893.00/5746: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Mayer) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 12—2:23 p.m.]
442. Following on general situation:
1. Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang in Tientsin and reported to be conferring with Tuan Chi-jui and others. About 40,000 Fengtien troops in vicinity Tientsin and more antagonistic [sic], who have taken over military control of Tientsin and adjacent railways from Feng’s troops. Included in first elements Fengtien troops to arrive Tientsin was battalion of Russians now Machang. Chang believed to be in a position to enforce his will. Chang is stationing his troops beyond Tientsin on Tientsin-Pukow and across Peking-Mukden lines extending his control of railroad to southward. Reported Wu Pei-fu has sailed from Chefoo with three transports with from 5 to 10 thousand troops, destination unknown. Regarding attitude [Page 394] of provincial leaders see American consul Nanking’s telegram November 11, 5 p.m.21 In announcement of preceding day Hsiao Yaonan indicates support of Wu Pei-fu. Sun Yat-sen has apparently decided to leave for north November 13th. Rail transport situation between Peking, Tientsin, Shanhaikwan still very unsatisfactory, international trains being run between Tientsin-Peking and return every few days. Great activity of Fengtien troop trains at Tientsin, withdrawal of Feng’s forces from that point and general disorganization resulting from military control of railways, chiefly failure to restore normal train service. Doubtful if any substantial betterment will take place until after political situation somewhat more settled by anticipated conference at Tientsin since Chang will doubtless wish to keep trains there for possible troop movement. No disturbance Peking-Tientsin or other places. Machang is reported to be principal destination of Fengtien troop train and no Fengtien troops reported north of Yangtsun.
[Paraphrase]
2. Reference my telegrams no. 441 of November 11, noon;22 no. 438 of November 9, 4 p.m.22; no. 435 of November 7, 4 p.m.
3. The present situation causes me much concern. In the present Peking Government the Soviet influence is very strong if not dominant. It is working chiefly through the Kuomintang Party. I do not wish to cause the Department undue alarm, but in my opinion it should be considered as distinctly possible that at any time the foreign powers may have to face a demand for the revision or cancellation of all of the so-called special-privilege treaties which they have with China. I consider Tuan Chi-jui and Chang Tso-lin to be the deciding factors. It is an important question now whether they will join with or oppose the Kuomintang Party which is under Soviet influence or control. Should they join with the Kuomintang I rather think that there will be the probability if not certainty that the Chinese Government will demand treaty revision or cancellation. Even should Tuan Chi-jui and Chang Tso-lin not join with the Kuomintang Party or endorse its policies, the present Peking Government urged on by the Soviets … [may] still take precipitate radical action. It is also possible that for a time at least all factions might join on a platform calling for the cancellation or revision of the treaties.
4. It is too early to report more than the possibilities as given above pending more definite information concerning the conferences [Page 395] which Tuan Chi-jui, Feng Yu-hsiang, Chang Tso-lin and others are now holding in Tientsin.
5. It is of course a matter of first importance whether the Japanese will side with or against the Soviets and which of these two, if they oppose each other, will have the controlling influence over Tuan Chi-jui and Chang Tso-lin. This is something which cannot be known at present.
6. This telegram repeated to Tokyo Embassy.