Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume VII

763.72119/6223

HD–6

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, July 12, 1919, at 3:30 p.m.

Paris, July 12, 1919, 3:30 p.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • Hon. Henry White.
  • British Empire
    • The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau.
    • M. Pichon.
  • Italy
    • M. Crespi.
  • Japan
    • M. Matsui.
  • Secretary-General
    • M. Dutasta.
  • Secretaries
    • Mr. L. Harrison.
    • Mr. H. Norman.
    • M. Paterno.
    • M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat
America, United States of	Colonel U. S. Grant.
British Empire	Lieut.-Commdr. Bell.
France	Capt. A. Portier.
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi.
Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

(At this point M. Cambon¹ entered the room.)

1. M. Clemenceau said that the Council had before them a proposal of Mr. Lansing to the effect that the Polish and Tzecho-Slovak Governments should be given 10 days to arrive at an understanding between themselves on the Teschen question. He requested M. Cambon to explain his point of view. Teschen

M. Cambon said that the Teschen question had been much discussed: no particular solution had been accepted; for it was hoped that MM. Paderewski and Benes would be able to come to an understanding. They had not been able to do so, with the result that conflict continued in the area in question. It was therefore necessary to arrive at some solution and he thought that Mr. Lansing’s proposal was a good one.

(After some discussion it was decided to accept Mr. Lansing’s proposal and to grant a period of 10 days to the Governments of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia to arrive at an agreement between themselves on the question of Teschen.)

2. M. Clemenceau said that Mr. Lansing had submitted a proposal to the effect that the Orava question should be referred to the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees, in order that they might correct the frontier previously adopted, in a manner which should conform to the ethnographical data on the subject. He therefore asked the experts to accept the ethnographical frontier and asked M. Cambon for his opinion. The Orava Question

M. Cambon said that the Czecho-Slovak Committee had examined the question with care: the Committee in question had decided to grant Orava to Czecho-Slovakia as a compensation. At present the populations affected were stated to be dissatisfied and Mr. Lansing had asked for a re-examination of the question.

Mr. White said that two peasants had visited President Wilson on the 28th June and that they had spoken to him on behalf of 50,000 inhabitants of the region in question.

M. Cambon thought that the two Committees might meet and submit a new proposal.

Mr. Balfour said that President Wilson desired strongly that the question should be examined afresh.

M. Clemenceau said that the question should be referred to the Committees, which should be asked to make a new examination of the question, without being bound by any obligation to return to the ethnographical frontier line.

(It was therefore decided that the question of the frontier between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia should be referred to the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees for examination and report.)

(At this point M. Cambon withdrew.)

3. M. Clemenceau said that the Council had to look into the effect upon the Russian Blockade of the termination of the Blockade of Germany. Blockade of Russia

Mr. Balfour said that whilst he recognised how urgent and important the question was, he had found that it raised points of such difficulty that he would be grateful if the Council would put off the discussion to its next meeting.

(Mr. Balfour’s proposal was agreed to.)

4. M. Clemenceau said that it was proposed that a Committee of Experts should examine the Italian demand for the cession of the Austro-Hungarian Concession in Tientsin to them. Question of Tientsin

Mr. White said that he was obliged to remark that the Government of the United States had always been opposed to any new concessions at Tientsin being made by China.

M. Crespi said that it was not a question of a new concession but simply of an extension of the existing Italian concession. The Note submitted by the Italian Delegation to the Council² showed that the Italian concession only consisted of 124 acres whilst those granted to other countries were more extensive.

M. Pichon said that the question should be summarised as follows. There was an article in the German treaty by virtue of which German concessions were restored to China. Germany had ratified the Treaty. It was to be observed that none of the concessions in question had been given to the Allied and Associated Powers, but that they had been restored to China, on the simple condition that the latter country should open its ports to international Commerce. The clauses in question were contained in Articles Nos. 128 to 132. The Italian proposal was therefore no less than an abrogation of the principle accepted by the Conference.

M. Matsui said that he entirely agreed with M. Pichon. The return of the concessions to China was part of the Treaty with Germany. The same thing applied to Austria; and the Austrian Government had received a copy of the text of the Treaty. It was therefore equitable to return the Austro-Hungarian concessions to China.

