711.672/126: Telegram
The Special Mission at Lausanne to the Secretary of State
550. Referring to Mission’s 549 of July 21.92 The final stand which Ismet takes in the negotiations is summarized below. He told me that he can go no further, and requested me to explain his position to the Department and ask for a definite and early reply.
He cannot admit into the establishment articles any formula for most-favored-nation treatment. The Allied convention contains the most that will be conceded.
If the treaty must contain a naturalization article it must also be accompanied by a reservation of the right of the Turkish Government to deny to naturalized United States citizens of Turkish origin the privilege of returning to Turkey.
The provision regarding capitulations contained in the treaty with the Allies is the most that Turkey can offer.
Ismet has offered to draft a clause dealing with claims and to refer it to his Government tomorrow but without taking any engagement. This formula will indicate as definitely as possible what the substance of our claims will be, but will not admit any claims arising from occupation of Turkish territory by armed forces of foreign powers.
Ismet will address to me as American plenipotentiary a declaration on judicial administration precisely identical with the declaration addressed to the Allied Powers.
Ismet declares that on the question of minorities he cannot address a letter of any sort to me or permit the subject to be mentioned in the treaty.
A satisfactory formula on the Straits will be found by the experts.
The experts will also study the question of taxes.
Ismet will take under consideration the sanitary declaration and will later communicate his decision.
In regard to the protection of institutions he will address to me a letter phrased precisely like that addressed to the Allied Powers.
[Page 1108]I have prepared a hasty and rough summary of Ismet’s statements to me during our conversation this afternoon. In my replies I tried to present forcibly and clearly our attitude on each of the issues, but I have omitted my own remarks except where necessary to a proper understanding of the following report.
In the beginning of his remarks Ismet declared with emphatic reiterations that Turkey’s sincere desire is to bring herself into intimate economic and political relations with the United States. He said that during all our discussions he had been guided by this feeling of friendliness which can best be demonstrated by actions rather than by speech. Turkey had already demonstrated in two ways this desire for intimate relations with the United States: (1) All that the Allies had obtained from Turkey after months of prolonged, painful, and laborious negotiation and under compulsion of a state of war, the United States was now receiving from Turkey at a stroke; (2) even before entering upon the treaty negotiations Turkey had had recourse to the United States in laying the foundations for a vast economic organization in Asia Minor. The sincerity of Turkey could be established by the evidence of these facts, and it was surprising that America remained unsatisfied. It was necessary, however, to meet the difficulties which had arisen. Ismet declared positively that the extreme limit to which the Turkish Government could go in concession was represented by what had been already yielded to the Allied Powers. At the very start of our negotiations Turkey had indicated clearly what she could concede and what she could not, and if at the end no agreement has been reached on some questions, it is because Turkey has not resorted to bargaining. All pending questions can be settled if we accept a single principle of settlement, namely, that all concessions made to the Allies, and no more, will be made to the United States. Ismet declared that Turkey is making a free grant to the United States of what had been extorted from her by the other powers.
He went on to say that it is to the principle, not the phrasing, of most-favored-nation treatment that Turkey objected. Turkey had never once contemplated discriminating against the United States, and would not now think of it. We were to get just what the Allies had received. He made the explicit statement that, with or without treaty provision, Turkey grants now and will continue to grant to the United States most-favored-nation treatment. But he said that it would hamper Turkey’s efforts to make separate agreements later with other countries and under other circumstances if Turkey should now admit into our establishment articles a grant of most-favored-nation treatment.
As an illustration of the way in which the grant of most-favorednation treatment to the United States might embarrass Turkey, Ismet [Page 1109] said that if British doctors should be permitted to practice in Turkey under a convention with Great Britain, and French lawyers to practice under a convention with France, and Italian engineers to practice under a convention with Italy, these privileges which had been designed to meet special requirements would become available to all countries indiscriminately. Agreements must vary with varying circumstances. The Turkish Government is very firm in its convictions on this point, and Ismet said that he could not reconsider his decision.
