. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
It will be remembered that the Japanese Government requested the Chinese
Government, in a memorandum dated September 7, 1921,65 to open direct
negotiations regarding Shantung. The Chinese Government replied to the
abovementioned Japanese memorandum on October 5, 1921,66 and stated clearly China’s
position in the matter as well as emphasizing the differences of opinion
between the two countries. The second Japanese memorandum dated October
15, 1921, in reply to the Chinese memorandum of October 5, 1921, was
handed to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs by the Japanese
Minister at Peking on October 19, 1921.67 This memorandum,
[Page 632]
after discussing the various points of difference
between the two countries, closes by expressing the willingness of the
Japanese Government to enter into further negotiations in the
premises.
The second Chinese memorandum, dated November 3, 1921, (a copy of which
is enclosed herewith as a newspaper clipping from the Peking, and Tientsin Times of November 5th) replies to Japan’s
second memorandum of October 15th and refutes the various arguments of
the Japanese Government as set forth therein.
It will be noted that the exchange of notes between the two governments
has at least set forth the points of contention between the two
countries, that while the chances of a satisfactory settlement of the
question by direct negotiations between China and Japan seem at present
remote, still these memoranda form a basis for further negotiations and
may prove helpful to the Chinese and Japanese delegates at Washington
provided the Shantung question is brought up at the Pacific
Conference.
[Enclosure]
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs
(W. W.
Yen) to the Japanese Minister
in China (Obata)
On October 19, the Japanese Government again presented to the Chinese
Government a Memorandum relative to the Shantung question. After
careful consideration, the Chinese Government feels that the
Japanese Government not only differs fundamentally from the views of
the Chinese Government as expressed in its Memorandum of October 5,
but also shows apparently much misunderstanding in her
interpretation of the text thereof. The Chinese Government therefore
deems it highly necessary to make a further declaration concerning
the past facts and its unchanged point of view from first to
last.
The Shantung question concerns the vital interests of China. The
Chinese Government is very earnest in its sincere endeavours to find
an early solution of the question, even very much more so than
Japan. It is only due to the fact that the bases of settlement
proposed by the Japanese Government are altogether too far apart
from the hopes and expectations of the Chinese Government and people
that they can but calmly and patiently wait for an opportunity to
come when Japan may reconsider her position. As to the statement
embodied in the Japanese Memorandum under consideration to the
effect that on the eve of Minister Obata’s departure for Japan, in
May last this year, Foreign Minister Yen formally expressed to him
his desire to see a concrete project presented by
[Page 633]
the Japanese Government couched in
Just and satisfactory terms such as would simultaneously be deemed
fair by all the nations, it is to be observed that when leaving for
Japan Minister Obata inquired of Dr. Yen as to his personal views on
the Shantung question. It is evident, therefore, that Dr. Yen’s
answer to his inquirer is purely personal and is not, as it is
alleged, a formal statement by the Chinese Minister of Foreign
Affairs. Again, it is alleged in the Japanese Memorandum under
consideration that the Chinese Government Authorities have
confidentially presented to the Japanese Government a certain
project for the settlement of the question and that they also
unofficially expressed their readiness to open negotiations with the
Japanese Government. As to these allegations, it is highly probable
that they must have arisen out of misunderstandings caused by the
roundabout repetition of personal conversations between General
Banzai and Councillor Yu of the Ministry of War. It would seem to be
wanting in discretion, if these private conversations between
individuals were to be referred to as grounds for the presentation
of the Japanese proposals. As to the Memorandum handed by China to
the Japanese Minister on October 5, it enumerates and points out the
difference of views between China and Japan, both regarding the
principles underlying the proposals of Japan and regarding the
contents of the terms thereof. If Japan had a true understanding of
them, she would certainly have proposed a project, more substantial
and just, one that would be generally recognized as fair by all
sides. It is, however, highly regrettable that Japan has not given
any sign of concession, while, on the contrary she maintains that
China has openly indicated her unwillingness to proceed with the
negotiations in question.
It is to be observed that the reason why the representatives of China
have not been able to sign the Versailles Treaty is simply because
of the few articles therein relative to the Shantung question. Since
China has not signed the Versailles Treaty, it is impossible to
oblige China to accord recognition to the effects arising from the
said Treaty regarding the Shantung question. Therefore, while Japan
considers that the leasehold of Kiaochao has been transferred to her
through the operation of the Versailles Treaty, China, on the other
hand, deems that it has expired through her declaration of war
against Germany. This difference of viewpoint, if insisted upon by
both Countries, will forever deprive this question of a solution.
