767.68119 F&M 1/7: Telegram
The Special Mission at Lausanne to the Secretary of State
120. Referring to Mission’s telegrams relating to legal status of foreigners and to customs regulations in Turkey, and also to Department’s telegrams of December 9, 9 p.m., and December 15, 3 p.m.
The Turks are especially resolute in their demand that justice and administration in Turkey shall be freed from foreign control of any sort. Their contention is not that the capitulations were abrogated by a state of war, but that abrogation by unilateral action had become necessary because the old system was an intolerable and unfair burden upon Turkey. The Turks have persistently refused to permit the slightest diminution of their national sovereignty. Their sentiments on this subject are so intense that even the ordinary treaty limitations on sovereignty which are commonly accepted by other countries long used to the full exercise of national sovereignty, are unacceptable to the Turks. In fact they seem disposed to reverse the old relationship between Turks and privileged foreigners by putting foreigners in a less favored position than Turkish nationals. They have stated repeatedly that on the basis of reciprocity and of the principles of international law they will negotiate the usual consular and commercial agreements with any country.
By their various proposals and statements the Allied Powers have in effect publicly admitted that the capitulatory regime has ceased to exist and that a new arrangement must be substituted. But they have not yet announced that the old treaty rights are definitely and finally abandoned. They have conceded a good deal to Turkey in the matter of customs, and for the sake of agreement will concede considerably more. They have made even more liberal concessions regarding rights of access and establishment, as also regarding immunities in taxation and other fiscal privileges under the capitulations, and they propose that their nationals shall receive only equal treatment with Turkish nationals, to which, however, the Turks are not always ready to consent. As regards the judicial regime for foreigners in Turkey, which is the most serious issue, the Allies have only asked that foreign judges be appointed by the Turkish Government to sit in courts of appeal and cassation and in courts of first instance at Smyrna, Broussa, and Constantinople. These judges are [Page 926] to sit with Turkish judges to try cases affecting Allied nationals, particularly criminal cases, and they are to assist in framing a system of jurisprudence on modern principles. They are to be paid by the Turkish Government and to be its functionaries. Although nothing has been as yet definitely decided, it seems probable that Allied nationals will not in general receive more favorable treatment than is enjoyed by German nationals under the German-Turkish treaty of 1916. So far the Allies do not seem to be trying to obtain a position of special privilege, or to be seeking favors in exchange for concessions in the matter of the capitulations. They seem to perceive that only by cooperation of all capitulatory powers in negotiating with Turkey can satisfactory results be obtained.
Accordingly the sessions of the subcommittee deliberating on the capitulations are attended by representatives of interested neutral states, who have also recognized impossibility of restoring the capitulations and necessity of devising a new regime by separate agreements for which the present treaty between Turkey and the Allies should serve as a model. Practical solutions, therefore, are being preferred to legal forms.
It will be evident to the Department that the limits of negotiation as contemplated in its 48 of December 15 have been already far surpassed. The Turks are rejecting every proposal which does not recognize their complete and unqualified sovereignty and exempt them from any foreign constraint whatever upon the judicial and administrative functions of their Government. It has been admitted in effect by the allied and neutral European powers that the old position of privilege for foreigners in Turkey is now irretrievably lost, and during the final bargaining the powers are attempting to hold fast to any special rights which may be retained for their interests in Turkey.
The facts of the situation, therefore, as distinguished from the theory, will soon compel us either to take up a conciliatory policy toward the Turks and meet them halfway as other governments are doing, or else to oppose their claims in every way we can. If we adopt the latter course we shall come under the displeasure of the Government at Angora, and since the whole population in Turkey earnestly supports the claims of the Government, we may be obliged after all to be content with just what the other capitulatory powers are now agreeing to, and meanwhile our interests in Turkey will reap no benefit from the delay and may incur actual loss.
On the other hand, if we show ourselves ready to recognize the altered status of the Turkish nation, we would stimulate the Turkish sentiment of friendliness toward the United States. Relying upon this sentiment and upon the desire of the Turkish leaders that American [Page 927] capital should make large investments in Turkey and their readiness to offer inducements for investment, we should be able to obtain much better conditions than if we remain persistently unsympathetic toward Turkish aspirations and in the end are compelled to recognize them. Besides reaping substantial benefits for ourselves, we should also increase our influence among the governing classes on behalf of minorities in Turkey if we take the initiative in declaring that we are in sympathy with Turkish views and are prepared to recognize Turkey’s unconditional sovereignty and the abolition of the capitulations. We might also assist in inducing the Turks to take a more reasonable view of the proposal, which they will not now entertain, for gradual readjustments during a transitional regime to follow the abolition of the capitulations. Should these considerations have weight with the Department we feel that we might contribute toward a settlement satisfactory to everyone by an active participation in the negotiations on these questions.
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