Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume VIII

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/79

HD–79

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, October 30, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, October 30, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • Hon. F. L. Polk
  • Secretary
    • Mr. L. Harrison
  • British Empire
    • Sir Eyre Crowe
  • Secretary
    • Mr. H. Norman
  • France
    • M. Pichon
  • Secretaries
    • M. Berthelot
    • M. de Saint-Quentin
  • Italy
    • M. Scialoja
  • Secretary
    • M. Barone Russo
  • Japan
    • M. Matsui
  • Secretary
    • M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat
America, United States of	Capt. G. A. Gordon
British Empire	Capt. G. Lothian Small
France	M. Massigli
Italy	M. Zanchi.
Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

• America, United States of
  • Rear-Admiral N.A. McCully, U. S. N.
  • Captain Madison, U. S. N.
  • Lieut-Commander H. W. Roeller, U. S. N.
  • Dr. J. B. Scott
  • Dr. I. Bowman
  • Mr. A. W. Dulles
• British Empire
  • Commander MacNamara
  • Captain Fuller
  • Mr. A. Leeper
  • Mr. H. W. Malkin
• France
  • Marshal Foch
  • General Weygand
  • General Le Rond
  • M. Laroche
  • Commandant Le Vavasseur
  • M. Fromageot
• Italy
  • C. Amiral Grassi
  • M. Ricci-Busatti
  • M. Vannutelli-Rey
  • M. Stranieri
  • Capt. de Corvette Ruspoli
• Japan
  • Commandant Ohsumi
  • M. Nagaoka
  • M. Shigemitsu

1. (The Council had before it a draft note of the Drafting Committee on the notification to the German Government of the coming into force of the Treaty. (See Appendix “A”.) Note of the Drafting Committee on the Notification to the German Government of the Coming Into Froce of the Treaty

M. Fromageot read and commented upon this note.

Crowe wished to raise a point of mere form relative to the second paragraph of this draft note. He desired that this paragraph be changed to read as follows:

“The President of the Peace Conference has the honor to inform the German Government that three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, namely, the British Empire, France and Italy, have ratified the Treaty, and Germany, on the other hand, having likewise ratified it, the above mentioned condition is fulfilled.”

This change was merely designed to prevent the note being drafted in such form as to notify the German Government that it had ratified the Treaty.

M. Pichon said that the question of the date to be fixed for the coming into force of the Treaty should not be discussed at the present time.

M. Fromageot concluded his commentaries on the draft note by saying that, as a result of the decision taken the preceding day by the Council¹ relative to the unexecuted Armistice clauses and to the drafting of a Protocol, he thought that a paragraph should be added at the end of the draft note to the effect that the German Government should send a representative to Paris prior to the ratification of the Treaty, with power to sign a Protocol relative to the unexecuted Armistice clauses. (This was agreed to.) The Drafting Committee thought that a large majority of the unexecuted Armistice Clauses were covered by provisions in the Treaty itself: in most cases the Treaty in terms imposed upon the German Government the same obligations as did the Armistice, and a large number of these Treaty provisions likewise specified the penalty for nonfulfilment of these obligations.

M. Pichon observed that for such violations of the Armistice clauses as the Scapa Flow incident no penalties were provided.

