Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume VII

763.72119/6050

HD–12

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Monday, July 21, 1919, at 3:30 p.m.

Paris, July 21, 1919, 3:30 p.m.

• Present
  • America United States of
    • Hon. H. White.
  • Secretary
    • Mr. L. Harrison.
  • British Empire
    • The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
  • Secretary
    • Mr. H. Norman.
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau.
  • Secretaries
    • M. Dutasta.
    • M. Berthelot.
    • M. de St. Quentin.
  • Italy
    • M. Tittoni.
  • Secretary
    • M. Paterno.
  • Japan
    • Baron Makino.
  • Secretary
    • M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat
America, United States of	Capt. Chapin.
British Empire	Capt. E. Abraham.
France	Capt. A. Portier.
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi.
Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. (a) Mr. Balfour said that before starting with the subjects on the Agenda, he would like to observe that there was not a single item on it touching Peace with Bulgaria, or indeed touching any Treaty of Peace at all. The subjects for discussion were no doubt important subjects, but the Bulgarians were to come to Paris on the following Friday. He thought it would be discreditable if the Conference were not ready to hand them a Treaty on their arrival, or shortly after it. He understood that the delay came from the re-opening of the frontier question. The Reparation and Financial Clauses were delayed in consequence. Unless the ultimate size of Bulgaria were known, it was difficult to estimate what sums she would be able to pay. Another question that was delayed was that of responsibilities, and the method of procedure to be adopted against persons who had broken the laws of war. He had enquired why Clauses similar to those inserted in the Treaties with Germany and with Austria were not adopted for the Treaty of Bulgaria, and he had been given the following explanations. In the other Treaties it had been stipulated that if the crime had been committed to the detriment of a Frenchman, the trial should be in a French Court, and if against an Englishman, in an English Court. If against Nationals of several countries, in a mixed Court. It appeared, however, that a Greek, Serbian, or Roumanian Court would not be regarded as offering a fair trial to a Bulgarian who had committed an offence against a Greek, Serbian or Roumanian. This might or might not be, but whatever the merits of the case, he thought the Council should insist that the work be terminated rapidly. He would suggest that M. Clemenceau should request the Commissions to expedite their labours. Question of Hastening Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria

Mr. White said that he would like to add a word to Mr. Balfour’s remarks. He wished to propose that the Council should give authority to the Commission on New States to take up the protection of minorities clauses for the Treaty with Bulgaria. He understood that the Economic Clauses and the clauses prepared by the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission were ready.

Mr. Balfour thought that Mr. White’s information was not quite accurate. The Port question for instance, was held up, pending a decision as to whether or not Bulgaria was to have Dedeagatch.

Mr. White said that in any case the Commission on New States might get to work on Clauses for the protection of minorities.

(It was agreed that the Commission on New States be asked to prepare for the Treaty with Bulgaria Clauses for the protection of Minorities.)

Report by M. Tittoni of Result of His Conference With M. Venizelos (b) M. Tittoni said that in accordance with the request of his colleagues, he had discussed the question of frontiers between Greece and Bulgaria with M. Venizelos. The latter demanded the whole of Eastern and Western Thrace, and declined to reduce his claims in any respect. It was therefore impossible to obtain any concession and the question must be decided by the Council. Consequently he considered his mission ended as he could obtain nothing further from M. Venizelos.

(c) M. Clemenceau said that he would ask M. Tardieu to explain the situation regarding the frontiers of Bulgaria.

Explanation by M. Tradieu (M. Tardieu entered the room.)

M. Clemenceau said that the Bulgarians were expected to arrive in four days. He asked him, as President of the Commission dealing with Bulgaria, to explain to what extent the Treaty was ready for them.

M. Tardieu said that he was only President of the Commission dealing with the frontier question. In that Commission, the result obtained was total disagreement between the American and Italian Delegations on the one hand, and the British, French and Japanese Delegations on the other. M. Tardieu then read and explained the report contained in Appendix “A”. He said that he would like to add a few words in support of the opinions he had himself backed in the Commission. In western Thrace there was no choice between Greece and Bulgaria on ethnological grounds. The vast majority of the population was Turkish. The country, however, was not to be given to the Turks. The next most numerous population was, according to French statistics, Greek—according to other statistics, Bulgarian. It was very likely that the war had brought about alterations in the relative proportions of the population. As to the possession of a Port, the Bulgarians had a good Port on the Black Sea. The internationalisation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles would give them free access to the open sea. As to discontent, there would undoubtedly be discontent in Bulgaria, but the Balkans were the natural home of discontent, and the only question was whether discontent should be chiefly on the side of those who had fought against us, or mainly, among the Balkan Nations who had fought for us. He would remind the Council that the impossible desire to produce union in the Balkans had wasted precious months during the war. It led to the Allied defeat at the Dardanelles, and to numerous troubles in Salonika. The mistakes made in the war should not be repeated in the Peace. As to the ultimate disposal of Eastern Thrace, he did not wish to prejudice the question. It might perhaps be most fitting to attribute it to the territory of Constantinople should the Council decide not to give it to Greece. The point was, not who got it, but who lost it.

