711.672/137: Telegram
The Special Mission at Lausanne to the Secretary of State
[Received July 26—2 a.m.]
557. It seems desirable to lay the issues plainly before the Department and to attempt an analysis of them lest some unforeseen turn in the negotiations should find us unprepared. Some elements of the situation which should be kept in mind are as follows:
- (1)
- Ismet’s determination to yield no further, as evidenced in statements reported to Department.
- (2)
- Yesterday’s Communiqué from the Turkish delegation to the press.
- (3)
- Information from Adnan Bey to High Commissioner at Constantinople that positive instructions had been sent to Ismet to return to Angora by 2d of next month.
- (4)
- Intimations given out openly by the Turkish delegation that it plans to quit Lausanne toward the end of the week and that the negotiations will be taken up again at Constantinople if necessary. It is possible that Ismet hopes by these expedients to rush us into a precipitate surrender. But it is also possible that he is acting under instructions from his Government requiring him to wind up the negotiations at once, or failing that to suspend negotiations and return to Angora forthwith for the opening of the National Assembly on the 2d of next month.
If Ismet’s attitude is a stratagem, we should simply hold patiently to our position. But if, on the other hand, he is following instructions, we must soon make up our minds whether for the sake of an immediate settlement we would be justified in yielding our position on almost all questions still pending. We should not take too seriously the assurances which Ismet gave last night that he will stay in Lausanne until we have completed our negotiations. He may wish to give those assurances a special interpretation, and it is quite conceivable that he will suddenly present us with an ultimatum carrying a time limit of only a few hours. It would be undesirable to risk compromising the dignity of the United States by making concessions at the last minute and after Ismet has announced that he is about to quit Lausanne. In that contingency I recommend that we should be the first to leave Lausanne and should make public the reasons for going away.
Last night Ismet informed me that he was expecting to receive instructions from his Government today and that he hoped then to be able to deal with the establishment articles in a way entirely in accord with our views. At half-past six this evening there is to be a meeting of the experts. As regards naturalization and the judicial declaration, [Page 1125] we have agreed provisionally to give way, provided our views are met on all other unsettled questions. On the question of minorities we have adhered to our position that it is necessary to receive a letter of some sort. I suggested last night as a concession that, instead of employing the formula of the Allied treaty, Ismet should quote from the National Pact the passages relating to the question. The proposal was not rejected point blank. In regard to the capitulations we have agreed for the present to accept the formula as phrased in the counterproposal drafted on March 8 by the Turks.2 But on the plea that Turkey requires uniform provisions regarding the capitulations, Ismet has persistently held out for precisely the same formula as in the treaty with the Allies. All the Turkish treaties contain a declaration that the high contracting powers accept, each insofar as it is concerned, and without reservation, the abolition of the capitulations. This is in substance the declaration which the Department authorized us to accept only as a last resort, and we shall make every effort to obtain some better formula. Except for this question and the question of claims we can get settlements on every point.
It is probably on the question of claims, therefore, that the success of the negotiations will turn, and if we adjourn it will be owing to disagreement on that question. Since it is an issue which involves the general principle of international obligations it should be a sound one by which to explain to the public the failure of our negotiations. But on this point we solicit an expression of the Department’s views.
Last night, during conversation, I presented Ismet with a virtual ultimatum on the principle of a mixed court of arbitration for final appeal of claims, no matter what preliminary steps might be suggested or examined during the negotiations. I told him that the tentative formula presented to the Turkish experts on July 22 (see Mission’s 551, July 22) represented the position of the American Government. He accepted this statement as our last word and said he would so report it to Angora. In case the reply of the Turkish Government is not favorable, we could then either consider the procedure suggested in Mission’s 555, July 25, or propose that Turkey pay us a lump sum. But I question whether Ismet would entertain the latter proposal.
We should receive as soon as possible any further comments or instructions which the Department deems necessary. An important element in the situation is that, on account of the diplomatic successes of the Turks over the Allies, the Turkish delegation, and particularly their chief, manifest a certain perversity and unreasonableness. In their present frame of mind they are not to be moved by argument. I think I can claim, however, that from our side the [Page 1126] arguments on every issue have been presented with force and clearness, although, because of expense, it has not been possible to report them exhaustively to the Department.