Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/62
CF–62
Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des
Etats-Unis, Paris, on Thursday, June 12, at 4 p.m.
Paris, June 12, 1919, 4 p.m.
- Present
- United States of America
- British Empire
- The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
- France
- Italy
- Japan
| Lt.-Col. Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. |
} |
Secratries. |
| Count Aldrovandi. |
| Professor P. J. Mantoux—Interpreter. |
1. With reference to C. F. 61, Minute 4,1 the attached telegram prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr
to Admiral Koltchak was approved and signed.
Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward it immediately to the
Secretary-General to be telegraphed, on behalf of the Conference, to
Admiral Koltchak (Appendix I). Russia: Further
Telegram to Admiral Koltchak
It was further agreed:—
That the whole of the telegrams interchanged between the Allied and
Associated Powers and Admiral Koltchak should be published in the
newspapers the following day.
Baron Makino while assenting with his
Colleagues to the above telegram said he would like to have gone further
and to have recognised Admiral Koltchak. Nevertheless it was a step in
the right direction.
Mr. Lloyd George said that the Allied and
Associated Governments could not yet recognise Admiral Koltchak for the
whole of Russia.
2. Mr. Lloyd George said that Sir George
Riddell2 had reported to him that the newspapers
in London now had copies of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. They had
not published it and he thought they would not publish it without
permission although there was no censorship. Sir George Riddell urged,
however, that permission should now be given. Publication of the Treaty of Peace
[Page 349]
M. Clemenceau said that at one time he had
favoured publication. It was, however, too late now and to publish it
would be ridiculous.
President Wilson agreed that there was no use
in publishing the Treaty now. The only treaty that could be published
was not the one that was going to be signed. He had cabled to the United
States that he was not willing to communicate to the Legislature, what
was only part of the Treaty. He thought it would be ridiculous to
release the document handed to the Germans as though it were the
Treaty.
On the proposed [proposal?] of Mr. Lloyd George it
was agreed—that when the reply to the Germans was released for
publication the German proposals should also be published, and, at the
same time or as soon as was physically possible thereafter the Treaty of
Peace in its final form should be published.
(Mr. Lloyd George instructed Sir Maurice Hankey to write officially to
Sir George Riddell in this sense).
3. Sir Maurice Hankey reported that he had
received a letter from M. Tardieu, proposing, as he, himself, had
already done, the formation of a Committee to edit the reply to the
German Note. Committee for Editing the Reply to the
German Counter Proposals
(It was agreed that the following Committee should be appointed, for the
purpose of editing the reply to the German Note:—
- M. Tardieu for France, and as President.
- Mr. Hudson for the United States of America.
- Mr. Philip Kerr for the British Empire.
- Count Vannutelli[-Rey] for Italy.
- M. Nagaoka for Japan.
Sir Maurice Hankey was directed to request the Secretary-General to
arrange for this Committee to meet with the least possible delay, and
communicate to it the various portions of the reply as they were
approved.)
4. Sir Maurice Hankey reported that he had
ascertained that the English version of the reply in regard to the Saar
Valley, which had been approved at the morning meeting,3 was a translation from the French, the French
version itself being a translation from an original English draft. In
these circumstances, he had felt justified in incorporating the
decisions of the Council in the original English version. As a matter of
fact, several of the alterations had thereby been found to be
unnecessary. Saar Valley: Reply to the German
Note
(Sir Maurice Hankey’s action was approved.)
[Page 350]
5. The draft reply to the German Note on the subject of Alsace-Lorraine,
prepared by the appropriate Commission Lorraines and dated June 8th, was
read and approved without alteration. Alsace-Lorraine: Reply to German Note
(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General
for communication to the Editing Committee.) (Appendix II.)
6. With reference to C. F. 61, Minute 5,4
Sir Maurice Hankey said that he thought it had
not been realised at the morning meeting that Mr. Philip Kerr’s
memoranda on these subjects of would not appear as a special pendant to
the covering letter, but would merely take their place among the
Negotiations other memoranda in the reply to the Germans. He had, as
instructed, made enquiries from the Secretary-General about the German
White Book, and had ascertained that this contained no documents that
had not already been translated and circulated. The first document in
the White Book was a reproduction of the Report of the Commission on
Responsibilities, which had been published in an American newspaper.
Responsibility of Germany for the War and the
Legal Basis of the Peace Negotiations
The second document was the long German reply,4a which had already been circulated. He was
not quite clear what the decision at the morning meeting had been in
regard to Mr. Philip Kerr’s draft.