M. Clemenceau said that the question was evidently one which the Council must solve. He was prepared to discuss it at once, but he was afraid that Mr. White would not be able, without consulting his Government, to reach a decision immediately.

Mr. White said this was so.

M. Clemenceau said that unfortunately he could not be present in the Council on the following day, and that M. Pichon also would be unavoidably detained in Brussels. He was not sure that a meeting could be held on Wednesday. He hoped that by Thursday Mr. White could obtain the views of his Government.

Mr. White said that he would send a second telegram that very evening to endeavour to obtain instructions by Thursday.

Mr. Balfour said that he regretted the delay as he regarded the matter as very urgent. He would, however, as it was necessary, assent to a postponement until Thursday.

(In view of the importance of terminating at the earliest possible moment, the preparation of the Treaty of Bulgaria, it was decided that the first item on the Agenda for Thursday, July 24th, should be the determination of the frontiers of Bulgaria.)

2. M. Clemenceau said that he had just received a communication from Bela Kun announcing that he proposed to attack the Roumanians, in order to enforce upon them respect for the Armistice arranged by the Powers. (Appendix “B”.) M. Clemenceau added that he did not know whether the Roumanians would be able to resist the attack. They had two divisions with which to oppose it. French troops were not far off and General Franchet d’Esperey had ordered them to fire if attacked. This news perhaps rendered the appointment of the Committee unnecessary. Appointment of an International Committee of Enquiry for Hungary

Mr. Balfour said that he considered himself authorised to nominate a General to go to Hungary. The General in question was Major-General Gorton.

M. Clemenceau said that the Generals might proceed to the front and report on what was going on there.

Mr. White said that he had, as yet, received no orders from Washington.

M. Tittoni said that, according to news from a good source, General Boehm, who had been Commander of the Hungarian Red Army, had paid a visit to Vienna. He had ceased to be Commander-in-Chief but appeared to be still in touch with Bela Kun. It would seem, from what he had said in Vienna, that an effort was being made to convert the Communist Government of Hungary into a Socialist Government. He suggested that the Allied Representatives at Vienna be asked to enquire into this report and inform the Council of the results of their enquiry.

(It was decided not to nominate the Committee of Enquiry until such time as Mr. White should have obtained the views of his Government. It was further decided that the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers in Vienna should be asked for information regarding the visit of General Boehm to that city, and to investigate the report that he had declared that he was trying to bring about a movement in Hungary aiming at the transformation of the present Communist Government of Bela Kun into a Socialist Government. The truth and eventual importance of the alleged scheme should be verified.)

(At this point, the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles and General Thwaites entered the room.)

3. The Council had before it a report of the Military Representatives on the Army of Occupation in Upper Silesia. (Appendix “C”.)

Report of the Military Representatives on Army of Occupation in Upper Silesia General Belin read the conclusions of the report to the effect that 1 division of 13,000 men would be required.

Mr. Balfour asked whence this division could be obtained.

General Belin said that, in the first draft of the report, it had been suggested that the division should be drawn from the troops employed in the occupation of the Rhinelands. He would suggest, therefore, that Marshal Foch be asked if he could spare the troops. These troops would not be lost to Marshal Foch’s command: they would be stationed on the confines of Poland and Prussia, and, should any trouble arise requiring armed intervention, these troops, which would remain under Marshal Foch’s orders, could be utilised to co-operate with any movements made in the west.

M. Clemenceau said that Marshal Foch’s estimate for the troops of occupation was 150,000 men. He would certainly be able to spare 13,000 from this number. He entirely agreed with the judicious remarks of General Belin. The division, would, no doubt be composed of international elements.

(It was agreed that the report of the Military Representatives, together with the suggestion that the necessary troops should be furnished by the Army of Occupation on the Rhine, be approved in principle and be submitted to Marshall Foch for his views regarding the possibility of furnishing the divisions required and on its composition.)

4. The Council had before it a report of the Military Representatives. (Appendix “D”.)

General Belin read the conclusions of the Report under heading “Material Assistance.”

Report of the Military Representatives to Poland in the case of Disturbance M. Clemenceau said that the means of transport to Poland were unsatisfactory. An inter-allied train, laden with munitions on its way to Poland, had been blown up on German territory. The German Government did not appear to be involved. The train was guarded by Polish soldiers, who had apparently been neglectful. It would perhaps, therefore, be advantageous to organise transport by sea.

Mr. Balfour pointed out that the only port available was Dantzig and that Allied control over it was not very good.

M. Clemenceau said that the situation at Dantzig had improved. The turbulent elements were quieter and the German Government appeared to be resigned to losing the port. He suggested that the best plan would be to ask Marshal Foch to telegraph to General Nudant in Berlin to open negotiations with the German Government regarding transport by sea.