When we came to discuss the question of naturalization I explained that if we put into the treaty a reservation such as the Turks desired, we would seem to be casting a doubt upon the right of each nation to keep out aliens who are undesirable. The validity of this argument was denied by Ismet, and he maintained that Turkish sovereignty would be strengthened by the reservation. He said that his insistence on the point was not for the sake of making difficulties, but because he considered it a very serious matter for Turkey. He could not yield as the Turkish Government found it impossible to concede the point.
When Ismet mentioned the capitulations, I pointed out that in the beginning my Government had been absolutely opposed to their abrogation as it held the view that they would be automatically abrogated by the new treaty. My Government had, however, acted in the spirit of compromise and had displayed good will by accepting a formula abrogating the capitulations. Realizing the intensity of sentiment in the Grand National Assembly on this subject, the Government of the United States had tried to meet the wishes of Turkey, and had sanctioned the formula I had proposed to him the day before. Since we had tried to assist him in finding a way out of a difficult situation, I asked Ismet if he would not make possible for us a solution of the present difficulty. He replied that the principles which underlie the new treaties which Turkey has concluded are the principles upon which the future of Turkey must rest, and he thought that in order to allow no misunderstanding he ought now to make himself clear. Any attempt on the part of the United States to hinder the operation or alter the form of these principles would be evidence of a desire to thwart Turkey’s aspirations for the future. To this I replied that by consenting to make any mention whatever of the capitulations, the United States had made a greater concession than had Turkey; that I saw serious obstacles for the treaty, as it was doubtful how far my Government would yield. He said that the instructions he had received from his Government were precise, and that it was plain that our respective instructions are irreconcilable.
I said also that at the meeting of the experts yesterday there had been no evidence on the part of the Turkish representatives to meet our wishes in the matter of claims, that we had received no satisfaction [Page 1110] and were much disappointed. We could not understand their indifference to what the United States might consider acceptable in the treaty. On our side we had spared no effort to comply with the wishes of Turkey. The draft treaty which we had prepared was modelled upon the latest treaties and agreements concluded between both great and small powers. But in order to meet the Turkish views we had altered this draft at almost every point. All we were asking of Turkey was equality of treatment with other foreigners, and we were offering the same in return. We had drawn upon international law and usage for every suggestion we had made. We regarded it as quite unfair that only one party to the negotiations should be expected to make sacrifices. We had already nearly reached the limit beyond which it would be impossible to go. A treaty which would be quite unacceptable to the people and Senate of the United States could not serve as the basis for the reestablishment of consular relations. We solicited from Turkey a just and magnanimous treatment as evidence of good faith.
Returning to the subject of claims I asked Ismet to read three short memoranda on claims arising out of war damages, acts of soldiers, and acts of authorities, as the bases of claims recognized by international law. I stated that as regards the acts of private persons, government liability was often involved in the acts of rioters, brigands, and mobs. He heard me attentively. I also laid before him a schedule of claims conventions which other countries had made with us. His Government’s chief practical difficulty, Ismet said, was that they had no way of knowing what to expect; we were making only vague proposals. Our views were then set before him in detail. I told him that some of our claims were still being examined by our Government and that others were not yet filed. It would be impossible, therefore, to submit a definite list of claims. The sound claims could be sifted from those which appeared inadmissible after examination by a commission of the Turkish Government. The former could then be met and the latter referred for decision to some impartial tribunal. Ismet intimated that the Turks fear that they will be presented with claims for which they ought not to be held accountable. In reply I said that we could not possibly accept the offer made by the Turkish experts to consider only claims growing out of requisitions. Ismet stated that that restriction was his own suggestion. He was of opinion that pre-war claims and requisition claims were the only categories which his Government would accept. I told him that on that basis it would be useless to carry the discussion further. Thereupon he agreed that if we would have our experts draft a formula setting forth the nature of our claims as definitely as possible but omitting mention of claims growing out of occupation of Turkish [Page 1111] territory by armed forces of foreign powers he would refer it to his Government without taking any sort of engagement.