Mr. White said that in spite of his keen desire to satisfy the Italian claims, it seemed impossible to him to grant to Italy what belonged to China.

M. Crespi said that the Italian Government had long been asking for an improvement in their concession from China.

The concession in question was very limited and surrounded by marshy ground. It did not even contain any land suitable for setting up a hospital for the sick and wounded. The Conference was very cognizant of Chinese methods and the discussions had been so drawn out that the Italian Government had received no satisfactory reply. It had therefore been decided to put the question before the Conference, with a view to making the concession a question of reparation. The Italian concession was too small to allow of any economic development and he was of opinion that the Chinese Government would not oppose the enlargement of the concession in question.

M. Clemenceau said that he proposed to nominate a Committee.

Mr. White said that he opposed any Committee being nominated, since the question before it would be that of ceding Chinese property. He did not see any objection to the Italian Government raising the question direct with China; but if Austria-Hungary were deprived of the concession by virtue of the Treaty, it must inevitably be returned to China.

M. Crespi proposed that the question should be referred to the Reparation Committee.

M. Clemenceau stated that he preferred that it should be examined by experts. He reminded Mr. White that no decision would be taken unless he authorised it, since every member had a right of veto. But it seemed difficult and not very conciliatory to oppose the nomination of a Committee.

Mr. White said that he agreed under the reservations which he had already made.

Mr. Balfour remarked that the representative of the American Delegation would always be able to refuse to accept the decisions of the Committee in question.

Mr. White stated that he agreed to the nomination of a Committee, but that he would be opposed to its decisions. The United States had renounced all claims to any concession and was, moreover, opposed to concessions in principle. He could not, therefore, recognise the necessity of nominating any Committee.

M. Crespi said that he did not wish to press the discussion further, but that he begged Mr. White to agree to the nomination of a Committee without thereby engaging himself in any way.

Mr. White stated that under these circumstances, he agreed.

Mr. Balfour stated that he agreed to the proposal but that he did not see what good would come of it in view of the American right of veto. The work of the Committee would be without effect, but if it could give any satisfaction to the Italian Delegation, he would not be opposed to the nomination of the Committee.

Mr. White stated that he thought the question should be dealt with by direct negotiation and read Article 3 of Section IV, Part III, of the Peace Treaty with Austria:—

“Austria cedes to China all her rights over the buildings, wharves and pontoons, barracks, forts, arms and munitions of war, vessels of all kinds, wireless telegraphy installations and other public property which belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and which are situated or may be in the Austro-Hungarian Concession at Tientsin or elsewhere in Chinese territory.”

M. Crespi stated that the Article in question had not yet been submitted to the Austrian delegation and that it was only a project.

(It was decided to nominate a special Committee to examine the Italian demand that a clause which should cede to Italy the Austrian concession in Tientsin should be introduced into the Peace Treaty with Austria.)

(The American Delegation accepted the proposal whilst making a reservation that it would not be bound by the findings of the Committee appointed.)

5. M. Clemenceau stated that he was obliged to submit to the Council a document which had been communicated officially by the Serbian delegation (see Appendix A). It had been found in Klagenfurt in the Office of the Senior Officer of the District. The document seemed to show that the Austrians had been informed of the movements of the Serbian army by the indiscretion of the Italian Authorities. A Document Communicated by the Serbian Gobvernment

(It was decided to communicate the document to the various Delegations for their scrutiny.)

