Mayer) to the Secretary of State

Peking, December 1, 1924—4 p.m.
[Received 10:07 p.m.]

465. My telegram no. 459, November 26, 6 p.m. paragraph 2.

1. During call on Chang on November 29th he spoke without formality with surprising directness and apparently with frankness as well as cordiality and at length regarding Bolshevik activities in China.

2. After exchange of usual greetings Marshal Chang asked me what I thought of the Bolsheviks. I replied that the fact that our Government had not yet recognized the Soviets should adequately answer his question. He then observed that during recent interview with Karakhan latter had indicated a special animosity against United States. Karakhan’s remarks were not of a nature Chang considered polite to repeat to me. Karakhan had dwelt mostly on capitalistic imperialism of the United States; that it was seeking to acquire all the wealth of the world and that it was imperatively necessary to accomplish the overthrow of the United States.

[Paraphrase.] Chang then said that in his opinion the most serious menace at present was the “Bolshevik question” and that Soviet activities in China greatly imperiled the lives and property of foreigners in China. He considered most dangerous Sun Yatsen’s close association with the Soviets. Chang said that he would not himself remain in Peking if Sun was coming to Peking to carry out the same program as he had at Canton. Chang expressed the opinion that the diplomatic representatives in Peking of the foreign powers should take some decided stand respecting the question of Bolshevism. If this were not done he did not know what his own policy would be, but he would take a definite stand if the foreign representatives did. He said that under no circumstances could he associate himself with Sun and his Bolshevik policy. [End paraphrase.]

3. In order to feel Chang out I observed that the problem of dangerous Bolshevik activities in China appeared to me one of Chinese internal administration and to be dealt with by the Chinese Government. Chang replied that he did not consider it such since the danger was an international one and of world-wide extent. I inquired whether Chang thought that there would be any immediate dangerous developments. He expressed belief that coming of Doctor Sun would make question one of immediate urgency; that necessary to wait and see position Tuan would take in the matter but primarily necessary that foreign Ministers should adopt definite policy. American policy of nonintervention in Chinese affairs appreciated but Bolshevik question one with which foreign nations should concern themselves.

4. Chang then discussed Sun Yat-sen’s announcements in regard to “unjust treaties” and observed that he thought western nations on considerations of justice would soon modify treaties when proper time came; that however a proper course must be followed in securing revision and inadmissible [inadvisable?] to make demand for abrogation “unjust treaties” in sudden manner. Agitation fomented by Doctor Sun was dangerous.

5. Chang spoke in similar vein regarding Bolshevik menace to the Netherlands Minister and I believe likewise to the British Minister and possibly others of the diplomatic body.

6. Although difficult to know reason or reasons why Chang should have spoken so openly, extensively, and hostilely respecting Bolshevik activities in China, following seems a reasonable deduction. As intimated in paragraph 3 of my 442 November 12, 4 p.m.²⁴ it has been to my mind quite possible that the Bolsheviks through the radical wing of the Kuomintang Party headed by Sun Yat-sen, C. T. Wang, Huang Fu and the like might make demand for immediate revision or cancelation a popular rallying cry; that Chang realizes that he, Tuan and other conservative leaders in China would not be able to oppose such a popular movement and might even have to join with it; that the Soviets through their local followers and sympathizers might thus control Chinese Government isolating Chang in Manchuria and seriously jeopardizing his position there. That Chang desires the foreign powers to take some action which will permit conservative Chinese leaders to work with them and prevent Bolshevik influence from predominating in China. Repeated to Tokyo.

Mayer

24. Ante, p. 393.