760c.61/285: Telegram
The Minister in Poland (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 6—11:10 a.m.]
483. Upon my return to Warsaw I gather the impression that the Government and people have been sobered by the events of the past few weeks [and are] undergoing a wholesome reaction which may be turned to advantage if the Allies can possibly agree upon some sound and common policy.
Prince Sapieha has described to me at considerable length his negotiations with the Bolsheviks and the powers. The constant inconsistencies and fluctuations of the various powers in their dealings with Poland would be laughable if they were not tragic in their toll of human life and unhappiness. …
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The Chief of State, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, my colleagues and others with whom I have talked express complete discouragement at the impossibility of finding a course for Poland to follow which will be agreeable for all her allies. Every one connected with the question longs for some concerted policy and I feel that the war weariness and anxiety for peace are such that any reasonable policy could now be enforced. It is however impossible to coerce Poland into being reasonable through conflicting advice and in the absence of material support.
There is a strong feeling that to stop at the line indicated in your telegram 36332 would be disastrous from a military point of view. This view is entertained not only by the Polish Government but by the military representatives of the powers who are acquainted with the actual military conditions. This line of course never intended as a military line but as a basis administrative boundary to the west of which the Poles could set up a permanent administration without prejudice to further acquisitions to the east. If it can be considered as a military line all its advantages obviously lie in the hands of the Bolsheviks as they would hold the fortified positions of Brest Litovsk and Grodno which are carefully excluded from Polish occupation as well as the lateral railroads which are of vital importance. Furthermore this line is impossible from a defensive point of view and if broken the capital would be in imminent danger. General Weygand has recommended that the Poles should occupy the former German line above referred to.33 M[ilitary] Intelligence] D[ivision] [Page 402] can furnish details on this line. Weygand advised against the occupation of Vilna as this would make too long a line and would produce a salient difficult to hold. It is evident that any public announcement that Polish [advance] would stop at the Curzon [line] would be a distinct advantage to the Bolsheviks as it would constitute an assurance that they might withdraw to the east and there unhindered, organize a drive for the annihilation of Wrangel, returning at their leisure for a fresh attack on Poland. Even with the forces they now possess they could, if not harassed, organize within a short time to strike the Poles at any given point, thereby creating a serious situation and perhaps a renewal of the crisis from which we are now emerging.
Sapieha stated that in the natural course of military operations it will probably be necessary to disregard the advice not to pass beyond the Curzon line. He said this without resentment but made it clear that in the opinion of the Government this was a matter of self preservation.
Polish opinion appears convinced that peace to-day would only be a truce of more or less indefinite duration. Conditions here are such however that the Government feels Poland must have such a peace even at the cost of sacrificing Wrangel. The country is exhausted by warfare, her whole energy is being devoted to military operations, many of the civil functions of the Government have practically ceased, and bankruptcy seems inevitable unless the population can soon be returned to productive work. Sapieha stated that he assumed the office of Foreign Minister for the avowed purpose of making an early peace, while keeping Poland faithful to her allies rather than allowing her to join with the radical elements in Russia and Germany who are making strenuous efforts to secure the ascendency here. He stated, however, that his difficult position had been further weakened by the adoption of restrictions placed upon Poland by the powers. There is a general feeling not only among radicals but even among the most pro-Ally elements who are trying to keep Poland upon, the right path, that the country has had to bear the full brunt of carrying on the war and that far from receiving active help has been actually hampered by her allies not only as regards the actual fighting front but in the various other important questions. The Bolsheviks are offering frontiers far to the east of anything proposed by the Allies and at Minsk the Bolshevist representative openly jeered at the Poles for their hesitation; radical elements here are harping upon the fact that Poland was being treated more generously by her enemies than by her friends, that the Allies were doing nothing for Poland and that the only evidence of their interest was in the form of restrictions which, if observed, [Page 403] would lead to the annihilation of her independence. Sapieha added that this was an argument which it was very hard to combat and that in view of the pressure exerted by the powers he did not feel that he could much longer retain office.
I venture respectfully but earnestly to urge my views that we now have an exceptional opportunity to secure adjustments which would contribute materially to the maintenance of peace in this part of the world. This opportunity can be exploited only if the Allies promptly formulate a concerted policy based upon an understanding of the political military necessities of the situation.