763.72119/6227
HD–18
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, July 29, 1919, at 3:30 p.m.1
- Present
- America, United States of
- Hon. H. White.
- (later)—Hon. F. L. Polk.
- Secretary
- Mr. L. Harrison.
- British Empire
- The Kt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
- Secretaries
- Mr. H. Norman.
- Sir Ian Malcolm.
- France
- M. Pichon.
- (later)—M. Clemenceau.
- Secretaries
- M. Berthelot.
- M. de St. Quentin.
- Italy
- M. Scialoja.
- Secretary
- M. Paterno.
- Japan
- M. Matsui.
- Secretary
- M. Kawai.
- America, United States of
Joint Secretariat | |
America, United States of | Capt. Chapin. |
British Empire | Capt. E. Abraham. |
France | Capt. A. Portier |
Italy | Lt-Col. A. Jones. |
Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux. |
1. M. Berthelot referring to the decision taken on the previous day (H. D. 17, Para. 62), said that he understood the decision to refer to Austrian notes despatched before the final Treaty had been handed to the Austrian Delegation. It would clearly be necessary to reply to any Austrian notes despatched since then. He proposed, therefore, that the note regarding minorities be examined by the Committee on new States. Question of Answering Austrian Notes
Mr. Balfour said that he thought the same principle might be adopted in dealing with the Austrian notes as had been adopted regarding the notes sent by the German Delegation. In the latter case there had been a Committee to survey the whole of the replies. He would, therefore, propose that M. Dutasta be asked to arrange for a similar machinery in order that the whole of the replies be co-ordinated.
[Page 370](These proposals were accepted.)
Note:—The Resolution referred to was as follows:—
(It was agreed that a Committee should be appointed for the purpose of editing the reply to the German Note. The Secretary-General was requested to arrange for this Committee to meet with the least possible delay, and to communicate to it the various portions of the reply as they were approved.)
2. M. Pichon said that the Austrians had asked for an extension of one week beyond the period of 10 days allowed them to present their observations regarding the Treaty. They justified their request by reference to the change of Foreign Minister which had lately occurred. He thought the demand could not be resisted, and asked his colleagues if they agreed with him. Note From Austrian Delegation Asking for Extension of Time Allowed for Reply
(It was agreed that the period of ten days allowed to the Austrian Delegation to present observations on the Treaty handed to them should be extended by one week and that this should be communicated to them by the Secretariat-General.)
3. (M. Loucheur, M. Seydoux and Mr. Waterlow entered the room.)
M. Seydoux said that on the previous day the question of the resumption of the parcels post and of the money order service had been raised by the British Delegation. He had raised no comment on the resumption of the parcels post, but he had asked for time to consult the Ministry of Finance regarding the money order service. He had consulted the Ministry of Finance and found that the question had already been considered. On the 26th June the French Postal Service had been addressed by the Ministry of Finance which took the view that the instability of the mark made it undesirable to resume any money order intercourse with Germany. He found that the same opinion still prevailed. From this he concluded that the objection of the French Finance Ministry was a technical one and was not concerned with any political consideration. If the British Government therefore felt that there was no technical objection from the British point of view, there seemed no reason to object to the resumption of money order interchanges between Great Britain and Germany. The British Government, as far as France was concerned, was, he thought, free to act as it wished. The French Government, however, did not for the time propose to restore the money order service. Re-establishment of Postal Communications With Germany
M. Pichon said that the only objection would be that the Allies would not be acting identically, but as the question was not a political one the matter was not of great importance.
[Page 371](It was agreed that there was no objection to the resumption by Great Britain of parcels post and money order interchange with Germany in accordance with the proposal of the British Delegation (Appendix A).
It was further agreed that the proposals of the Special Committee as modified on the previous day (H. D. 16, Para. 43) should be accepted.
(For these proposals see Appendix B.)