Ismet made the following remarks upon the question of minorities: The minority clauses in the treaty with the Allies is regarded by Turkey not as a pledge to all the powers, but only as an agreement between the interested powers, over which the League of Nations will exercise supervision. I said that in view of the principles which he had just stated to me, Turkey ought to grant to us what she proposed to grant to the Allies. He answered that it was necessary to consider that the powers with whom the agreement had been made were members of the League of Nations. If, for example, one of the provisions regarding minorities should be violated by Rumania, Turkey could appeal to the League to have the matter investigated. Ismet asked whether the United States would consent to be bound in the matter. In return I suggested that I address a letter to him stating that we had participated in the discussion of the minority clauses of the Allied treaty and inquiring about the general applicability of those clauses, and I asked whether he would answer my letter in the affirmative recognizing that we had participated in the discussions and specifying the provisions. He replied that to do so would be to take a definite engagement, and he could not therefore comply with my request. He wanted to know whether we proposed to receive similar pledges from Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, or other countries where minorities existed. The allied treaty, he said, contained the information for anyone to read, while a letter, whatever its form, might be used against Turkey as an instrument of direct coercion. In the end Ismet declined positively and decisively to consider the proposal.
During our interview I tried to give solemn warning that if the negotiations fell through, the reaction in the United States would be very unfortunate. American trade and finance would be reluctant to venture into Turkey before we should resume diplomatic and consular relations which would be impossible without the treaty. With the help of a diagram I showed Ismet that in every one of the questions still pending he gave no indication of trying to meet us halfway and was expecting us to come clear over to his views. I told him that we were prepared to remain in Lausanne until the negotiations had been brought to a conclusion, and that there must be no thought of postponement. He declared that the understandings upon which we had begun the negotiations furnished the basis of his position and that he could not change. It had been agreed that the United States was to receive what had been granted to the Allies and no more; he had not anticipated the issues with which he was now being confronted.
[Page 1112]Ismet wished to know, if the negotiations should fall through, whether we could not represent our failure as due to lack of time, since he desired to keep from public knowledge the questions which we had discussed. I told him positively that we could not. I said that if the negotiations broke down we should be obliged to explain precisely and publicly where we had stood on every issue. And again I referred to the fact that a politically disinterested country like the United States could provide the economic assistance of which Turkey stood in need, and I spoke in detail upon the probable obstacles to economic cooperation which would result from the failure of our negotiations. Ismet said that while he felt the force of these observations, he did not yet see his way out.
Ismet returned to each point and summarized his position. I then inquired if he intended me to regard his statements as his last word, and whether I should so report them to my Government. He said that that was his wish. Most of these questions, he said, were of vital importance to Turkey and he was not free to discuss them; he had not refused to yield on questions in which he had liberty to act, and he had hoped that our treaty would be concluded at Lausanne and without delay. The difficulties with which he was confronted seemed insurmountable, but he had carried on the negotiations in honesty and good faith. I told him that I hoped that by Tuesday morning I should have received instructions from my Government. Ismet replied that he planned to return home as soon as possible, in order to superintend the ratification of the treaty of peace, but that in the hope of signing a treaty with the United States he would not quit Lausanne before Wednesday or Thursday.
This telegram is being repeated to the High Commissioner at Constantinople, and we are requesting him to send his comments directly to Washington. He will no doubt make recommendations suggested by the situation at Constantinople. In case the negotiations here are broken off there are two respects in which the consequences may be important, in respect to American interests in Turkey and in respect to the continued presence of the American High Commission at Constantinople. There is little doubt that the protection of our interests in Turkey will be extremely difficult after the conclusion of the treaty with the Allies and the consequent evacuation by the Allied forces if we cannot then appeal to a treaty of our own which the Turks recognize as in force. The Turks will almost certainly ask to have the High Commission withdrawn. We think that both of these contingencies should be given serious consideration. In case it is decided to discontinue the negotiations it would be very helpful if the Department would instruct us whether we are to attempt to [Page 1113] secure from Ismet assurances for the preservation of the status quo, and what the nature of those assurances should be.