6. M. Clemenceau produced a document addressed to him directly by Bela Kun. Wireless Message From Bela Kun

M. Mantoux then read it aloud (see Appendix B).

Mr. Balfour stated that it seemed to him that the Council was in a very difficult position with regard to the document in question. It should be remembered that the Allied and Associated Powers had approached Hungary with a view to making that country withdraw its troops from Czecho-Slovakia on the condition that an analogous order should be imposed upon Roumania. Hungary had accepted and had withdrawn its troops. Roumania had not obeyed the order. M. Bratiano had said in a private conversation with him that it would be impossible for Roumania to withdraw her troops before Hungary had disarmed. The argument was strong. Roumania was threatened by Russian Bolshevism on its eastern frontier and by Hungarian Bolshevism on its western frontier. Up to the present time the country had managed to hold its own, owing to the fact that on the Hungarian side, it was protected by the line of the Theiss which could easily be defended. The Roumanians stated that if they were to abandon this line and attempt to defend themselves further back, they would have no guarantee against an attack from Bela Kun which, if made, would make it difficult for Roumania to defend herself. Although M. Bratiano had not made a precise statement to that effect, he had given the impression that if Hungary had disarmed according to the conditions of the Armistice, Roumania would carry out the wishes of the Allies and would retire to the line which had been laid down. M. Bratiano had further explained that Hungary by withdrawing its forces from Czecho-Slovakia had not lessened the danger to Roumania, which was on the contrary more than ever menaced by the Hungarian movement.

M. Clemenceau said that he supposed that Bela Kun’s ready obedience to the orders he had received could be explained in this way.

Mr. Balfour said that he thought the Roumanians would be justified in not withdrawing their army so long as the Hungarians were not prevented from re-enforcing theirs and from manufacturing munitions and war materials.

M. Clemenceau said that he proposed that Mr. Balfour should prepare a reply.

M. Crespi said that new facts had to be taken into consideration, which had occurred since the withdrawal of the Hungarian troops. Massacres and looting subversive of human rights had taken place. The Italian representative, who was President of the Interallied Armistice Commission, had formally protested to the Government of Bela Kun and had been able to prevent certain executions.

Mr. Balfour proposed that a reply should be given to the effect that no discussion could be undertaken with Bela Kun so long as he did not comply with the Armistice conditions.

M. Pichon said that the Italian representative had evidently done everything within his power. He drew the attention of the Council to a telegram received by him. (See Annex C.)

M. Clemenceau said that he thought that Mr. Balfour’s proposal was the best.

(It was therefore decided to send the following telegram in reply to the wireless telegraphic message sent by Bela Kun to M. Clemenceau:—

“The Peace Conference cannot discuss any matter with you whilst you do not carry out the conditions of the Armistice.”)

6. [sic] M. Clemenceau asked whether M. Crespi had the report on this subject asked for by the Conference. Supply Trains at Modane

M. Crespi said that the report in question would be ready during the afternoon. The examination that had been made showed that the trains had not been held up at Modane except for a few hours on account of customs formalities.

M. Clemenceau said that he would examine the report.

7. M. Crespi said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to the following note on the subject of the actions of the Greeks in Asia Minor. (See Annex D.)Greeks in Asia Minor

Clemenceau said that even though the Greeks had passed the lines of demarcation laid down, they were none the less in the country with the authorisation of the Peace Conference, and this could not be pleaded for the Italians, who, in spite of our wishes and of our decisions, had occupied the country. In a full Conference, at which M. Orlando and M. Sonnino were present, Italy had been asked to withdraw her troops.³ She had not done so. If the Greeks had acted in the manner described, in the note, it was regrettable, but how could they be blamed for it? He therefore proposed that Mr. Balfour should send a despatch to the British Commodore on the spot, instructing him to report on the situation.

Mr. Balfour said that he would do so, but was the Commodore to confine his enquiry to the actions of the Greeks in the region in question, without taking note of the actions of the Italians?

M. Clemenceau said that what the Italians had done was well-known. The Italian forces were in the region in violation of a formal decision of the Conference. M. Orlando and M. Sonnino had taken no notice of the requests made to them, nor of the decisions made. Together with Mr. Balfour, he had sent a memorandum to M. Tittoni,⁴ to which a reply had just been received. It had been agreed that the Italians should send no more troops into the regions in question, and in spite of this, three thousand more had been sent. He therefore proposed that an enquiry should be made by the British Commodore, but he did not see how he could place any blame upon the Greeks.

M. Crespi said that M. Tittoni would soon be back, and that he, personally, did not wish to enter into the discussion, more particularly as a memorandum had been sent. He would confine himself to saying that the Italian Government thought that it possessed rights over the region in question by virtue of Article 9 of the Treaty of London.⁵ He none the less thanked the Council for the proposal for an enquiry, which he agreed to.

(It was decided that Mr. Balfour should direct the British Commodore in command on the Coast of Asia Minor to send in a report on the subject of the incidents that had occurred between the Greeks and Italians in the region in question.)