4. The Council had before it the proposal made by M. Tittoni on the previous day (H. D. 16, Para. 24).
Creation of Inter-Allied Organisation for the Distribution of Raw Material M. Loucheur said that M. Tittoni’s proposal really amounted to the perpetuation of the Supreme Economic Council. The very functions he wished exercised were those hitherto exercised by the Council with the help of the Wheat Executive, the Interallied Maritime Transport Council, and similar organisations. The problem before the Government [Council?] was therefore merely restated in other terms. As the Council knew, the French and Italian Delegations favoured the continuance of the Supreme Economic Council. Great Britain latterly had taken the same view. Only the American Delegation disagreed, and had wired to Washington for instructions. On the following Friday and Saturday there was to be a meeting of the Council in London. Everything depended on the instructions that might be received from the Governments. Without them the members could take no action.
Mr. Balfour said that he had prepared a draft resolution to the following effect:—
“That the problems arising out of the present difficulties of providing food, coal and raw materials to the Allied Powers be submitted to the Supreme Economic Council for examination and report.”
He had expressed his resolution in these terms in order not to bind the Supreme Economic Council in any way. M. Tittoni’s proposal appeared to dictate the conclusion in some manner.
M. Loucheur observed that neither resolution offered a solution of the question. All that could be done was to postpone it unless instructions were received for the Supreme Economic Council to continue its functions. In regard to the primary necessity of finding coal for Italy, he wished to inform the Council that he had had a conversation with M. Tittoni. There was information that between the dates of August 5th and September 5th, Germany would furnish one million three hundred and fifty thousand tons of coal. This coal was intended for French uses according to agreement. France, however, had agreed, in order to assist Italy, to despatch out of this one hundred and seventy-five [Page 372] thousand tons to the latter country. This would save the situation. In addition to this, in spite of considerable shortage in France, he had given an order for the despatch from the Saar Basin to Italy of one thousand two hundred tons daily. He hoped that Great Britain would also help to ease the situation and he expected to have a conversation with Sir Auckland Geddes5 at the end of the week.
(It was then resolved that the problems arising out of the present difficulties of providing food, coal and raw materials to the Allied Powers be submitted to the Supreme Economic Council for examination and report.)
5. (At this moment Mr. Hudson, Mr. J. F. Dulles, M. Fiori,6 and Major Greig entered the room.)
Appointment of Commission of Experts for the Distribution of Rolling Strock in Enemy Countries Mr. Loucheur said that on the previous day he had asked that the Expert Commission for the distribution of Rolling Stock in Europe should work in harmony with the Reparations Commission. This had apparently been interpreted by the Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways, as meaning that the Expert Commission should work under the orders of the Reparations Commission. This was not what he meant to convey. It was clearly necessary that the work of the Expert Commission should be co-ordinated with that of the Reparations Commission. He therefore, proposed that the following Note, prepared by the British Delegation, be accepted:—
“The Presidents of the Main Expert Commissions on the distribution of rolling-stock, will work in close touch with the Reparations Commission in order that the latter may take the necessary measures for effecting financial adjustments resulting (a) from the transfer or liquidation of the above rolling-stock, craft and installations and (b) from such other decisions within the competence of the above Expert Commissions as may affect the Reparations Commission. No final decision will be communicated to the States affected without the previous concurrence of the Reparations Commission.”
He would like to add that, should there be disagreement between the Expert Commission and the Reparations Commission, the disagreement should be referred to the co-ordinating Committee, the setting up of which had been agreed to on the previous day.
Mr. Balfour said that two quite different considerations had to be reconciled. It was obvious that the rolling stock of Europe, as being a financial asset, should not escape the grasp of the Reparation Commission, but it was clearly important that for the economic [Page 373] reconstruction of Europe, so essential an instrument of reconstruction should be employed to the best purpose. Without this, work on Mines, Farms, Factories etc., would be wasted. From this point of view, there was no more important resource than rolling stock for the economic revival of Europe. This resource must be husbanded by the Experts. It was therefore necessary to reconcile these two important objects.