(It was decided that Marshal Foch be asked to initiate negotiations with the German Government for the transport of material for Poland to Dantzig.)

General Belin then read the conclusions of the report under the heading “Preventive Measures.” He explained that there were Allied officers serving in the Polish Army. Some of these might be nominated in advance to posts on the Delimitation Commission, which, as such, was only to be appointed 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty. These officers might, in anticipation of their future duties, undertake to supervise the handing over of the ceded districts.

(This proposal was agreed to.

It was decided that Marshal Foch be requested to report on the possibility of appointing Allied Officers serving in the Polish Army, who would ultimately be nominated to the Delimitation Commission, to supervise the transfer of the ceded territory from Germany to Poland.)

5. M. Clemenceau said that he had received a letter from M. Venizelos regarding the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry. (See Appendix “E”) M. Venizelos desired that a Greek Commissioner be appointed. This proposal did not appear to be very acceptable. Appointment of Inter-Allied Commission of Enquiry in Asia Minor

Mr. Balfour pointed out that the Council had sent French and Italian officers to investigate the incidents at Fiume.

M. Clemenceau observed that the case was different. At Fiume the incidents had occurred as between Nationals of the Great Powers. In Asia Minor the incidents concerned Greeks and Turks. It appeared to him unreasonable to appoint a Greek to investigate a case of that kind. If his colleagues disagreed with him, however, he would not press this point of view.

M. Tittoni said that he was of the same opinion as M. Clemenceau. The investigating Commission would be the direct emanation of the Council. It should, therefore, conform to the composition of the Council. If a Greek officer were to be appointed to the Commission in Asia Minor, it might be argued on the same lines that M. Venizelos should have remained in the room, at a previous meeting, when the Council deliberated on the subject of the Greek occupation in Anatolia.

Mr. Balfour said that in the early days of the Conference, it had been laid down that Powers with limited interests should be represented when matters directly affecting them were discussed.

M. Clemenceau said that they were heard on matters regarding their interests, but the deliberations were conducted by the Five Powers.

Mr. White said that he thought the argument on both sides was strong, and that he had no very definite preferences.

Mr. Balfour asked the military experts present in the room whether they thought the collaboration of a Greek officer would be conducive to a sound finding.

General Thwaites expressed the opinion that it was undesirable to appoint a Greek officer.

General Bliss said that the presence of officers of all Allied Nations would give an appearance of impartiality. He did not feel strongly on the subject, but he was inclined personally to think that there should be officers from each of the Allied Nations on the Commission.

M. Clemenceau said that the presence of a Greek officer on the Commission would doubtless not matter much.

M. Tittoni objected to it as creating a precedent, which challenged the whole mechanism of the Conference.

Mr. Balfour observed that the Greek officer would go as a representative of the Powers.

(After some further discussion it was agreed that M. Venizelos be informed that he might appoint a Greek officer to follow the labours of the Commission. This officer would not, however, have a vote on the Commission and would take no part in its finding.

The following nominations were then made:—

For Italy	General Dallolio.
For France	General Franchet d’Esperey to nominate an officer.
For Great Britain	General Milne to nominate an officer.
For United States of America.	An officer to be appointed after a reply from Washington had been received.

It was decided that the Commission should begin its labours at once, and should gather as early as possible at Constantinople.)

6. (It Was agreed that nominations to this Commission should be communicated to the Secretary-General on the following day.)Appointment of a Administration in the Plebiscite Zone of Upper Silesia

7. Mr. Balfour said that the report (Appendix “F”) was to the effect that the Commission was unable to say whether the money required by General Gough was really necessary, whether the Allied Governments could furnish the money and what security existed for repayment. For all the assistance given to the Council, the Commission might as well not have reported at all. He quoted from a telegram from General Gough to the effect that the Germans were paying 15 million marks a month to support the Baltic Landwehr and the troops of Prince Lieven,¹ and suggesting that to deliver Latvia and Russia from financial obligation to Germany, the Germans be ordered to continue payment into a British bank to the account of the Ulmannis² Government as a portion of the reparation due from Germany. Mr. Balfour added that it was surprising that the Germans should be able to pay such a sum while all the Entente Powers to-gether could not afford half a million a month. Report of Financial Commission Regarding the Financial Assistance to the Baltic States

M. Clemenceau said that he thought the matter could not be settled at that meeting.

(The question was therefore postponed.)

8. M. Tardieu said that, as he had previously explained, there was a Commission to supervise the execution of the Territorial and Political Clauses of the Treaty, and another to supervise the execution of the Reparation and Financial Clauses. There were, however, two other important chapters in the Treaty requiring similar Commissions, namely, the Economic and Colonial. He pointed out that the existing Committees could not perform this work He, therefore, proposed that a Committee be appointed to supervise the execution of these Clauses of the Treaty. Appointment of Commissions To Supervise Execution of Economic and colonial Clauses of Treaty With Germany

Baron Makino said that, as regards the Colonial Clauses, the most important of these were covered by the work of the Reparation Commission, and the remainder by the Committee dealing with Mandates. The work of these two bodies appeared to cover the main part of the Articles dealing with German colonies. If anything were left over, there might be a reason for appointing a new Commission, and he would be glad to know what remained over.