Villa Majestic, Paris, 12 July, 1919.

Annex A to HD–6

headquarters of the serbian army operations division
No. 40,941

From: Volvode Michitch, Chief of the Staff of the Serbian Army.

To: General Pruneau, Head of the French Military Mission.

The Serbian Headquarters Staff has been informed on several occasions, that the Italian Military Authorities were giving the Austrians information upon the positions of our Army, and upon the movements of our troops in Slovenia and Carinthia.

During the events which have taken place recently on the Carinthian front, our authorities discovered when they occupied Klagenfurt, a document which proves the existence of relations between the Italian and Austrian Military authorities, upon the table of the Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian troops in Carinthia, who was then stationed at Klagenfurt.

I have the honour to transmit to you two photographs of the document in question, the original of which is at Headquarters; it will be shown to you if you so desire. I further beg you to be so good as to transmit a copy to the Commander-in-Chief, and to keep the other for your own use.

The Headquarters Staff has sent several copies of the photograph to the Delegation of the Jugo-Slav Kingdom at Paris, begging it to do what is necessary to cause the Italian Military Mission to be sent away from Lioubliana as soon as possible, since it can no longer be doubted that the Mission in question receives information about our troops and conveys it to the Austrians by means of code telegrams which it has permission to use.

I beg that you will ask the General Commander-in-Chief to cause the Italian Mission to be withdrawn from Lioubliana since it has exceeded its functions, and our authorities can no longer have any confidence in it. It should be noted that the document in question is dated 29th May, and that our attack had begun on the 28th May, which facts will show how prejudicial it was to us.

Volvode Michitch

Chief of the General Staff

Belgrade , 4 July, 1919.

Transmitted to the General Commander-in-Chief for necessary action.

I am taking a copy of this letter to Paris and a photograph of the document under consideration.

Pruneau

Belgrade , 6 July, 1919.

No. 385

Paris, 23 June, 1919.
4, rue Boccador.

From: General Pechitch, Chief of the Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene Military Mission.

To: General Alby, Chief of the General Staff, Paris.

I have the honour to transmit to you a copy of the document referred to in my letter of the 18th June (No. 373).

Pechitch

Commander-in-chief of the Mission

[Enclosure—Translation]⁶

intelligence service
villach division
intelligence no. 281
s. h. s.—situation

Villach, May 29, 1919.

To the Bureau of Intelligence of the Provincial German Austrian Commandant at Klagenfurt.

In reply to code telegram Intelligence No. 594 confidential of May 23, report that Kl 24 under military orders charged with this mission, up to the present has not returned.

Kl 19, under military orders, sent May 26 to obtain information, reports on this subject, May 28, 1919, as follows:

In the region Wurzen–Krainburg–Radmansdorf, there are not more than 4000 men. In this radius, there are about 3 battalions, comprising: 1 battalion of legionaires: 1 company, Wurzen; 1 company, Assling; 1 company, Radmansdorf and 1 company, Ratschach. 1 battalion, 17th Regiment, infantry: 1 company, Kronau; 1 company, Assling; 2 companies in the positions “Rozica” Rosenbacher-Sattel and “Golica” MaElender-Sattel. 1 battalion, Serbian 22nd Regiment, infantry: ½ company, Wurzen; ½ company, Lengenfeld, 1 company, Birnbaum; 2 companies, Assling. 1 battalion, Serbian 26th Regiment, infantry: 2 companies, Ratschach; 2 companies, Krainburg. 1 battalion, Serbian 27th Regiment, infantry: 1 company, Lengenfeld; 1 company Alpen Planira, number 993; about a ½ company, Krainburg. South of Krainburg, reserves are massing: Effectives per company estimated at about 200 men.

Per battalion, 8 machine guns, artillery: Ratschach, 21 cannons; Assling, 12 cannons; Krainburg, 8 cannons, 4 of which are heavy. The Serbian 4th Regiment, infantry, was transferred about May 20th, probably to Unterdrauburg. Traffic on all railroad lines in Serbia, Croatia Slovenia.

Similar information has been forwarded to the Bureau of Intelligence at Klagenfurt and to the officer of Italian intelligence at Paris, Tenento Parenti.