Mr. Hudson said that the Commission of Experts which was to deal with the distribution of rolling stock was, according to the Treaty, entirely independent. It could not be subjected to the Reparations Commission. Should it be so subjected the Germans would have cause for complaint that the Treaty was not being observed. He quite agreed that it should work in harmony with the Reparations Commission, but if it were unable to take any decision without the concurrence of the Reparations Commission, the object for which it was created would be defeated. It was essential that it should be able to take independent decisions and have them executed speedily; should it have to wait for the previous sanction of the Reparations Commission it could not do its work.
M. Loucheur said that the experts might be allowed to make provisional allotments of the railway stock, subject to sanction by the Reparations Commission. He disputed that the experts under the Treaty had any right to dispose finally of such material. The Reparations Commission, it had been stipulated, could intervene in all matters touching the disposal of material. He quite agreed that every day lost was a serious thing for the economic fate of Europe, but he could not admit that any of the material resources of the enemy countries could be disposed of irrespective of the Reparations Commission.
Mr. Balfour said that he understood M. Loucheur to agree to a temporary allotment of railway stock by the experts. They were bound, however, to inform the Reparations Commission of what they were doing. Their action would then be considered in its financial aspect, and the result of the action would be considered by the two Commissions together.
M. Loucheur pointed out that according to the Treaty, only the Reparations Commission could receive material in discharge of the reparations debt. No transfer of material could, therefore, be made without the knowledge and concurrence of the Reparations Commission. He could not therefore admit the complete independence of the experts.
Mr. Hudson maintained that the experts should be entirely free to make a distribution of the railway stock according to the technical necessities of the case. It was the role of the Reparations Commission [Page 374] to consider the financial consequences of the action of the Experts.
M. Loucheur quoted Articles 19 and 20 of Annex II of the Treaty. He pointed out that the Reparations Commission did not propose to make the allocation of the rolling stock, but should the experts make such an allocation that Germany was not able to restore her economic life in such a manner as to pay reparations at all, it was clear that the Reparations Commission had a right to intervene. In his view a mistake had been made in drawing up the Treaty, and the Experts should have been placed under the Reparations Commission. Without this there would inevitably be constant conflict of authority. However the Treaty had been signed and so he proposed that the experts should make a distribution, that they should inform the Reparations Commission, and that in case of disagreement the matter should be referred through the co-ordinating Committee to the Governments.
Mr. White said that he saw no objection to this course.
Mr. Dulles said that as the American representative on the Reparations Commission he sympathised with M. Loucheur. Should the Reparations Commission think it necessary to order a supply of coal from one country to another its intentions might be defeated, if the experts had allocated rolling stock in such a way that coal could not be moved.
Mr. Hudson said that he thought the subjection of the experts to the Reparations Commission a violation of the Treaty.
M. Loucheur said that what he proposed was no violation of the Treaty, but a matter of internal arrangement among the Allies.
Mr. Balfour said that the last sentence of the proposal under consideration seemed to imply that final decisions could be taken but not communicated to the Governments concerned. This appeared to be an absurd situation. He thought that the experts could make provisional allocation, but that no communication of their allotment as final should be made till the Reparations Commission had sanctioned it.
Mr. Hudson pointed out that the experts could only decide how the rolling stock should be distributed. They would be bound to utilise the Governments in order to have their plans carried out. For instance, should they decide that a proportion of German rolling stock was required in Denmark, they would be bound to inform the German and Danish Governments in order that they could execute the proposals. It was impossible to wait for the sanction of the Reparations Commission.
Mr. Balfour said that a test question would be, should the Technical Committee desire to send 500 wagons to Czecho-Slovakia, were they entitled to do so without the consent of the Reparations Commission.