M. Tardieu said that he agreed. The Reparation Commission could, he thought, in a few hours deal with all questions which the Committee on Mandates left untouched. All he wished was that some body should be required to do the necessary work on behalf of the Council.

Baron Makino suggested that the Committee on Mandates should be asked to make a report.

(After some further discussion, the two following resolutions were then adopted:—

1. That the supervision of the execution of the Economic Clauses of the Treaty with Germany should be entrusted to the Economic Commission. The Commission was asked to report to the Council at an early date.

2. That the supervision of the execution of the Colonial Clauses of the Treaty with Germany should be entrusted to the Mandates Committee. The Committee was asked to report to the Council at an early date.)

9. M. Tardieu said that he had just seen a letter which had not been communicated to the Commission dealing with the question of Klagenfurt. (Appendix “G”.)The Evacuation of Klagenfurt

M. Tittoni observed that the question relating to war material was totally different from that of the Armistice line.

M. Tardieu said that the Council had required a line to be drawn behind which the two belligerent parties could withdraw. It had then been thought right that this line should, as nearly as possible, be the boundary between the plebiscite areas. This had been done. An argument was now raised by the Yugo-Slavs against withdrawing behind the line on the plea that there was a certain stock of arms and munitions captured by them from the Austrians which they were entitled to remove. He thought this excuse for not withdrawing should not be tolerated.

Mr. Balfour said that he had imagined that it had been arranged that the Serbs should retire leaving behind them a small guard under Allied officers to watch those stores, to which it appeared they had a legitimate title. There appeared to be no serious objection to the execution of this plan. The stores belonged to the Serbs and should they have to abandon them they would have a real grievance.

M. Tittoni said that the matter was not as clear to him as it seemed to be to Mr. Balfour. Mr. Balfour seemed convinced that these stores belonged to the Serbs. The Serbs had occupied the territory in which these stores were after the armistice. They had no right, therefore, to claim as war booty material taken after the armistice. These stores represented a security for the reparation due from Austria. In it the Serbs were entitled not to the whole, but to one-fifth. The whole question should therefore be handed over to the Reparation Commission. If all the armaments in Austria were bartered away, there would finally remain nothing in the country to pay reparation. Further, he thought the presence of Serbian troops, even in small numbers, was incompatible with the due observance of the plebiscite. As it was, the inhabitants complained that the Serbians threatened them. The same plan therefore should be adopted in this territory as was adopted in the areas in dispute between Germans and Poles. A police force was required, but not one representing either claimant.

Mr. Balfour said that M. Tittoni’s argument was a strong one, but it could hardly apply to a very small section of Serbian troops posted to guard a building. This he thought was all that the proposed force amounted to. He would like to ask at what date the plebiscite was to take place.

M. Tardieu said that M. Tittoni’s observation might have force at the time when the plebiscite was to occur, but this was to be from three to six months after the coming into force of the Treaty. The Treaty had not yet been signed.

Mr. Balfour said that long before this the munitions would have been removed, and the Serbian guard would have gone with them.

M. Tardieu said that he would suggest a slight modification of Mr. Balfour’s proposal, namely, that instead of a Serbian guard, the Allied generals in the area be asked to take charge of the stores, and to give the Serbians a receipt.

(The following Resolution was then adopted:—

“It was decided that the troops of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes be required to evacuate the whole of zone “B” in the Klagenfurt Basin, in conformity with the boundary already communicated to them. The arms and stores claimed by them will be handed over for custody to the Allied Generals, who will furnish a receipt for the same.”)

10. M. Clemenceau said that there was a complaint communicated by M. Paderewski that the Germans were removing from Dantzig all that was necessary for the working of the factories. The complaint emanated from a Committee of the working population of Dantzig. (See Appendix “H”.)Removal of Material From Danzing by Germans

M. Clemenceau proposed that Marshal Foch be asked to deal with the question.

(It was decided to refer the document communicated by M. Paderewski regarding German action in Danzig to Marshal Foch for suitable action.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris, July 21, 1919.

Appendix A to HD–12

[Translation³]

Report on the Boundaries of Bulgaria Presented to the Supreme Council by the Central Territorial Committee

The Central Territorial Committee, entrusted by a decision of the Supreme Council under date of July 2⁴ with the proposal of a boundary line for Bulgaria, has the honor to formulate the following opinion:

I.—Boundary of Dobrudja

Unanimity could not be obtained. The following opinions were expressed:

(1) The Committee, with the exception of the American delegation, considers that it is not possible, by a decision of the Conference, to impose upon Roumania a change of the boundary existing in 1914;

(2) The American delegation does not believe that it would be wise to separate the different elements of the question in the settlement regarding Roumanian territories. It considers, moreover, that the powers are qualified, in the interest of a peace that they have to guarantee, to demand of Roumania that she return the territories which she annexed by force in 1913, since she receives now at the hands of these powers much more extensive territories taken from Austria, thanks to the military efforts of the Allied and Associated Powers.

