711.672/110a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Special Mission at Lausanne
228. Inasmuch as the Allied negotiations appear to be nearing a conclusion, it is desirable to examine the situation and to determine upon a course best suited to protect the interests of the United States Upon due consideration the Department feels that our purposes would be best achieved by actively carrying along our negotiations toward an early settlement. You should give your best endeavors, therefore, to obtain signature of the treaty before adjournment of the conference.
No irreconcilable divergencies of views seem to stand between us and the Turks, and it should be possible to arrive at an adjustment of unsettled questions if the Turks are willing to extend to us the privileges which they accorded the Allies and to give the articles a clear and unequivocal phrasing.
It is apparent that Turkey will benefit more than will the United States by a resumption of normal relations between the two countries, but if our negotiations can be brought to a satisfactory conclusion this Government would be disposed to come to a prompt agreement with Turkey for the resumption of diplomatic and consular relations, and to give recognition de jure, which is implied in those relations and which should be of the greatest assistance to Turkey in reestablishing her relations with other countries.
Turkey herself, moreover, should understand how desirable it is to regularize her relations with the United States if she wishes to attract American business and not to allow the other powers to occupy the whole field of economic opportunity in the near future. Turkey should also see that unless diplomatic and consular relations are restored, American business would hardly be attracted by the opportunities to be found in Turkey.
When you make these representations to Ismet you should not permit him to suppose that you are unduly anxious to hasten the negotiations or that for the sake of a quick settlement the Department is ready to yield on questions of principle, but you should make it clear that the Department will spare no effort to settle pending questions in a way best suited to promote the interests of both countries, and is anxious to avoid the delay which might ensue if the negotiations were not completed before the conference breaks up. Since the negotiations have now begun, the considerations set forth in your 326 of May [Page 1102] 1387 and in Department’s 139 of May 17 regarding the desirability of negotiating with the Turks at Lausanne have even greater weight and relevance in regard to the early termination of the negotiations. If the conference adjourns immediately after the Allied treaty is signed it might be difficult to secure responsible Turkish representatives competent to carry on the negotiations with us in the near future. And since the Turkish electoral campaign is now in progress these difficulties will be augmented. Moreover, the whole field of the negotiations might have to be reviewed, and perhaps under less favorable circumstances, if the elections result in a change of Turkish leadership or policy. The Department believes also that at Lausanne the atmosphere is favorable to the negotiation of a treaty, especially since the Allies seem assured of a peaceful settlement.
After reading these instructions you are desired to draw up a brief statement of the principal points which will present difficulties in our negotiations in order to enable the Department as soon as possible to draft final instructions upon those matters which you feel will offer special difficulties. You are requested also to present to the Department for its consideration any provisions already agreed to by the Turks and the Allies which you think might be substituted for provisions of our draft which are now causing difficulty.
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