Since Japan is willing to restore Kiaochao completely to China,
there is no more necessity for her to insist on the aforesaid point
of dispute. As to the criticism directed to the declaration made by
the German Representatives to China, it is to be observed that at
the time when they came to negotiate the commercial Agreement with
[Page 634]
China, China still
insisted on her demand for the restoration of Kiaochao. But, owing
to the conditions of the war and the Treaty restraint, Germany lost
by force majeure, her power of returning
Kiaochao to China, for which she expressed her regret to the Chinese
Government. To this, it must be also noted, the Chinese Government
has only declared its acknowledgement of Germany’s explanation as
such and no more. Indeed, it is a serious misunderstanding on the
part of Japan to construe this incident to mean China’s recognition
of the Versailles Treaty.
Again, it is to be observed that the Kiaochao-Tsinan Railway, built
within Chinese territory, was primarily an undertaking of the nature
of a corporation and Chinese capital was also invested in it. It was
not the public property of Germany. Nor was it private property
exclusively belonging to Germans. Although it was temporarily
operated by the Germans, China has long been looking forward to an
opportune moment for its reclamation. Furthermore, the right of
policing the Railway belonged exclusively to China. There was
absolutely no military necessity, justifying the occupation of the
Railway by Japan. During that time, China repeatedly protested to
Japan that there was really no justification for the occupation of
the Railway by the Japanese Army. Furthermore, there were then no
German troops stationed along the line of the Railway except that
part lying within the Leased Territory. At the time of the
occupation of the Railway, Japan encountered no resistance whatever,
and she can have no ground to claim for any sacrifice of lives and
treasure suffered on account of the Railway. Later when China joined
the belligerent nations on the side of the Allies, it was only
proper that all railways within the territorial bounds of China
should be returned to her own control. However, the Japanese troops
have remained, refused to withdraw and caused innumerable and
endless losses and damages to the Chinese people along the line of
the Railway. This the Chinese Delegates had not hesitated to declare
repeatedly in the Peace Conference at Paris.
The Chinese Memorandum of October 5 proposes to reclaim the right of
control over the Railway and to divide its entire capital and
property into two halves, and that as to the half obtained by Japan,
it is to be redeemed by China in successive periods. This
arrangement, in the opinion of the Chinese Government, is very fair
and just, and it is to its great regret that Japan has referred to
it as a proposal devoid of meaning. It is to be inferred that in the
opinion of the Japanese Government the capital and property of the
Railway have been adjudged by the Reparations Commission to offset
German indemnities. However, it must not be overlooked that China
has not signed the Versailles Treaty. Consequently, how
[Page 635]
can the Reparations
Commission have any right and authority to make disposition of
property within Chinese territory to satisfy the indemnity
obligations of Germany? Furthermore, owing to China’s participation
in the War on the Allies’ side, Germany has also a certain amount of
indemnity to pay to China. If the Kiaochao-Tsinan Railway is to be
used as an article in [to] satisfy indemnity
obligations, China, it is more than evident, should be reimbursed
first.
Again, with reference to the disposition of public properties
belonging to Germany, as long as the Japanese Government has no
intention of holding the various kinds of properties, it is only
right that they should be handed over to China for proper
administration. Indeed, in the interests of the nationals of foreign
countries, the Chinese Government is most desirous of deciding upon
a just and fair settlement, but so far the Japanese Government has
not presented to China its avowed concrete and fair project. It is
therefore impossible for the Chinese Government to define its
attitude either one way or the other.
In a word, the views of the Chinese Government have already in
general appeared in its Memorandum of October 5. Owing to the fact
that in her second Memorandum, Japan has not yet understood China’s
views and further that with reference to the railways, her proposals
are more difficult to accept than as stated in the first Memorandum,
leading perhaps in a direction contrary to that of an early solution
of the question, the Chinese Government does not hesitate,
therefore, in taking pains again to make a further declaration and
deeply hopes for the sake of the everlasting peace of the Far East
and in the interests of true Sino-Japanese friendship, the Japanese
Government will again give its fullest consideration to the
question.
Further, with reference to the Japanese troops in Shantung province,
the Japanese Government has long promised to withdraw them in
advance, and their evacuation at an early date, it is to be
recalled, was also urged by China in her last memorandum. However,
up to the present, the actual evacuation has not yet been begun as
promised and requested. It is therefore the earnest hope of the
Chinese Government that the Japanese troops in question be recalled
at an early date, while the responsibility of policing the Railway
will, as a matter of course, be assumed by China’s own police
force.
[Peking, November 3,
1921.]
[Documents relating to negotiations during the Washington
Conference on the Limitation of Armament, November 12,
1921–February 6, 1922, will appear in a later volume of Foreign
Relations.]