(3) The Committee, except for the American delegation, considers that the Conference could simply interrogate the Roumanian Government regarding its intentions as to the maintenance or eventual change of the boundary of 1914, without making a suggestion in the matter to that Government.

(4) Consequently, for the moment, the Committee, except for the American delegation proposes the maintenance of the 1914 boundary.

II.—Northern Boundary (Without Dobrudja)

The Committee unanimously proposed the maintenance of the existing boundary.

III.—Western Boundary

The Committee unanimously proposes the boundary described in the report of the Commission on Yugo-Slav Affairs dated April 6, subject to the following amendment regarding the region of Timok:

(Report No. 2 of April 6, 1919, regarding the boundary of Yugo-Slavia, page 16, line 9.)

following the old boundary to a point to the east of Vkisvor where it meets the river Bezdanica;

from there toward the northeast and to a point on the course of the Timok River to be selected near hill 38 to the west of Bregowo;

a line to be determined on the ground, following in a general manner the line of the watershed between the valleys of the Timok to the northwest and of the Topolovitsa and of the Delejna to the southeast, passing through hills 367 and 374 and leaving to the Serb-Croat-Slovene state the localities of Halovo, Sipikovo (as well as the road connecting these two localities), and Kojilovo, and to Bulgaria the localities of Kosovo, Rakitnica, and Bregovo;

from there to the Danube, the former boundary between Bulgaria and Serbia.

This amendment is not motivated by military considerations, but with a view to rendering possible the policing of the railroad. It relates, at the maximum in round figures, to an area twenty kilometers long and three wide.

IV.—Southern Boundary

Unanimity could not be obtained. The British, French, and Japanese delegations propose the blue line on the map attached to the report of the Commission on Greek Affairs dated March 30. The American and Italian delegations propose the frontier of 1913, amended to the profit of Bulgaria by the Turko-Bulgarian treaty of 1915.⁵

The British, French, and Japanese delegations recall that the American delegation on the Commission on Greek Affairs accepted, without making a reservation, the above-mentioned blue line, and that the Italian delegation, while formulating a reservation on the attribution of all of Eastern Thrace to Greece, declared itself in agreement, in principle, on the blue line.

The British, French, and Japanese delegations express, in this connection, their regret that, on practically the same question but in two different commissions, the American and Italian delegations in a period of four months have issued two different opinions.

The American delegation points out that in the report of the Commission on Greek Affairs, the American delegation explained its acceptance of the Greek demands, in the following terms:

“The United States delegation reserves the right to change the boundary, which it accepts, following the eventual assignment of the territory of Eastern Thrace.”

The American delegation observes that this reservation was dictated by the belief that if Eastern Thrace was attached to the International State, there would be no serious reason for annexing to Greece the territory of Western Thrace which is not Greek; it points out, in addition, that, in the first report of the Central Territorial Committee to the Supreme Council, the American delegate refused his adhesion to the boundary proposed by the Commission on Greek Affairs, and, on the contrary abstained from formulating any proposals based on the report of the Commission on Greek Affairs on the subject of the region in question.

Basing its position on these expressed and implied reservations, and, in addition, on the fact that the Central Territorial Committee, to which is assigned the duty of drawing the boundaries of Bulgaria, has the duty of approaching the task with larger views than those of the special territorial committees and with the sole aim of arriving at a decision which will best contribute to the establishment of a just and durable peace, the American delegation cannot adopt the point of view of the British, French, and Japanese delegations.

The Italian delegation associates itself with this observation and refers to the formal reservations which it has already presented on this subject and which are mentioned in procès-verbal No. 16 page 3 of the Central Territorial Committee.

These observations having been made on the conditions of the disagreement, this disagreement, basically, is as follows:

1. American and Italian Viewpoints

The American delegation expresses the following opinion:

(a) Bulgaria did not acquire Western Thrace by right of conquest, but in consequence of a cession consented to voluntarily by Greece and her allies, enemies of Bulgaria, who, even though they were the victors, recognized the wisdom of according to vanquished Bulgaria this natural outlet to the sea. The country was occupied by Greek, and not Bulgarian troops; and Bulgaria entered into possession only after the voluntary withdrawal of the Greek forces. The right of Bulgaria to the possession of Western Thrace was not made the subject of any contest at the beginning of the present war. The only point still under discussion at Bucharest was to learn whether Bulgaria ought not to obtain rather more than less territory on the Aegean Sea. The American delegation thinks that one would be ill-advised to inflict on a nation, with the object of punishing it, the loss of territory to which it has just claims from the legal, ethnic, and economic points of view.