M. Fromageot said that this was true, and that likewise no penalties were provided for the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, although in this case the Treaty did take care of this obligation (Article 433). With respect to most of the remaining unexecuted clauses of the Armistice the Treaty provided penalties. He thought it might be well to give a brief summary of the unexecuted clauses. There was nothing in the Treaty with respect to the delivery by the German Government of rolling stock. With respect to the Financial Clauses, the Treaty in Article 238 not only reiterated the obligations incumbent upon the German Government, but explicitly provided penalties. This was likewise true with respect to the handing over of agricultural and industrial implements. The Penalties provided for Germany’s non-fulfilment of her obligations in general were laid down in Article 430 and paragraphs 17 and 18 of the second annex to Part VIII (Reparations). The question of works of art was likewise fully covered. The question of aeronautic material was not so well covered. Articles 170, 202 and 210 of the Treaty prohibited the exportation of such material but no penalties were provided. The Committee did not feel that it quite understood the argument of the Minister for Finance relative to the payment by the German Government of maintenance expenses of the troops of occupation (See H. D. 78, Appendix “C”).² The question of the German mercantile marine, which at present resolved itself into a matter of the tank steamers, the five vessels alleged to be sold to Holland and some undelivered vessels in neutral ports, was also fully covered by the Treaty. The foregoing summary seemed to indicate that in general the Treaty took into account the probability of the German Government not having fulfilled all its obligations under the Armistice prior to the entry into force of the Treaty.

M. Pichon asked if there were any remarks.

Sir Eyre Crowe wished to know if this note were to be sent to the German Government without at the same time informing it what it was proposed to include in the Protocol relative to unexecuted Armistice clauses. He thought that if the German Government were directed to send a representative to sign such Protocol without knowing what it was to contain, further delay would ensue.

M. Berthelot remarked that there was no need at the present time to arrive at a decision as to the date of deposit of ratifications. The Protocol relative to unexecuted Armistice clauses would be ready on the following Saturday; the point was to agree upon the form of the note which should be sent at the proper time.

M. Pichon said it was only necessary to agree on the principle of this note.

Marshal Foch said that he agreed in principle with the foregoing remarks, but he felt that it was important to let the German Government know what had to be done. He thought that the following arrangement would be most advisable: without letting the German Government know the exact date of the deposit of ratifications it should be informed that the Treaty would be put into force at an early but undetermined date which could be designated as “D” day. The German Government could be informed at once that on “D” minus 8 day for instance, it would be notified of the date of deposits of ratifications and that on “D” minus 6 day, for instance, its representative must be in Paris. He thought that an arrangement of the note on such a basis would solve all difficulties.

M. Berthelot inquired if it was intended that the representatives of the German Government should all be in Paris and not in the various regions where Allied Commissions and troops of occupation were to arrive.

General Weygand said that the German representatives must be here and come to an agreement before the Treaty could be put into force.

M. Berthelot brought up the example of Silesia. Should it be decided here in Paris what German officials would remain there in order to effectuate a transfer of authority in that territory without a hitch?

General Le Bond replied that German representatives should be here in Paris to settle the general principles involved, and that officials should likewise remain in Silesia and other territories where the same situation was presented in order to effect the necessary arrangements with the incoming Allied Commissions and troops of occupation. The procedure to be adopted consisted of two phases.

General Weygand thought it would be better not to put these details in the draft note, as confusion would certainly be caused thereby. It was most important that the summoning to Paris of the German representatives should not be bound up with the question of settling the date of deposits of ratifications.

M. Piohon agreed that pourparlers should certainly start in Paris before the date of deposit of ratifications was necessarily fixed.

M. Polk, referring to Marshal Foch’s idea as to rearrangement of the draft note on a time-table basis, inquired whether this was to include the unfulfilled Armistice clauses. He supposed that it was only meant to refer to movement of troops, evacuation, and similar points.

M. Pichon said that this was so.

M. Scialoja thought that the draft note should be modified so that the invitation to the German Government to participate in the deposit of ratifications should be eliminated so long as that date remained unsettled. It would be enough to merely inform the German Government that as the time for deposit was approaching, it became necessary for it to fulfill the conditions precedent thereto.

M. Berthelot thought that the German Government should be informed why the deposit of ratifications had not yet taken place.

M. Scialoja thought that representatives of the German Government should be summoned to Paris immediately to discuss the matters still remaining unsettled prior to the fixing of a date for the deposit of ratifications.

M. Fromageot still thought it would be better to retain the framework of the draft note to the extent of acquainting the German Government with the proposed procedure, this in order to avoid any argument on their part that the Treaty should now automatically be put into force.