(It was agreed that the two memoranda referred to should be approved for
incorporation in the reply.
Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to communicate them to the
Secretary-General for the information of the Editing Committee.)
7. The Council had before them a memorandum signed by M. Jules Cambon on
behalf of the Czecho-Slovak Commission of the Conference,5 recommending certain alterations in
the Peace with Treaty of Peace with Germany, affecting the Kreis
Provision of Ratibor and the Kreis of Leobschütz.
After President Wilson had read the document, it was appreciated that an
expert explanation was required. M. Jules Cambon not being available,
Sir Eyre Crowe, Dr. Lord, and M. Laroche were sent for and introduced.
Treaty of Peace With Germany: Provisions
Regarding the Czecho-Slovak State
Sir Eyre Crowe explained that the district of
Leobschütz was to have been attributed to Poland, but was now affected
by the plebiscite in Upper Silesia. The northern part of Leobschütz was
German, and the southern part was Czech. If Upper Silesia was attributed
to Germany as a result of the plebiscite, the German portion of
Leobschütz should go with it, otherwise, it should remain with
Czechoslovakia.
[Page 351]
(After some further detailed explanations by the experts on the map, it
was agreed to approve the recommendations of the Czechoslovak Commission
and the Article proposed was signed as an instruction to the Drafting
Committee.
Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General
for the information of the Drafting Committee.)
(Sir Eyre Crowe, Dr. Lord and M. Laroche withdrew.)
8. With reference to C. F. 60, Minute 9,6 the Council had before them the further report of
the Council of Foreign Ministers on the questions referred to them on
the previous day. (Appendix III.) The Military
Situation in Hungary
- 1.
- The proposal to maintain the frontier between Hungary and Roumania
adopted on May 12th, was accepted.
- 2.
- The recommendation against establishing the Czech-Slovak State on
the southern bank of the Danube opposite Pressburg was also
accepted.
- 3.
- The recommendations of the Council of Foreign Ministers in regard
to an alteration of the frontier, so as to include in Czech-Slovak
territory the junction of the Korpona railway with the
Komarom–Losoncz railway line, and the insertion in the Treaty of
Peace with Hungary of a provision to ensure to the Czecho-Slovak
State the right of passage for its trains over the sections of
railway included in Hungarian territory of the Komarom–Csata–Losoncz
railway, were also approved.
President Wilson proposed that the boundaries
as adopted in the preceding decision should now be communicated to
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Roumania, and that their observance should
be insisted on.
M. Clemenceau suggested that it might be better
to adopt the Roumanian boundary provisionally only.
Mr. Lloyd George said that the Allies ought
also to hear what Hungary had to say.
M. Clemenceau said that Roumania would present
great objections.
President Wilson pointed out that the Roumanian
Delegates had presented their case at very great length.
Mr. Lloyd George added that Roumania was more
than doubling her territory.
M. Clemenceau suggested that representatives
ought to be sent, not to Vienna as proposed by Bela Kun, but to
Buda-Pesth, to arrange an armistice.
President Wilson suggested it would be better
to send a telegram to Buda-Pesth, Bucharest and Prague.
[Page 352]
Mr. Lloyd George doubted whether this course
would be successful. His view was that the Hungarians had attacked the
Czecho-Slovaks mainly owing to the Roumanian advance, with a view to
dividing the Roumanian and Czecho-Slovakian forces.
President Wilson said that this was quite
unjustifiable.
M. Clemenceau doubted if the Roumanians could
be induced to retire behind the boundary line.
Mr. Lloyd George said that if they refused,
Roumania would have to be informed that she was outside the protection
of the Allied and Associated Powers.
President Wilson said she would also be outside
the recognition of the Allied and Associated Powers. Roumania could not
expect the Allied and Associated Powers to fight for a boundary which
they did not believe to be right.
M. Clemenceau suggested that a document should
be prepared, to be sent to M. Bratiano, M. Kramarcz and Bela Kun.
President Wilson said that each paper would
have to be carefully prepared and accompanied by a map of the
boundaries.
Mr. Lloyd George said it would be necessary to
insist on the instructions being obeyed.
(It was agreed:—
- 1.
- That a separate communication should be sent to each of the
following:—
- Bela Kun for Hungary,
- M. Kramarcz for Czecho-Slovakia, and
- M. Bratiano for Roumania.