(b) The report of the Commission on Greek Affairs contains a fundamental error when it states, as the first argument in support of its conclusions, that:

“The non-Mohammedan population of Bulgarian Thrace is more Greek than Bulgarian”, and that: “The ethnic rights of Greece are therefore superior to those of Bulgaria.”

The statistics on which these assertions are based are anterior in date to the cession of Western Thrace to Bulgaria; consequently, only the past tense of the verb could be used. The non-Mohammedan population was Greek more than Bulgarian, to a very slight degree, before the territory had passed to Bulgaria. However, it is a well-known and uncontested fact that in proportion as the Greek troops withdrew from Western Thrace after its cession to Bulgaria, a part of the Greek population evacuated the region; and this exodus has continued since, while a flood of Bulgarians arrived to replace the Greeks. Testimony bearing on the alleged deportations of Greeks from this region is contradictory. In any case, the relatively light majority on the side of the Greeks should have been, inevitably, replaced by a relative Bulgarian majority thanks to natural causes following the cession of this territory to Bulgaria.

The evidence is contradictory on the question of whether the Mohammedan majority would prefer to be under Bulgarian or Greek authority, in case it should be impossible to have a Turkish Government. The depositions of the eight Mohammedan deputies are not entirely convincing. One should note that the mother tongue of a large proportion of these Mohammedans is Bulgarian, while few among them speak Greek; it is, therefore, difficult to believe that these Bulgarian language populations would prefer to be under the authority of Greece rather than under that of Bulgaria. The two principal arguments that the Commission on Greek Affairs advanced in support of its conclusions thus lose their force.

(c) The lack of all direct access by land to the Mediterranean will seriously compromise the economic development of Bulgaria. The promise made by Greece not to interfere in any way with transit and to grant facilities in ports on Greek territory does not represent the equivalent of direct access to the sea, even in time of peace; in time of war it would have no value. This principle was fully recognized by the powers when they undertook to assure this access to the sea in the case of Poland. The route through the Black Sea and the Dardanelles does not take the place of direct access, since that is an indirect way which, consequently, will be longer and more expensive.

(d) Even if one could in fact overcome the economic inconveniences, it would be impossible to convince the Bulgarian people that its future development is not hindered by the loss of that which all nations value most highly. They would nurse a profound resentment for the injustice committed in imposing on them these boundaries; and this feeling would be an inevitable menace to the future peace of the world.

(e) The cession by Turkey to Bulgaria in 1915 of territory adjoining Adrianople rectified a grave injustice inflicted on Bulgaria in 1913, when Turkey closed the natural outlet of the valley of the Maritza, and cut the only railroad line leading to the Bulgarian port on the Aegean Sea. It is essential to maintain this rectification, since it would be useless to give Bulgaria a position on the sea, if the natural route giving access to this position must remain blocked.

Ethnographical, economic, and political arguments, as well as possession certainly supported by valid claims, all favor the maintenance of the Bulgarian boundaries as they are at the present time.

Consequently, the American delegation makes the following proposal:

“The southern boundary of Bulgaria will be that which existed after the cession by Turkey in 1913 [1915] of territory adjoining Adrianople, under the reservation of the right of the principal Allied and Associated Powers to attach to the International State such part of the said territory as seems desirable.”

The Italian delegation associates itself with the observations and conclusions of the American delegation.

2. English, French, and Japanese Viewpoints

(a) From the historical or moral point of view, Bulgaria has no claim to Western Thrace. This territory was given to her after the Second Balkan War by Greece and Serbia as proof of their desire to live on friendly and unsuspecting terms with an ally who had just betrayed them. Bulgaria flagrantly abused this generosity; she entered into this war solely with a view to plunder; she conducted this war in a most barbarous manner, and for the second time was thoroughly beaten.

Under these conditions, the three delegations consider that Bulgaria has not justified the confidence which was originally placed in her, nor that it would be wise to reward her for her entrance into the European war by an increase in territory, as permitted by the American program.

(b) Bulgaria, from an ethnical point of view, is not justified in claiming Western Thrace, a territory in which the Bulgarian element ranks only third according to the latest Turkish statistics (1910). The three delegations consider that the value of these statistics has not been at all changed by the fact that deportations or mass emigrations of the Greek population have taken place since the occupation by Bulgaria. To admit such a criterion would be to put a premium on the persecution of foreigners and to establish a precedent which, in other cases, for example that of Armenia, would lead to very unjust results.

Concerning the aspirations of the Mohammedan population of Western Thrace, there is the testimony of eight of the twelve Mohammedan deputies in the Bulgarian Parliament who, in a recent communication addressed to General Franchet d’Esperey, expressed themselves as follows: “It would be unjust to leave us under the most cruel and pitiless of yokes, the yoke of Bulgarian domination.”

For these reasons, the three delegations maintain that the conclusions of the Commission on Greek Affairs were completely justified.

(c) Regarding Bulgaria’s access to the sea, the three delegations consider that the economic situation of Bulgaria will benefit from the treaty of peace such as in fact they propose to impose upon her.