M. Pichon summed up by suggesting that the draft note should be changed so as to accord with the views above expressed by Marshal Foch, M. Scialoja, Sir Eyre Crowe and M. Fromageot, and that as so modified, it should be submitted to the Council on the following Saturday, together with the Protocol relative to unexecuted Armistice clauses. (This was agreed to.)

(It was decided:

(1) to accept in principle the note of the Drafting Committee on the notification to the German Government of the coming into force of the Treaty (See Appendix “A”), with the following modifications:

(a) in the first part of said draft the German Government should be invited to participate in the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty at a date specified as not yet being determined.

(b) that the German Government, at the same time, should be informed that the date of the coming into force of the Treaty would later be communicated to it in ample time but that without awaiting the notification of said date it should immediately send representatives to Paris to discuss the settlement of the matters constituting conditions precedent to the putting into force of the Treaty.

(c) to add at the end of said draft a paragraph to the effect that the German Government, prior to the date of deposit of ratifications, should send representatives to Paris with power to sign a Protocol dealing with the unexecuted clauses of the Armistice.

It was further decided:

(1) to change the form of the second paragraph of said draft so that it should read as follows: “The president of the Peace Conference has the honor to inform the German Government that three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, namely: the British Empire, France and Italy, have ratified the Treaty, and Germany, on the other hand, having likewise ratified it, the above mentioned condition has been fulfilled.”

(2) that the draft note of the Drafting Committee should be modified as above indicated and submitted to the Council on the following Saturday, together with the Protocol relative to the unexecuted Armistice Clauses.)

2. Captain Fuller R. N. explained to the Council that the Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had met on the preceding day; no report had been made by them to the Council, but the report which he was now going to read had been agreed to by the British, French, Italian and Japanese representatives, and in great part had been agreed to by the United States representative, who, however, wished to submit a minority report. He then read the majority report (See Appendix “B”). He added that it was understood that in the event of the surface vessels being broken up and sunk, the same procedure should not be adopted in the case of floating docks. Siniking of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow

Mr. Polk asked if Rear Admiral McCully might read his minority report.

Rear Admiral McCully then read his minority report (See Appendix “C”).

Mr. Polk said that the point of view of the minority report was this: although it had already been decided that the German Government should give up certain ships, their disposition had never been definitely determined. At one time there had been some question of sinking them. Now the ships in question had actually been sunk. The majority report proposed to take mercantile material, which of course could not be destroyed, in reparation for the vessels sunk. This mercantile material would be useful to the Reparation Commission. It seemed to him better, by way of reparation for the vessels sunk, to take from the German Government naval material which could be destroyed if so desired. The point he wished to emphasize was that he thought that the proposal to take over mercantile material, raised a question which distinctly affected the Reparation Commission.

M. Pichon remarked that the French Government had never agreed to the sinking of these ships.

Mr. Polk replied that such was not his contention. That was not the point now at issue. His question was whether it were not better to leave this mercantile material to be devoted to such purposes that it would become useful to the operations of the Reparation Commission, rather than, by taking it away, to diminish Germany’s power of making adequate reparation.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarked that several questions were now being confused. He pointed out that the British Government had been willing to make a big concession; it was willing to bear all the loss resulting from the Scapa Flow incident, therefore, it seemed to him that the opinion of his Government should now bear some weight. To him it seemed pointless to take over from the German Government ships which were useless to them and were equally useless to the Allied and Associated Powers. He thought that such an action might indeed be pleasing to the German Government. Likewise the docks which it was proposed to take over were so large that they were only useful for large sized ships of which the Germans now had none, and certainly it was not desired to encourage them to build any.

