763.72119/6513
The Secretary of State to the Japanese Chargé (Debuchi)
Memorandum
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Japanese Chargé d’Affaires and desires to express on behalf of his Government its appreciation of the frankness with which the Japanese Government stated its attitude in regard to negotiating with China concerning the restitution of Kiao-chou and German rights in Shantung in the memorandum handed to the Secretary of State on August 22, 1919.46
With the same frankness and same desire to avoid misunderstandings the Secretary of State has the honor to present his observations upon the memorandum of the Japanese Government and to state the views of the Government of the United States as to the situation which has been created by the delivery of the memorandum.
The Government of the United States would be wanting in candor if it did not admit that it views with grave concern the present attitude of the Japanese Government since it discloses that there is a radical difference of understanding as to the proposed negotiations with China. The Government of the United States had no doubt that the representatives of the Japanese Government at Paris clearly understood that a condition precedent to the assent of the President to Articles 156, 157 and 158 of the Treaty of Versailles was that the Japanese Government should agree that the Sino-Japanese Agreements of 1915 and 1918 should not be relied upon or referred to in the negotiations for the return to China of Kiao-chou and the German rights as dealt with in the Japanese statement to the Council of the Allied and Associated Governments at Paris.
The President, after careful consideration of the Japanese memorandum, directs the Secretary of State to say that he is deeply concerned that the Japanese Government have without doubt unintentionally declared a policy contrary to the understanding reached with the Japanese delegates at Paris; that during the conferences of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Governments Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda showed their willingness to accept the condition precedent by stating that their Government would not appeal to the Agreements of 1915 and 1918 in negotiating with China unless the latter refused to negotiate under Articles 156, 157 and 158 of the Treaty; and that the assent of the President to those Articles was given because he believed that the Japanese Government acting through their accredited [Page 721] delegates understood and agreed to disregard the Agreements of 1915 and 1918 in their negotiations with the Chinese Government relative to Kiao-chou in carrying out the agreement reached at Paris.
The President further directs the Secretary of State to say that, since his assent to the Articles of the Treaty depended upon the acceptance of this condition precedent, the non-compliance with that condition by the Japanese Government may oblige him to consider the necessity of discontinuing his support of the Articles in question, though he sincerely hopes that the Japanese Government will find it possible to remove the necessity of such action on his part.
The Government of the United States considers it needless in this connection to discuss the validity of the Agreements of 1915 and 1918 or whether the assent of the Chinese Government to those Agreements was given voluntarily or obtained by duress. The fact essential at the present time is that it was understood at Paris that they were not to be considered in the negotiations for the return to China of Kiao-chou and certain German rights in Shantung. In the event, however, that the Japanese Government find themselves unable to reconsider the position set forth in their memorandum, which it is sincerely hoped will not be the case, the Government of the United States may feel it needful to raise the question of the validity of such agreements though it would do so with reluctance and regret.
It is confidently anticipated that the Japanese Government upon further consultation with their peace delegates and upon consideration of the facts above set forth will find it possible to give a frank assurance to the Government of the United States that in accordance with the understanding reached at Paris they will not base their negotiations with the Chinese Government for the return of Kiao-chou and German rights upon the Agreements of 1915 and 1918 and that they will not introduce any terms of such Agreements into the negotiations. The grave embarrassments which may result from the failure of the Japanese Government to give an immediate assurance as outlined above cannot but impress that Government with the desirability of preventing the possibility of such embarrassments arising by changing the situation created by the memorandum under consideration and by removing all doubt and uncertainty as to the Japanese Government’s intention to abide by the condition precedent as stated in this communication, and which the Government of the United States is firmly convinced is only now a subject of discussion through misapprehension of the facts on the part of the Japanese Government.
[Page 722]The Government of the United States in presenting this statement of the case has done so with all candor because it is not the part of friendship and of good understanding to withhold the truth or attempt to hide existing divergence of views. It is the earnest desire of the President and the Government of the United States to avoid everything which could affect unfavorably the friendly spirit and mutual confidence which have in the past characterized the relations between the United States and Japan; and it is, because of that desire, which is doubtless shared by the Japanese Government, that they are urged to give the assurance which will bring to an end the difference which has arisen as evidenced by their memorandum.