On the one hand, her outlet on the Black Sea will be made better and more certain by the internationalization of the Straits and of the Danube.

On the other hand, the natural outlet of Bulgaria into the Mediterranean is not situated in Western Thrace, but in Greek territory, either at Cavalla or at Salonika. Moreover, the Greek Government has offered to grant Bulgaria special privileges and facilities in one of these two ports, and the Commission on Ports and Waterways has elaborated special provisions to make this offer effective.

The case of Poland is not comparable with that of Bulgaria since, whatever the solution may be, Bulgaria will always have free access to the sea by way of its northern and eastern boundaries.

(d) The three delegations admit without argument that, in case of war between Greece and Bulgaria, the rights obtained by the latter at Cavalla or at Salonika will be without effect. But they, nevertheless, do not consider that a purely military or strategic argument could outweigh other considerations.

They also admit that to take Western Thrace from Bulgaria would give rise in Bulgaria itself to bitter resentment. They maintain, however, that this solution is just in itself, and that the resentment caused in Greece and Serbia by the gift to Bulgaria of this territory to which she has no right would be at least equivalent to that which the loss of this territory would awaken in Bulgaria.

(e) The three delegations also admit that the boundary rectifications obtained by Bulgaria from Turkey in 1915 have great economic value for Bulgaria. They point out, however, that the territory in question is inhabited almost entirely by Greek and Turkish populations; but these delegations are reluctant to violate the ethnical principle with the object of giving to Bulgaria the economic advantages which constitute exactly the price paid to Bulgaria for her entrance into the war against the Allied Powers. They are convinced that the militaristic spirit in Bulgaria would only be encouraged by such action, and that Bulgarian opinion would be led to believe that a war, however unjustified, inhumane, and disastrous it might be, is, in the last analysis, an advantageous means of satisfying her appetites.

The three delegations, confining themselves to the precise question raised by the Supreme Council, and reserving the problem of the attribution of Eastern Thrace, conclude, therefore, in the most formal manner, that this province, with what was added to it in 1915, ought to be ceded by Bulgaria to the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The President of the Committee:

André Tardieu

Appendix B to HD–12

[Translation¹⁰]

Radio from Budapest No. 237 to 55 July 21 at 1:30 to M. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference

In the face of the attitude of the Roumanians, who have become aggressive in defiance of the will of the Entente, we were forced to cross the Tisza and to try to make the will of the Entente respected by the Roumanians.

Bela Kun

Commissar for Foreign Affairs

Appendix C to HD–12

SWC–440(77MR)

supreme war council
military representatives

Report on the Composition and Size of the Army of Occupation in the Plebiscite Area of Upper Silesia

[The text is the same as appendix E to HD–7, page 145.]

Appendix D to HD–12

SWC–444(79MR)

supreme war council
military representatives

Report on the Help To Be Given to Poland in the Event of Trouble in the Area Ceded by Germany

[The text is the same as appendix F to HD–7, page 149.]

Appendix “D” [E] to HD–12

Paris, July 19, 1919.

[The Head of the Greek Delegation (Venizelos) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]

[Translation]¹¹

greek delegation
to the peace conference

Mr. President: The Supreme Council of the Conference decided, in its session of yesterday, to send to Smyrna a Commission to inquire into the events which have occurred in Asia Minor during the past two months.

This Commission shall be composed of four representatives of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

I beg that your excellency permit me to explain to him the reasons according to which in my opinion it would be neither just nor in conformity with the usages hitherto followed in analogous cases, that the part of the inquiry treating of the conduct of the Greek Army of Occupation should be conducted without the participation of a representative of Greece.

No one more than the Greek Government desires only that an impartial inquiry throw a full light on the events which have unfolded during recent weeks in Anatolia, because it has the firm hope that, if certain regrettable excesses could be proven against several Greek military men, whose exemplary punishment will follow immediately, there will be established at the same time the provocative circumstances and general disorder in the midst of which these excesses were committed, and the extent of the cruelties on the part of the Turks of which the Christian populations have once again been the victims.

But an unmerited loss of morale would be inflicted on the Greek Army if, considering it in its totality as responsible for incriminating acts, one would not permit it to be represented in the investigation ordered.

This would be to disregard the right in virtue of which it finds itself in Asia Minor whither it has gone at the invitation of the Allied and Associated Powers, and with the mandate which they have done it the honor to confer upon it.

This would be to forget that, in contradistinction to the Turkish forces, it belongs to a friendly Allied state, that it is joined with the armies of the great powers by the bonds uniting brothers in arms and by the memories of engagements gloriously fought in common for a common cause, that wherever it has been called upon to fight at their sides, in Macedonia as in Russia, it has distinguished itself by a valor and discipline and by a steadiness which have won it the esteem and consideration of all.

The Greek Army proudly claims these titles in order to request the Allied and Associated Powers to spare it the wound which it would feel very keenly if the investigation ordered concerning isolated facts and involving only personal responsibilities should, as a result of the absence of a Greek representative, seem to have been instituted against it.