M. Berthelot thought that Mr. Polk’s observations had shown that the argument of the United States was entirely based upon the sinking of the ships. The question had now, however, reached a further stage. Neither the French nor the Italian Governments had ever agreed to the sinking of the ships and they had demanded their distribution. Certainly there was no point in distributing the ships if they were thereafter to be sunk. He recognized the force of Sir Eyre Crowe’s argument and he wished to point out that the British Government had even made another concession: although the British Government was prepared to have the ships sunk and thought that the American Government would agree, nevertheless, it was ready to admit the right of France and Italy to dispose of their share of the ships as they saw fit. He thought it was important to settle now the question whether or not the ships were to be sunk.

Mr. Polk inquired if M. Berthelot meant to say that naval material ought not to be replaced by naval material. However the Council was not then discussing the disposition of ships; he merely wished to repeat that he thought the question now under discussion was one that interested the Reparation Commission. The action proposed by the majority was, to give a priority, on account of reparation, for the ships sunk. To his mind three points were involved: there was no question at the present time of the disposition of the ships; he understood and appreciated the attitude of the British Government; he thought that this was a question for the Reparation Commission. He pointed out that his position was purely a matter of principle inasmuch as the United States would not get any ships.

M. Pichon thought that this presented a new phase of the question.

Sir Eyre Crowe observed that this would make it impossible to settle the Scapa Flow incident prior to the drafting of the Protocol relative to unexecuted Armistice clauses and would indefinitely postpone the entry into force of the Treaty.

M. Pichon agreed, and observed that Marshal Foch had pointed out to him that as this was a question of a violation of the Armistice the Reparation Commission could not yet be interested therein. The American argument could equally be applied to all material to be handed over by virtue of the Armistice clauses.

Mr. Polk asked if the Financial experts had not been consulted with respect to the delivery of locomotives and similar questions?

Marshal Foch said that they had not, for the reason that the Reparation Commission had not yet existed and did not yet exist.

Mr. Polk thought that on that basis it would be easy for the Armistice Commissions to seriously embarrass the Reparation Commission.

M. Pichon remarked that all matters heretofore adjusted had been controlled by the Supreme Council.

M. Scialoja added that the conception of reparation only existed by virtue of the coming into force of the Treaty.

Mr. Polk said that he was surprised to learn that the Financial experts had not been consulted. He thought that the American Financial experts had at least given an opinion on these matters.

M. Pichon said that the French Government could not yield on this point.

Mr. Polk remarked that if the docks and similar material now proposed to be demanded were received, the United States would get something, otherwise they would not.

Sir Eyre Crowe thought that the principle of demanding floating docks and similar material should be maintained, at the same time giving instructions that only the large ones and those belonging to the German Government or in which it had a predominating interest should be taken.

Mr. Polk thought that the Naval Representatives could easily agree on that basis.

Sir Eyre Crowe thought that the Naval representatives should immediately meet and settle this question.

M. Pichon remarked that the question was a very urgent one inasmuch as it had to be settled before the Protocol, which was to be submitted the following Saturday, could be drafted. The Naval representatives should come to a conclusion by the following day at the latest and communicate the same to M. Berthelot and M. Fromageot.

Captain Fuller, R. N. said he understood then that the Committee of Naval Experts might call upon the German Government to make over by way of reparation: (1) Government docks; (2) docks, cranes, etc., in which the German Government had a predominating interest; and, (3) docks, cranes, etc., the removal of which would not affect the working of ports in which they were situated either from the Allied or from the German point of view.

(It was decided:

(1) to accept the principle of the responsibility of the German Government for the sinking of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow.

(2) that the Committee of Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should meet immediately and agree as to the reparation to be exacted from the German Government for the sinking of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow, being guided by the principle that docks and similar material belonging to the German Government or in which it had a predominating interest, or too large to be suitable for present German maritime uses, should be taken by way of reparation.)

3. (The Council had before it a report of the Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers relative to the dispatch of naval vessels to Flensburg (See Appendix “D”).) Dispatch of Naval Vessels to Fleburg

M. Pichon suggested that the recommendations contained in this report be adopted.

(This was agreed to)

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he only wished to recall the fact that although it had been intended to send three battalions to Schleswig, only two battalions would go there. It was worth considering, in view of the adoption of the Naval Representatives’ recommendation not to send Allied warships to Flensburg, whether this force was sufficient.