Lieutenant Parenti reports: A Serbian division arrived this noon at Eisenkappel. After the capture of this place, the division was divided into two parts, one brigade of which headed in the direction of Kühnsdorf; the second brigade toward Villach. The enemy possesses a considerable quantity of artillery. The effectives of all the enemy troops to be found at the Carinthian front are estimated to be from 20 to 25 thousand men. The Italian military forces can be ready to move within five hours. The two dispositions were dispatched by telephone to the Bureau of Intelligence at Klagenfurt, May 29, 1919.

Please kindly check the veracity of the information furnished by Kl 19 and indicate amount of remuneration to be payed this person who up to now has not been recompensed.

Captain Rimitz, M. P.

hezersko detachment

o. no. 243

To the Commander of the Division of the Drave, I transmit the above information on our forces and positions rendered by enemy spies. This document was found June 8 on a table in a house which was the headquarters of the Provincial Commandant of Klagenfurt.

Klagenfurt, June 11, 1919.

The Commandant

Colonel Dobr. Milenkovié, M. P.

Copy verified by
Lieutenant-Colonel
Signature illegible.

Appendix “B” [to HD–6]

Wireless From Budapest

SSS No. 121 from Budapest W. 840 11/7 at 21.15.

To:—M. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference, Paris.

Mr. President: In your dispatch of 13th June⁷ you assured me that as soon as our troops had evacuated the territories ceded to the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia, and had retired behind the frontiers assigned to the federated socialist republic of Hungary, the Roumanian troops would make an analogous movement of evacuation, and would retire behind the frontiers laid down in great detail in your note. In the reply which I then gave,⁸ as well as in the dispatch which I sent subsequently,⁹ I stated that the federated socialist republic of Hungary was desirous of showing how anxious it was to avoid any useless bloodshed, and would therefore agree to your demand. And that I have kept my word has been proved by facts. At the same time I took the liberty of requesting, that you would give us the necessary guarantees that the Roumanian troops should carry out the orders of the Allied and Associated Powers. I was also of the same opinion as you, when you stated that frontier lines acquired by force of arms could not be held. As I did not receive the guarantees, I stated in my last dispatch, that I accepted as a personal guarantee, or assurance, that the Roumanian troops would evacuate the regions to the East of the Theiss, which were completely devastated. You have doubtless been informed, Mr. President, that our troops broke off the fighting in which they had become engaged, with the troops of the Czecho-Slovak Republic by the action of these latter. On the 24th June our troops occupied the lines which marked the neutral zone established by General Pellé. The Roumanian troops should, therefore, have conformed to the orders and instructions issued by the Allied and Associated Powers, contained in your dispatch of the 13th June; they should have retired behind the lines laid down, thereby giving some evidence of a desire for peace on their part and of a wish to accede to your desires in the matter of frontiers acquired by force of arms. In spite of your promise the Roumanian troops have made no movement of withdrawal, but, subsequently, to the 24th June have made several violent attacks more particularly at Tiszaluc; these attacks were beaten off with serious loss by the Red Army. However much we may regret the shedding of blood, we consider it to be a duty imposed on us by your very word, to prevent the Roumanian troops from re-opening such conflicts, in defiance of the formal instructions of the Allied and Associated Powers. We do not wish to dilate on the exactions and the bad conduct which characterise the daily doings of the Roumanian troops. On this point it will be sufficient to tell you, Mr. President, that the devastations of General Hindenburg in the invaded departments of Northern France are perfect oases when compared to the conditions brought about by the savagery of the Roumanian troops in the economic life of the countries that they have occupied. Allow me to ask you, Mr. President, whether your word, and the engagements of the Allied and Associated Powers are sufficient to cause the Roumanian troops to retire behind the frontiers assigned to them in your despatch of 13th June. We believe that you have means of preventing unnecessary shedding of blood, even though you address your instructions to persons whose desire for peace has not been proved, so strongly as the wishes of the federated socialist republic of Hungary, which, after conducting a series of successful engagements, was willing to cause all useless shedding of blood to cease.