I have the honor, Mr. President, to submit this request to your kind examination, and, confident of your sentiments of justice, I flatter myself with the hope that you would formally recommend it for adoption by the Supreme Council of the Conference.

Kindly accept [etc.]

E. K. Venizelos

Appendix F to HD–12

M–359

July11, 1919.

financial assistance to the baltic states

Report of Financial Commission

[Translation]¹²

financial commission of the principal
allied and associated powers

The President of the Financial Commission

To the President of the Supreme Council.

The Supreme Council has referred to the Financial Commission for examination, a resolution by the Commission on Baltic Affairs relating to the financial assistance to be given to the three Baltic states.^12a

According to this resolution there would be an urgent necessity, on military grounds, for placing immediately at the disposal of General Gough, chief of the Interallied Mission in Latvia, a credit of 500,000 £ for the payment of Russian and Latvian troops employed at Libau for the maintenance of order. This credit of 500,000 £ would, moreover, only suffice to meet immediate military needs, and the sums needed later could not now be determined.

It would be a question, therefore, of financial assistance regarding which it is at the moment impossible to foresee the importance.

If the members of the Supreme Council consider that there are important political and military advantages in immediately advancing funds to the Baltic states or in authorizing loans which these states could issue, they will doubtless think it opportune to pledge their governments to obtain from the respective Parliaments the necessary authorizations and the indispensable credits.

Regarding the financial side of the question, the Financial Commission believes it should point out that, in its opinion, it could only be considered by the finance ministers of the interested governments, and that it [the Commission] would be stepping out of its role in substituting itself for the different treasuries in judging either the possibility or the method of extending financial aid to the Baltic states.

Appendix G to HD–12

[Translation]¹³

ministry of foreign affairs
office of political and commercial affairs
french republic

Paris, July 21, 1919.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the President of the Council, Minister of War, General Staff

War Material Seized by the Yugo-Slavs at Klagenfurt

It appears from the telegrams from General Hallier,¹⁴ confirmed by information communicated to me by the British delegation, that the Yugo-Slavs are expressing the intention of evacuating the Klagenfurt sector only when a decision shall be reached on the subject of the disposition of the war materials taken by them from the Austrians. They claim this material for themselves, and intend not to leave Klagenfurt before the arrival of Interallied detachments assigned to guard it, and among which they request to be represented in the proportion of one-fifth.

It seems to be difficult to establish to whom, Austrians or Yugo-Slavs, belongs the responsibility for the hostilities which recently broke out in this region, and which called forth the intervention of the Conference. It is, therefore, equally difficult to base a decision on this responsibility in deciding the disposition of the war material in question.

According to information which will come to you, moreover, the material involved is not important. On the other hand, the Yugo-Slavs are precisely in need of war material; they are experiencing the greatest difficulty in having delivered to themselves any material of the former Austro-Hungarian Army, the greatest part of which has been preempted by the Italian Government.

Finally, it seems that we have an interest in increasing their resources in this respect to meet the case in which their intervention in Hungary would be considered.

For all these reasons, it seems to me that there would be occasion to accede to the request of the Yugo-Slavs, and to assign to them the material which they claim. By way of compensation they should withdraw immediately from the Klagenfurt sector, behind the line of demarcation traced by the Conference. If the material could not be carried away, the Interallied Mission could indeed consider measures of conservation, not being in any way obliged to take the character of an Interallied occupation, since the territory north of the line of demarcation would be occupied by the Austrians. Nevertheless, a decision of the Supreme Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers is necessary.

Referring to your letter of July 16, No. 6851, BS/J, I have, therefore, the honor to state that, in my opinion, it is fitting for you urgently to promote this decision by presenting the Council with a proposal in this regard, and by having it put on the agenda of one of the earliest sessions. There is, indeed, every interest in settling this question with the least delay possible.

I should be happy to be advised of the effect which you may think proper to give to the present dispatch.

Appendix H to HD–12

Dantzig, 7. 7. 19.

To the Council of Four

The Dantzig working classes are faced with a problem threatening their very existence (as?) the local Authorities can arrange no prospects of work for the future. Part of the factories, etc., are being, and will be, closed, owing to lack of materials and power. The working classes will very shortly be starving, and riots among the workers are to be feared, which will not be in the interests of the new Free Town.

Time presses, and the working classes therefore appeal to the Council of Four to safeguard their working interests.

The Committee of the Working Population of Dantzig

1. Prince Anatole Lieven, a Bait, in command of the Russian detachment of volunteers fighting the Bolsheviks in the Baltic regions.
2. Karlis Ulmannis, Latvian Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture and Supplies.
3. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
4. FM–29, minute 4, p. 14.
5. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cix, p. 879.
10. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
11. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
12. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
13. HD–2, minute 5, p. 48.
13. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
14. French representative, Inter-Allied Military Commission at Klagenfurt.