(It was decided:

to accept the report of the Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers relative to despatching naval vessels to Flensburg (See Appendix “D”).)

4. M. Pichon thought that, as the Central Territorial Committee was not unanimous, the best procedure was for it to submit majority and minority reports which would be discussed and settled by the Council at its meeting on the following Saturday. Request of the Centeral Territorial Committee for Instructions on the Questions of Dobrudja and of the Serco-Bulgarian Frontier, in Connection With the Reply to the Bulgarian Counter-Proposals

M. Laroche observed that certain delegations had stated that the opinion held by them relative to the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier might be influenced by the Council’s solution of the Dobrudja question; certain other delegations had stated that their opinion would not be changed by such a solution.

Mr. Polk inquired if the question of Dobrudja were not a short one susceptible of being settled immediately.

M. Pichon remarked that he could only say that the opinion of the French Government was that Dobrudja, a province belonging to an Allied Government, should not be taken away from it and given over to Bulgaria, an enemy.

Mr. Polk pointed out that he was not insisting on that matter being settled now. The only point before the Council was what kind of an answer should be sent to Bulgaria? He quite understood that in this answer there would be nothing relative to transferring Dobrudja to Bulgaria.

M. Laroche said that the settlement of the Dobrudja question was intimately connected with that of Bessarabia.

Mr. Polk replied that in his opinion the question of Bessarabia should not be discussed at the present moment particularly on account of the situation in Russia.

M. Pichon agreed.

M. Laroche said that if the question of Bessarabia were not to be raised he thought the question of Dobrudja should likewise not be raised.

Mr. Polk thought that at some other time or in some other form, by the medium of another Treaty or action on the part of the League of Nations, the question of Dobrudja could be brought up.

M. Pichon said the French Government absolutely did not agree to any solution contemplating the transfer of Dobrudja to Bulgaria.

M. Laroche thought that if the matter were left for future action in the manner intimated, with the implication that Dobrudja would eventually be transferred to Bulgaria, it was equivalent to certainly depriving Roumania of this province.

Mr. Polk remarked that the chief trouble was that Roumania had been given everything she wanted in a territorial way without any equivalent being demanded. The time to bargain would have been when Roumania’s territorial requests had been freely granted.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggested that it would be sufficient to say in the answer to the Bulgarian counter-proposals that in a Treaty with Bulgaria the question of Dobrudja could not be raised.

M. Berthelot agreed. He thought that it would be inadvisable to mention anything further, particularly in regard to the League of Nations.

(The suggestion of Sir Eyre Crowe met with approval and the discussion of the questions of Dobrudja and the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier were fixed for the meeting of Saturday, November 1st, 1919.)

5. M. Berthelot, referring to the draft instructions to the Inter-Allied Commission charged with examining into the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, called attention to Section X thereof (H. D. 77, Appendix “C”).³ Instructions to Inter-Allied Commission Charged With Examining Into the Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces

In the first paragraph of that Section it was provided that: “In order to accomplish its mission, the Allied Commission shall have at its disposal the personnel of the British and French Allied Missions now operating in Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania with a view to preventing any isolated initiative or divergence of action.” He observed that no mention had been made of Italian and American Commissions. He thought that the paragraph should be redrafted so as to include the personnel of the Military Mission of all the Allied and Associated Powers. He understood that there was no Italian Military Mission in that region but that there was an American one.

Mr. Polk stated that there was no American Military Mission in that region, but that he had no objection to the change proposed.

(It was decided:

to modify Section X of the draft instructions to the Inter-Allied Commission charged with the examining into the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces (H.D. 77, Appendix “C”), so that the first paragraph thereof should read as follows: “In order to accomplish its mission, the Inter-Allied Commission shall have at its disposal the personnel of the Military Missions of all the Allied and Associated Powers now operating in Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with a view to preventing any isolated initiative or divergence of action”.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Hotel Crillon, Paris , October 30, 1919.

