500.A4/62: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Harvey)
429. Your 618, July 27, 6 p.m.
Last evening Geddes presented text of cable from Foreign Office to which I understand you refer. Geddes said in substance that there apparently was some difference in points of view of the two Governments; that Foreign Office had contemplated preliminary conference. I recalled his attention to order of events, pointing out how careful we had been to avoid any possible misunderstanding; that we had taken the extraordinary precaution of sending the exact text of the President’s announcement, which was clear, succinct and comprehensive in order that we might have definite approval of British Government before it was made public; that we had published the announcement only after receiving the Prime Minister’s definite and complete approval. Geddes expressed surprise at this statement, asking particularly whether Lloyd George was acquainted with the text of the announcement before it was given to the Press and I assured him that he was. I added that quite apart from this, after the publication on Monday, July 11th, the Prime Minister had expressed his unqualified approval in his speech in Parliament. I told him that I had read the announcement and editorials in the British Press and that I had failed to find any misunderstanding whatever with respect to the proposed conference; that the procedure had been clearly defined and widely approved, so that I could not understand any suggestion that the purport of the American announcement had not been fully understood.
I emphasized this in reference to the statement in Foreign Office telegram submitted by Geddes that “in tangle of correspondence by [Page 48] telegraph between interested parties there appears to be grave danger that scheme may miscarry not because there is any real difference between us but because of misunderstandings which personal intercourse could easily explain.” I told Geddes that I did not understand this, as everything to me seemed quite clear.
With reference to first sentence in Foreign Office telegram that “some doubt appears to exist as to nature and locality of preliminary consultations or conversations which United States Government has signified its willingness to hold before meeting of Pacific Conference at Washington later in the autumn,” I referred to my telegram to you, Number 415, of July 20, that I had no objection to proposed consultations to facilitate preparation for conference. This was to be taken in connection with preceding sentence of same telegram that conditions are most favorable to conference if terms of announcement adhered to, and this must be regarded as final attitude of this Government. I told Geddes that while we had not the slightest objection to all consultations that could prove helpful, we deemed it inadvisable that there should be a meeting which would partake of the nature of a preliminary conference, for reasons which had already been communicated to the British Government through you. I assumed that the consultations in question would be such as could conveniently take place in London between Curzon and Dominion Premiers and with you and other Ambassadors, and similar consultations with Ambassadors here, out of which might emerge helpful suggestions.
With respect to proposition contained in Foreign Office telegram and amplified by your 618, July 27th, this Government entertains the following views. It would be impossible to call such a meeting anything but a conference of the first importance. It would bring together the leading statesmen of the British Empire in consultation with the representatives of this Government and Japan. To describe this as a consultation instead of a conference would be ineffectual.
Manifestly, such a conference on American soil could be called only by the President. As it would be impossible for the President to call a conference or any part of a conference to meet in London or anywhere else except in the United States, so it would be impossible for a conference to meet in the United States to be called by anyone but the President.
But for the President to call such a conference with Great Britain and Japan, after he had already asked France, Italy and China to attend a conference, which would embrace the discussion of Far Eastern questions, could hardly fail to be regarded by the countries omitted from the preliminary conference as a discourtesy, and I do [Page 49] not see that it will be possible to alter the effect by merely changing the place of the conference from Washington to Bar Harbor. It seems to me that it would be the calling of the conference and not its particular location in the United States which would be regarded as significant. The President feels that it would be quite impossible for him, having made his announcement, which has received the approval of all the Governments to which his proposal was addressed, now to depart from the announced plan by calling another conference of three of the governments to deal with the same subjects in advance.
If at such a preliminary meeting the agenda were framed or any controlling action taken, it would be felt that the conference had in fact been forestalled. If there was a failure to reach an agreement because of divisions of opinion, the success of the main conference might easily be jeopardized.
Again, the proposition of a week’s meeting at Bar Harbor seems to contemplate rather speedy action. The Japanese Ambassador, calling today, and referring, without being informed by me, to what he had heard of some such proposal for a preliminary meeting in this country, directed attention to the fact that the British Empire would be represented by her Prime Ministers; that the American Government would be fully represented; and that Japan necessarily would be without an equivalent representation and that whatever was done would have to be referred to Tokio. This would mean, as I understood the Japanese Ambassador clearly to intimate, that such a preliminary meeting would be without definite results, so far as Japan was concerned. It is possible, of course, that something might be achieved if we were content with some very general observations, but I am disposed to think that such a brief preliminary meeting would fail of its purpose.
Further, I have no doubt of the effect upon American opinion of such a departure from the President’s announcement. At this time there is almost unanimous approval of the course that has been taken, and Japan’s acceptance yesterday being deemed to remove the last obstacle to the conference, it would greatly surprise our people if it were found that Great Britain, where emphatic approval was at once voiced when the President’s announcement was made, contemplated anything else but participation in the conference in accordance with the President’s plan. Of course, you will make it plain that it would have given the President the greatest pleasure to welcome Lloyd George, Curzon and the Dominion Premiers, and that he appreciates the inconvenience they are willing to undergo in the interest of a meeting here, but he cannot escape the conclusion that the above considerations are controlling.
[Page 50]The President is most desirous that everything should be done through interchanges of views and the availing of opportunities for consultation in London and Washington to facilitate agreement as to the subjects for discussion and thus to promote the success of the conference. It is with great regret that he finds himself unable to accept the British proposal but he is clearly of the opinion that there should be adherence to his original announcement.
Now that Japan has expressed her willingness to accept an invitation, it is desired that the formal invitations should be sent out as soon as possible, and it is hoped that the conference can be held this autumn. It should be noted that the convening of the Conference in the Autumn is assumed in the telegram of the British Government, submitted by Geddes, which refers to conversations “before meeting of Pacific Conference at Washington later in the Autumn”. I recur to what I said in my 415 of July 20th, that the President had in mind November 11th but would gladly have regard to convenience of British Government, and that if it would convenience Dominion Premiers returning via America to have conference in early October or even at the end of September, would endeavor so to arrange. I may add that if Premiers must return earlier, it would give me great pleasure to see them if they could stop in Washington.
You may communicate with Curzon in the above sense, making it clear that while we are very desirous of facilitating consultations as above suggested, it is deemed to be inadvisable to have a preliminary conference or a meeting of the three Powers which would be tantamount thereto.
I have said nothing with regard to the physical arrangements for such a meeting at Bar Harbor as early as suggested, but it may be added that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to effect them.