[Page 375]M. Loucheur said that the answer in the case of experts would be yes, and in his own case it would be no. The experts, for instance, might lose sight of the necessity of transporting coal. If the Council of Five were in existence reference could be made to it, but, if it were not in existence, chaos would ensue. He thought it absurd that experts should act irrespective of orders. They should receive instructions from the Governments. The Clauses of the Treaty operated as against Germany, not as against the Allies among themselves. The various parts of the machinery employed for the execution of the Treaty must work together, otherwise there would be complete disorder. He therefore asked that definite instructions be given to the experts, so that they should not work independently of the Reparations Commission.
Mr. Hudson said that M. Loucheur had stated the issue very clearly. Poland, for instance, had been attributed certain territory which had been German. The accepted theory was that a certain amount of rolling stock went with this territory, in order to make its economic life possible. It might, in the opinion of the Reparations Commission, be necessary to allot Poland some rolling stock by way of payment in the Reparations account. Restitution was no business of the experts, but, after the Reparations Commission had done what it thought fit, it might appear to the experts that Poland required more rolling stock. The experts would then take a decision for the sole purpose of employing the rolling stock available to the best general advantage. According to M. Loucheur, Reparations questions came in at this point. This, he submitted, was widening the sphere of the Reparations Commission unduly. The Expert Committee, in his view, ought to be able to say that for technical reasons, rolling stock was required at such and such a place. M. Loucheur’s view falsified the intentions of Article 371. Was this Article to be applied in its obvious interpretation, or was its application to be made subject to the political situation of Europe as a whole? For instance, was Poland to be deprived of necessary rolling stock because the Reparations Commission decided to pay Belgium in coal?
M. Loucheur said that he thought the clauses drawn up by the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways had entirely left financial considerations out of account. He did not say that the Expert Commission should not allocate rolling stock, but that this allocation should be provisional. The value of the rolling stock thus assigned, must be determined by the Reparations Commission. If, for instance, Poland could not pay for the rolling stock allotted her, was she to receive it for nothing? This would entirely stultify the work of the Reparations Commission. What he asked for was coordination. It was regrettable that better liaison had not been maintained by the various Commissions which had framed different [Page 376] portions of the Treaty. As the Treaty itself did not provide for coordination, arrangements must be made for co-ordination in its execution.
Mr. Balfour said that he thought perhaps the following proposal would reconcile the two points of view:
“The immediate distribution of rolling stock shall be made on the authority of the Expert Committee; but no such distribution shall be final until the financial aspects of the question have been considered and approved by the Committee of Reparation.”
(This proposal was accepted provisionally subject to further examination by the Experts present of the Reparations Commission and of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways.)
Mr. Hudson asked that subject to this, the nomination of the experts should be made in accordance with proposal annexed. (See Appendix “C”.)
(With the addition of a French member in the Principal Com-mission Para. 1(a), the proposals contained in the Report—Appendix “C”—were accepted.)
(M. Loucheur, Mr. Hudson, Mr. Dulles and M. Fiori withdrew.)
(At this point Mr. Polk entered the room.)
(M. Clementel, M. Alphand, M. Nogara and Mr. Hutchinson8 entered the room.)
6. M. Clementel said that the draft Clauses now before the Council had been unanimously agreed to. (Appendix “D”.) He explained the various clauses in which alterations had been made since the last edition. Some discussion arose concerning Article 29. Economic Clauses for Insertion in the Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria
Mr. White asked whether the Smaller Powers might not claim equal rights with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in respect to the “most favoured nation” treatment.
M. Clementel explained that this provision had been inserted at the request of the Japanese Delegates.
Mr. Balfour asked why it was proposed to re-impose Consular Courts on Bulgaria.
M. Clementel said that it was merely a case of re-stating preexisting rights.
Mr. Balfour said that he had not been aware of any right of Consular jurisdiction in Bulgaria, but, in any case, he would have thought it more in keeping with the times to abolish or curtail such a right rather than to re-assert or extend it.
[Page 377]Mr. White said that the United States did not wish to claim extra-territorial rights in Bulgaria.
M. Pichon said that the French Government were negotiating just before the outbreak of war for the abolition of the capitulations in Bulgaria.