Appendix A to HD–79

Project of a Note to the German Government

By the terms of the final provisions of the Treaty signed at Versailles June 28, 1919, it has been stipulated that:

“A first procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up as soon as the Treaty has been ratified by Germany on the one hand, and by three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other hand.”

The President of the Peace Conference has the honor of calling to the attention of the German Government that three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, namely, the British Empire, France and Italy on the one hand, and Germany on the other, have ratified the Treaty and that the condition above referred to has been fulfilled.

The other Allied and Associated Powers who have, up to the present day made known their ratification, are Belgium, Poland and Siam.

In execution of the said provisions, and if the various acts necessary to the coming into force of the Treaty be fulfilled in time, there will take place in Paris on November . . . . 1919, at . . . . o’clock, the Procès-verbal of the deposit of these ratifications. The German Government is requested to be kind enough to participate.

The final provision[s] of the Treaty add:

“From the date of this first procès-verbal, the Treaty will come into force between the High Contracting Parties who have ratified it. For the determination of all periods of time provided for in the present Treaty, this date will be the date of the coming into force of the Treaty.”

This entry into force of the Treaty entails certain consequences which should be considered:

1. The beginning of operations by the Inter-Allied High Commission of the Rhineland. (Arrangement, Article 2);

2. The beginning of operations by military, naval and air delegations, at the present time in Germany, as military, naval and air commissions of control (Treaty, article 203);

3. The beginning of operations by the Reparations Commission; (Treaty, article 233 and Annex II paragraph 5);

4. Transfer of sovereignty for Memel (Treaty, article 99) and for Danzig (Treaty, Article 100), resulting in the evacuation of the troops, and German authorities, and the taking possession of these territories by the Interallied troops;

5. Transfer of Government in the Saar Basin (Treaty, article 49 and annex, paragraph 16);

6. Transfer of temporary Government in the territory of Upper-Silesia, submitted to a plebiscite (Treaty, article 88 and annex, paragraphs 1 and 2); resulting in the evacuation of German troops, and authorities to be designated by the Commission, and the occupation by the Inter-Allied troops as well as the beginning of operations by the Commission of Government and of Plebiscite on this territory;

7. Transfer of temporary administration in the territory of Schleswig submitted to a plebiscite (Treaty, article 109) resulting in the evacuation of German troops and authorities, and occupation by the Inter-Allied troops, as well as the beginning of operations by the Commission of Administration and of Plebiscite on this territory;

8. Beginning of the 15 day period, in which must be effected the evacuation and the transfer of temporary administrations, in the territories submitted to a plebiscite: Eastern Prussia, Allenstein (Treaty, article 95) and Eastern Prussia, Marienwerder (Treaty, article 97), resulting in the evacuation of German troops and authorities, and occupation by the Inter-Allied troops, as well as the beginning of operations by the Commissions of Administration and of Plebiscite on these territories.

9. Beginning of the 15 day period, in which the Commissions of Delimitation must begin their operations.

The German Government is invited to send to Paris for the . . . . . . . . . duly accredited representatives to:

1. agree with the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers as to the conditions of establishment of the Commissions of Government and of administration and plebiscite, the handing over of powers, the transfer of services, the entry of Inter-Allied troops, the evacuation of German troops and authorities, and all other measures above provided for.

Attention is now called to the fact that the German authorities must leave on the spot all installations of service or dwelling as well as the documents which are to be used upon the immediate entry into action of the Inter-Allied authorities; that the German troops must also leave on the spot all installations occupied by them.

2. agree with the Staff of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated Armies as to conditions of transport of Inter-Allied troops.