With regard to the republic of Czecho-Slovakia we beg you, Mr. President, to make your wishes and those of the Allied and Associated Powers effective in the matter of the hostile attitude taken up by the Roumanian troops. The federated socialist republic of Hungary brought about a cessation to the hostilities opened up by the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia despite the fact that the Hungarian troops were successful. We beg that you will repeat your instructions of the 13th June and make the wishes of the Allied and Associated Powers respected. It is only in this way that the federated socialist republic will be able to justify its conciliatory attitude in the eyes of its supporters, by having accepted the guarantees given in your declaration. I hope that the Allied and Associated Powers will be able to impose respect for their wishes, and maintain their prestige in the eyes of the Roumanian troops.

Budapest, 11 July.

Bela Kun

Commissary for Foreign Affairs

Appendix “C” [to HD–6]

[Telegram Presented to the Council of Heads of Delegations by the French Plenipotentiary (Pichon)]

We are informed by a telegram from Budapest, that the judicial sentences passed after the last anti-Bolshevist movement included: 11 death sentences, 6 sentences to hard labour and about 60 punishments, which vary from 1 to 15 years imprisonment. There is a rising indignation in the town against this recrudescence of Bolshevist procedure. A note has been sent to Vienna by Bela Kun’s emissary. This note refers to the accusations which the journals in Vienna have made against the Bolshevist Government in Hungary and demands that satisfaction be given.

The Secretary for Foreign Affairs has replied that it is impossible for him to act as requested.

Bauer¹⁰ requests that Bela Kun shall recall Czobel, the Hungarian Minister to Vienna. He further remarks that the Austrian Government was not consulted on the appointment.

Appendix “D” [to HD–6]

dated 12 July, 1919.

[Memorandum Presented to the Council of Heads of Delegations by the Italian Plenipotentiary (Crespi)]

Memorandum

It is known that the Greeks were obliged by the Turks to evacuate Aidin on the 1st July, but they were able to re-occupy it on the 5th. After this date they have continued to advance to the South of the line laid down by the Council of Four at its meeting of the 19th May (Ayasoluk-Aidin).¹¹

It should be noted that the Council of Four laid down that the Greeks should not be allowed to occupy any territory outside the Sandjak of Smyrna, and the Kaza of Aivali, without being authorised to do so by the Senior Naval Officer, that is to say, by the British Commodore. It follows, that, as the Commodore opposed the re-occupation of Aidin by the Greeks with a view to avoid useless blood-shed, it was only right that he should have been obeyed. But on the other hand, as we have said, the Greeks had not only re-occupied Aidin but have gone to a distance of 20 to 25 kilometres to the south of the line laid down; in consequence of this, they have been brought face to face with the Italian troops, on whose patrols they have fired. The Greek aeroplanes have directed machine-gun fire against the Italian troops marching from Giroba towards the Meander; whilst the Greek artillery has fired on the Italian positions. In view of these considerations the British Commodore has uselessly ordered the Greek Commissioner to respect his orders, which are, that the Greek troops should immediately withdraw to the North of the Aidin railway. It would seem that orders have come from Paris, at the same time, telling the Greek Commissioner at Smyrna to re-occupy Aidin, in spite of the contrary orders given by the British Commodore, who, on several occasions, has given evidence of his indignation at the disregard of his instructions. I have therefore the honour to demand that the Supreme Council shall give it to be understood to the Greek Delegation that the orders of the British Commodore are to be respected.

1. Jules Cambon, French representative and president, Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs.
2. This document does not accompany the minutes.
3. For previous discussion of this subject, see CF–9, CF–10, CF–17, CF–19, vol. v, pp. 570, 577, 686, 716, and CF–37B, CF–93A, vol. vi, pp. 83 and 712.
4. Apparently a reference to the declaration by Great Britain and France to the new Italian delegation, June 28, 1919. For text, see appendix I to CF–99A, vol. vi, p. 760.
5. Great Britain, Cmd. 671 Misc. No. 7 (1920): Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915.
6. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
7. Appendix V (A), V (B), and V (F) to CF–65, vol. vi, pp. 411, 412, and 416.
8. Appendix II to CF–73, vol. vi, p. 518.
9. Appendix III to CF–93, vol. vi, p. 706.
10. Dr. Otto Bauer, Austrian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, November 12, 1918–July 27, 1919.
11. CF–19, vol. v, p. 716.