M. Clementel pointed out that the formula employed was permissive. Special conventions might be entered into by each of the Allied and Associated Powers with Bulgaria. There was nothing to compel them to do so. The sentence regarding “most favoured nation” treatment had been added at the request of Japan.
Mr. Balfour observed that things were not left just as they had been before the war, as the United States and Japan were added to the list of Powers entitled to negotiate with Bulgaria regarding special rights which they had not possessed before the war.
M. Pichon observed that they need not avail themselves of this right. France had rights which had not been put into practice. Just before the outbreak of the war, negotiations were going on for the abolition of those theoretical rights. The object of the Article was therefore quite a restricted one, namely, to enable France to resume these negotiations.
Mr. Balfour remarked that it was odd that an Article with so restricted an object, contrived to add two Powers to the list.
M. Matsui said that he understood that there was in practice, no consular jurisdiction in Bulgaria. Japan, however, had been for a long time urging her right to exercise such jurisdiction in Turkey. Japan would therefore seem to be weakening her position unless this sentence were inserted in the Article. If none of the Powers chose to exercise their rights under the capitulations, Japan would do nothing; should the Powers wish to do so, Japan desired to be in the same position as the rest. Nothing very substantial was being asked for, and he thought that any exercise of the right was improbable. In view of the negotiations with Turkey, however, the Japanese Delegation had thought it desirable to have this sentence inserted.
Mr. Balfour said that he thought it was strange to insist in a Treaty on a right which no one wished to exercise, and which no one approved. With this comment, however, he would be content, and would not oppose the acceptance of the Article.
The Economic Clauses as drafted (see Appendix “D”) were then adopted for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.
It was further decided to communicate these Clauses in the same manner as the other Clauses, through the President of the Committee, to the Smaller Powers concerned.
(M. Clemenceau and M. Tardieu entered the room.)
[Page 378]7. Mr. Balfour read the following telegram. He thought this amounted to a refusal on the part of General Pilsudski to obey the orders of the Council:— Line of Demarcation Between Polish and Lithuania Forces
(M. Clementel, M. Alphand & M. Nogara withdrew.)
Telegram From Sir P. Wyndham,9 Warsaw to Mr. Balfour
July 25th, 1919.
“On July 24th I saw General Pilsudski as instructed by you in your telegram of July 23rd.
Upon my raising the question of the Polish troops being withdrawn to the line of demarcation General Pilsudski said that this was a responsibility which he would not take as the immediate result would be the outbreak of disturbances, possibly leading to regular warfare. He declared that he would resign Office and leave Poland for Lithuania if we insisted on the Polish troops being withdrawn, and showed absolute determination on this point.
The internal situation is now so difficult that, as it seems to me, General Pilsudski would gladly avail himself of any opportunity to resign which might be afforded to him by foreign pressure in opposition to a cause which is popular in Poland. The political consequences will be serious if he carries out his threat.”
M. Clemenceau observed that the telegram was dated July 25th and that the decision of the Council had been taken on the 26th.10
Reply to Herr Voi-Bethmann-Hollweg
8. It was decided that no answer need be made to Herr Von Bethmann-Hollweg’s letter regarding his personal responsibility for the outbreak of war.11Reply to Herr Von Bethmann-Hollweg
9. (At this point M. Venizelos and the Members of the Commission on Greek Affairs, entered the Room.)Hearing of M. Venizelos Regarding Frontiers of Bulgaria
M. Clemenceau, addressing M. Venizelos said that of the Council thought that he would probably have something to say regarding the frontiers of Bulgaria.