Appendix B to HD–79

Conclusions Arrived at by the British, French, Italian and Japanese Naval Advisers to the Peace Delegation on the Subject of Reparation for the Sinking of the German “Warships at Scapa at Meeting Held at Ministry of Marine at 8 p.m. on 29 October, 1919

Note: The U. S. Naval Adviser has a minority report.

In view of the reparation claims that Germany had already incurred under the terms of the Peace Treaty, it was not considered feasible to make any further financial or material demands other than the following, which, however, cannot be regarded as complete compensation to the Allied and Associated Powers for the losses incurred through the sinking of the modern German men-of-war at Scapa.

2. The further claims which it was considered should be put forward are as follows:

(a) For the capital ships sunk.

A number of floating docks now in German ports, whose total lifting capacity is equivalent to that of the capital ships sunk, should be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers. The aggregate tonnage is 370,740 tons.

(b) For the five light-cruisers sunk.

The following light-cruisers, left to Germany under the Peace Treaty, should be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers;—

• Königsberg
• Pillau
• Graudenz
• Regensburg
• Strassburg

(c) For the fifty T. B. D.’s sunk.

A number of small floating docks, floating cranes, tugs, dredges, and other floating port material of an equivalent displacement to the fifty destroyers should be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers. The aggregate displacement is 41,800 tons.

Note: A certain number of these ships have since been salved and are in a bad condition. The raising of these vessels has incurred a considerable expenditure, and consequently it is not considered that these vessels can be placed to the credit of the German Government in the above demands.

3. With a view to carrying out the above conditions the German Government shall undertake to supply to the Allied Naval Commission of Control within ten days of the deposit of the ratifications of the Peace Treaty, a complete list of all floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers, etc., now in German possession, and to surrender such floating docks and additional material as may be notified to them by the Allied Naval Commission of Control.

4. The distribution of docks, cranes, tugs, and dredges, etc., surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers, under the above conditions, should be considered in conjunction with the disposal of the enemy surface vessels.

5. That on the understanding that the Supreme Council have decided to hold the German Government solely responsible for the sinking of these ships at Scapa, it is desirable that all the German officers and men belonging to these ships should be repatriated as early as possible, with the exception of any whose surrender is required under Article 228 of the Treaty of Peace. The German Government should, however, agree to the reparation demanded, before it is effected.

6. With regard to the moneys salved from the German warships at Scapa, it was considered that such moneys should be placed to the credit of the Reparation Fund. Individual claims can be made good by the German Government.

7. It was not considered that the torpedo boat destroyer B–98 could be retained as compensation for one of the destroyers sunk at Scapa, but that she should be claimed as one of the forty-two torpedo boat destroyers to be surrendered under the Peace Treaty.

Appendix C to HD–79

Hotel Crillon, Paris, France, October 30, 1919.

office of naval adviser

From: U. S. Naval Adviser.

To: Supreme Council.

Subject: Minority Report on Memorandum submitted to Supreme Council by the British Delegation regarding Responsibility for sinking of German warships at Scapa Flow, and other questions connected therewith.

Reference:	(a) Report Board of Admirals, June 23, 1919.
	(b) Letter of M. Clemenceau to German Delegation of June 25, 1919.4
	(c) S. H. Bulletin 756 of October 22, 1919.
	(d) S. H. Bulletin 148 [1148] of October 25, 1919.
	(e) Report Board of Admirals, October 29, 1919.

1. The German Government was responsible for failing to take preventive measures against sinking of the interned German vessels. In consequence the Armistice was violated, and this justifies a demand for Reparations.

2. The German Naval Officials in command at Scapa Flow were responsible as active agents in sinking the vessels. This justifies a demand for the trial and punishment, if convicted, of such officers.

3. The Reparations demanded should in principle be confined to further delivery of Naval Material. German Naval Material available for Reparations, according to Reference (a) consists of:—

(a) Of Military Value.

(1) Five (5) Light Cruisers (Graudenz, Koenigsberg, Pillau, Regensburg, and Strassburg).

(2) Fourteen (14) Destroyers (1908–09 program).

(3) Roght (8) Torpedo Boats.

(b) Of Small Military Value.

(1) Fourteen (14) Pre-Dreadnaughts (1900–1906 types) (about 182,000 tons in all).

(2) Nine Light Crusiers (Gazelle and Hamburg classes).

(3) One (1) Cruiser (Roon).

(4) Twenty-three (23) Destroyers (1906–07 Program and later).

(c) Of Little or No Military Value.

(1) Seven (7) Battleships (Kaiser Friedrich and Brandenburg classes).

(2) Roght (8) Coast Defense ships (Hagen Class).

(3) Two (2) Cruisers (Prinz Heinrich and Furst Bismarck).

(4) Six (6) Light Cruisers (5 of Hertha class and Kaiserin Augusta).

(5) Thirty-six (36) Destroyers.

(6) Sixty-four (64) Torpedo Boats.

(d) Naval Docks (At Wilhelmshaven).

(1) Three (3) Large Docks, one of 40,000 tons

(2) One (1) Pontoon Dock 1,500 tons

(3) Four (4) Torpedo Boat Docks 4,000 tons

The entire Reparations could be taken from classes (a), (b) and (d) mentioned above, reckoning either on tonnage basis, or based on value for scrap. In Class (c) would still remain sufficient Naval Forces for Germany’s needs to assist in maintaining internal order.

Note: At time of sinking of German vessels in Scapa Flow, there were in port 50 German Destroyers, of which fifteen (15) were not sunk, four were salved later, another is being salved. Majority Report, Reference (c), demands Reparations for fifty (50) Destroyers.

4. In regard to the sum of 34,642 marks, 20 pfennings, the Germans have claimed some of this money as personal property of Officers and Men. Such of this money as can be proved by them to be personal property, should be paid to German Officers and Men entitled to it, as personal property of war prisoners is not subject to confiscation. The remainder should be placed in Reparation Fund.

5. The German Destroyer B–98 was engaged in bringing mails to German vessels interned at Scapa Flow, was provided with proper authority to make the trip, and was flying the white flag. It is not alleged to have had any part in the sinking of the German vessels, or to have been guilty of any warlike act. However justifiable her seizure may have been at the moment, her indefinite retention is not justified by International Law, and she should be released and restored to Germany pending further dispositions.

N. A. McCully

Appendix D to HD–79

Report of Allied Representatives on Dispatch of Naval Vessels to Flensburg

According to the decision taken on October 25 by the Supreme Council,⁷ the Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers met on Monday, October 27, at 15 o’clock, in the Ministry of Marine, in order to determine whether, on account of the recent events at Flensburg, they deem it possible to send battleships to that port.

The Naval Representatives express the following opinion:

• First: From a maritime point of view, the sending of light ships (light cruisers, destroyers or gun boats) is possible, but it is unnecessary for them to enter the port and stay there.
• Second: Great Britain, the United States and France are the only great powers which have ships available to fulfill this mission.
• Third: They think that, in case one or several battleships were sent immediately, the Commander-in-Chief would be placed in a difficult situation, if, as is probable, the Danes would ask him for assistance which he would be unable to give; and, as he would be in a German port, the Germans might assume a hostile attitude towards him, which would necessitate immediate action on the spot, and an ulterior action of the Supreme Council.
• Fourth: In case the Supreme Council should decide to send ships, it is indispensable for it to determine in a precise manner what line of conduct the Commander-in-Chief must observe.
• Fifth: The Naval Representatives think that it is not judicious to send Allied battleships for “demonstration” purposes only, before the day under which the Allied Naval Force? are to arrive, with troops, for the plebiscite of Schleswig, according to the stipulations of the Peace Treaty.

1. HD–78, minute 1, p. 802.
2. Ante, p. 819.
3. Ante, p. 796.
4. Appendix XI to CF–92, vol. vi, p. 695.
7. HD–76, minute 8, p. 770.