M. Venizelos said that he would have something to say on the subject, but before dealing with that, he would like to give an explanation regarding the document produced by Mr. White at a previous meeting (see H. D. 16. para. 712). This document had been communicated to him by the Chairman and the Council would understand that he was considerably upset by it. It was implied that he had made use of a forged document to influence the Conference. He had never stated that the Mussulmans of Western Thrace desired to join Greece. Should they be given the choice, it was obvious that they would be inclined to choose the Allies of Turkey rather than the [Page 379] enemies of Turkey. What he had suggested was that Allied Officers should consult the Mohammedan Deputies without the knowledge either of Bulgaria or Turkey. He then read a letter addressed to him by 8 Mussulman Deputies of Western Thrace (Appendix “E”). This petition he had sent to M. Cambon, but he had never attempted to represent the Mussulmans of Thrace as desiring a union with Greece.
M. Venizelos then read a series of observations he had prepared on this subject (see Appendix “F”). He added that he had made complaint to the Government at Washington regarding the imputation made against him by the American Delegation.
Mr. White said that the document had been communicated to M. Venizelos confidentially. M. Venizelos had therefore no right to make any communication to Washington on the subject.
M. Venizelos said that the document had been communicated to him by the Chairman of the Council, and he thought he had a right to defend himself vis-à-vis the American Government.
M. Clemenceau said he thought M. Venizelos would have done better to reserve his justification for the Council.
M. Venizelos said that he would withdraw his complaint at Washington.
M. Venizelos said that in Thrace as claimed by him for Greece there were more than five times as many Greeks as Bulgarians. There were, in addition, a large number of Greeks in Constantinople and in the districts surrounding it. To these he made no claim and he argued that this reinforced his claim to the other parts of Thrace. Against the ethnographical argument which entirely favoured Greece an economic argument was alleged in favour of Bulgaria. He recognised that free access to the sea was one of the principles of the Conference. Whenever interests were opposed which could not be reconciled, it was necessary to decide which deserved the greater respect. The principle of nationality should take precedence over economic considerations. Bulgaria had excellent ports on the Black Sea. An outlet on the Aegean Sea was not a matter of primary necessity since the opening of the Straits would convert the Black Sea into an open sea. The inclusion of Greek populations in Greece was however a vital interest. Bulgaria could have commercial access to the Aegean either at Dédéagatch or, if this port were regarded unsuitable, at Cavalla. Similar rights might be guaranteed to Bulgaria as had been guaranteed to other land-locked states. Four states, each of them larger than Bulgaria, namely Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, Hungary and Poland had been left by the Conference without direct access to the sea. Why should a similar arrangement not be enough for Bulgaria? Poland had not been given Dantzig, in order that the nationality of the intervening populations should be respected. [Page 380] It had been alleged that the arrangement he proposed served Bulgarian purposes well enough in peace, but would not suit them in war. He thought this argument operated in his favour. There would be no chance for Bulgaria to establish a submarine base on the Aegean. Bulgaria was a continental power. Greece was very largely an island power. Should Bulgaria have complete control over a port in the Aegean, she could intercept the movements of Greek troops by means of submarines. He knew that strategic arguments were not in favour at the Conference but he only used this as a secondary argument and in reply to an objection. It was needless to attempt to satisfy Bulgaria. Nothing but Hegemony in the Balkans would satisfy her. She would undoubtedly attempt to upset the settlement made by the Conference. The only hope for peace in the Balkans was to set up her neighbours as ethnic units each individually too big to be attacked. It had also been said that the Greeks had left Western Thrace. This was true. They had been driven out by the Bulgarians and had for five years been refugees in Macedonia and Greece. M. Venizelos then read copious extracts from a work entitled “Rapports et Enquêtes de la Commission Interalliée sur les violations du droit des Gens commises en Macédoine orientale par les armées Bulgares”. He added that the American Red Cross Society which had worked in Eastern Macedonia thoroughly corroborated the report of the Interallied Commission. He argued that it was undesirable to entrust to the rule of a nation which could behave in the manner illustrated by these extracts, any foreign population whatsoever.
(M. Venizelos then withdrew.)
(The Meeting then adjourned.)
Villa Majestic, Paris, 29 July, 1919.
[Page 396]- These notes have been corrected in accordance with an errata sheet filed under 763.72119/6232.↩
- Ante, p. 362.↩
- Ante, p. 345.↩
- Ante, p. 343.↩
- President of the Board of Trade of Great Britain.↩
- Dr. Manley O. Hudson, United States representative, Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways; John Foster Dulles, United States representative, Commission on the Reparation of Damage; and F. Mori, Italian representative, Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways.↩
- Etienne Clémentel, French representative and president, Economic Commission; Charles Alphand, French representative, Section on Permanent Commercial Relations, Economic Commission; B. Nogara, Italian representative, Financial Commission; and H. J. Hutchinson, British secretary, Economic Commission.↩
- Sir Percy Wyndham, British Commissioner at Warsaw.↩
- HD–15, minute 1, p. 315.↩
- Appendix I to CF–99, vol. vi, p. 756.↩
- Ante, p. 352.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- Presumably, this Article will, as in the German Treaty, appear in the Bulgarian Treaty, in the Part relating to Ports, Waterways and Railways. It is to be subject to the provisions as to revision embodied in Article 378 of the German Treaty. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Presumably, this Article will, as in the German Treaty, appear in the Bulgarian Treaty, in the Part relating to Ports, Waterways and Railways. It is to be subject to the provisions as to revision embodied in Article 378 of the German Treaty. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cii, p. 64.↩
- G. Fr. de Martens, Nouveau recueil général et traités et autres actes relatifs aux rapports de droit international, 2 sér., tome xxii, p. 42.↩
- Ibid., 3 ser., tome ii, p. 878.↩
- Luigi Palma, Nuova Raccolta dei Trattati e delle Convenzioni in Vigore fra il Regno d’Italia ed i Governi Esteri (1881–1890), vol. 3, pt. 2, p. 783; see also Germany, Reichs-Gesetzblatt, 1887, p. 111.↩
- Malloy, Treaties, 1776–1909, vol. ii, p. 1996.↩
- Ibid., p. 1924.↩
- Ibid., p. 2209.↩
- Ibid., p. 2140.↩
- Malloy, Treaties, 1776–1909, vol. ii, p. 2214.↩
- British and Foreign State Papers, vol. c, p. 575.↩
- Ibid., vol. xlvii, p. 24.↩
- Lewis Hertslet, Commercial Treaties (London, 1864), vol. xi, p. 355.↩
- Ibid., p. 1097.↩
- British and Foreign State Papers, vol. lxxix, p. 18.↩
- Ibid., vol. xc, p. 303.↩
- Martens, Nouveau recueil général de traités, 3 sér, tome xi, p. 245.↩
- British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xcv, p. 421.↩
- Martens, Nouveau recueil général de traités, 2 sér. tome xxxiii, p. 277.↩
- Presumably, this Article will, as in the German Treaty, appear in the Bulgarian Treaty in the Part relating to Ports, Waterways and Railways. [Foonote in the original.]↩
- Malloy, Treaties, 1776–1909, vol. ii, p. 1935.↩
- Ibid., 1910–1923, vol. iii, p. 2953.↩
- British and Foreign State Papers, vol. lxxvii, p. 22.↩
- Ibid., vol. cii, p. 619.↩
- Great Britain, Treaty Series, 1914, No. 11 (Cd. 7613).↩
- Malloy, Treaties, 1776–1909, vol. ii, p. 1949.↩
- Ibid., p. 1956.↩
- Jules De Clercq, Recueil des traités de la France (Paris, 1891), vol. 17, p. 295.↩
- Malloy, Treaties, 1776–1909, vol. ii, p. 1958.↩
- Martens, Nouveau recueil général de traités, 3 sér., tome xi, p. 304.↩
- British and Foreign State Papers, vol. ciii, p. 434.↩
- Malloy, Treaties, 1776–1909, vol. ii, p. 2135.↩
- Great Britain, Treaty Series, 1910, No. 21 (Cd. 5221).↩
- Ibid., 1909, No. 4 (Cd. 4530).↩
- Malloy, Treaties, 1776–1909, vol. ii, p. 2131.↩
- Great Britain, Treaty Series, 1912, No. 20 (Cd. 6326).↩
- Treaties, Conventions, etc., 1910–1923, vol. iii, p. 2918.↩
- Ibid., 1776–1909, vol. ii, p. 2066.↩
- British and Foreign State Papers, vol. lxxxiv, p. 12.↩
- Ibid., vol. lxxxv, p. 7.↩
- Ibid., vol. lxxxvii, p. 78.↩
- Ibid., vol. lxxxix, p. 159.↩
- Ibid., vol. lxxiii, p. 323.↩
- Ibid., vol. lxxxi, p. 1311.↩
- Ibid., vol. cii, p. 969.↩
- The words “signatories to the present Treaty,” which appear in the German Treaty, are omitted at the request of the Belgian Delegation. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- The words “or with Roumania” are omitted. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Brackets appear in the original.↩
- The following sentence has been accepted by the Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for insertion after the first paragraph of this Article:—“The Principal Allied and Associated Powers will enjoy in Bulgaria in the matters above mentioned most-favoured-nation treatment.” [Footnote in the original.]↩
It is presumed that the final part of paragraph (d) of Article 296, viz.:—
“In the case of new States the currency in which and the rate of exchange at which debts shall be paid or credited shall be determined by the Reparation Commission provided for in Part VIII (Reparation).”
will be omitted, as there win be no new States in relation to Bulgaria. [Footnote in the original.]
↩Having regard to the modifications since introduced into the German and Austrian Treaties in regard to the right of liquidation in new States and transferred territory, it has been necessary to reconsider the Article on this subject approved by the Economic Commission for inclusion in Section VIII of the present Treaty. The Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have unanimously agreed upon the inclusion in Article 31 of the foUow-ing paragraph based upon the corresponding provision in Article 297 of the German Treaty (see separate memorandum):—
“In the case of liquidations effected in new States which are signatories of the present Treaty as Allied and Associated Powers, or in States to which Bulgarian territory is transferred by the present Treaty, or in States which are not entitled to share in the reparation payments to be made by Germany, the proceeds of liquidations effected by such States shall, subject to the rights of the Reparation Commission under the present Treaty, particularly under Articles (235 and 260), be paid direct to the owner. If, on the application of that owner, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal provided for by Section VI of this Part, or an arbitrator appointed by that Tribunal, is satisfied that the conditions of the sale or measures taken by the Government of the State in question outside its general legislation were unfairly prejudicial to the price obtained, they shall have discretion to award to the owner equitable compensation to be paid by that State.” [Footnote in the original.]
The following paragraph omitted:—
“The provisions of this paragraph do not apply to such of the above-mentioned measures as have been taken by the German authorities in invaded or occupied territory, nor to such of the above-mentioned measures as have been taken by Germany or the German authorities since the 11th November, 1918, all of which shall be void.” [Footnote in the original.]
In place of this Article, the following new Article has been agreed upon by the Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers:—
“The private rights referred to in the Treaties of Constantinople (1913), Athens (1913), and Stamboul (1914) shall not be affected by transferences of territory made under the present Treaty. Private rights in all territories transferred by or to Bulgaria under the present Treaty shall equally be respected under the same conditions.
“In case of disagreement in regard to the application of this Article, the difference shall be submitted to an arbitrator nominated by the Council of the League of Nations.” [Footnote in the original.]
- It has since been unanimously agreed between the Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers that Article 51 (liquidation of Bulgarian property in transferred territories) should be omitted in view of the inclusion in the paragraph for insertion in Article 31, given in the third footnote on p. 5, of the words “States to which Bulgarian territory is transferred by the present Treaty.” [Footnote in the original; reference is to the footnote on p. 391.]↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- The Bulgarian national assembly or parliament.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- See p. 352.↩
- Supra.↩
- BC–21, minute 8, vol. iii, p. 859.↩