- notifying them of the permanent territorial frontiers adopted
by the Conference; insisting on the immediate cessation of
hostilities; on the withdrawal of all military forces behind the
frontier lines; and on an undertaking for the future observance
of these frontiers, as a preliminary to the conclusion of a
Treaty of Peace with Hungary.
- 2.
- That Mr. Balfour should be invited to draft these documents
for approval by the Council.
- 3.
- That maps should be prepared by experts to accompany the above
communications.)
9. Arising out of the previous discussion, President
Wilson suggested that a line should also be established between
Poland and the Ukraine.
Mr. Lloyd George thought the same course should
be adopted as in the case of Upper Silesia. M. Paderewski had told him
that the Ukrainians were anxious to enter Poland. The situation there,
according to M. Paderewski, was almost the same as in Upper Silesia.
There was an area where there was one Pole to two Ruthenians, the upper
grades of the population being Poles, but
[Page 353]
the Ukrainian population was also said to be in
favour of junction with Poland. The best plan therefore, would be to
hold a plebiscite. Poland-Ukraine Frontier
President Wilson suggested that experts should
be got together to draw a plebiscite area.
(On the suggestion of President Wilson, it was agreed that the Council of
Foreign Ministers should be invited to examine this question with
experts, and after hearing representatives both of Poland and of the
Ukraine on the subject, should advise the Council of the Principal
Allied and Associated Powers—
- (a)
- as to whether they recommended a plebiscite.
- (b)
- as to the area of the plebiscite.)
10. The Council had under consideration a draft reply to the German note
prepared by the appropriate Commission on the subject Political of the
Political clauses relating to countries outside Europe.
(After President Wilson had read the draft aloud it was approved subject
to some quite minor alterations. A copy of the reply as finally approved
is attached in Appendix IV.) Political Clauses
Relating to Countries Outside Europe
11. Mr. Lloyd George said that one question
that had to be faced related to the property of Religious Missions in
the German Colonies. The representative of the Vatican had called to see
German him and had seen Mr. Philip Kerr and claimed that colonies all
Roman Catholic property was the property of the Vatican. Great Britain
has always challenged this claim from the earliest times. Religious Missions in German Colonies
M. Clemenceau said that these Missions were not
really the property of the Vatican. He was prepared to give a guarantee
that Roman Catholic property should be handed over to Roman Catholics of
some other nationality, or even to the Vatican, but he was not prepared
to say that it was property with which the Vatican could dispose as it
liked.
M. Orlando said he had no relations with the
Vatican.
President Wilson said that he had received a
letter on the subject and the point made was that the Vatican desired a
specific promise that missionary property should be transferred to some
Church of the same connection.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that this was not
claimed by Germany and that all that was required was some assurance to
the Vatican.
President Wilson suggested that the assurance
given might be that the matter should be provided for in the mandates
for the German Colonies.
Mr. Lloyd George undertook to instruct Mr.
Philip Kerr to prepare a draft declaration on the subject.
[Page 354]
12. The Council had before them a draft reply to the German Note prepared
by the appropriate Commission on the subject of Military Clauses.
(Appendix V.)
Mr. Lloyd George suggested that Paragraph I
ought to be strengthened as it was a matter of great importance before
coming to the concessions to indicate the great trouble that had been
caused in the world by the development of the German military machine.
Military Clauses: Reply to the German
Notes
(This was accepted and two paragraphs drafted by Mr. Philip Kerr were
adopted later in the Meeting.)
(It was agreed to delete Paragraph 2 and the following words at the
beginning of Paragraph 3:—“With due regard to these points
therefore”.)
Para 4. M. Clemenceau objected to the number of
300,000 men which Germany was to be allowed to have after three months.
He pointed out that Marshal Foch had originally proposed an Army of
200,000 men for Germany. The Germans already had more than 300,000 men
on the eastern front alone. He did not think that these were intended
for fighting, but rather for passive resistance and to make difficulties
in Upper Silesia. He proposed to reduce the number to 200,000.
(It was agreed that the number at the end of three months should be
200,000.)
(Para 5: The last six lines were deleted on the ground that this was not
a convenient place at which to introduce a reference to the League of
Nations.)
(The draft articles for the Treaty of Peace with Germany in Paragraph 4
were initialled by the Five Heads of States.
Sir Maurice Hankey was directed to communicate them to the
Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.
A copy of the reply as finally approved is attached as Appendix VI.
Sir Maurice Hankey was directed to forward it to the Secretary-General of
the Editing Committee).
13. The Council had before them a joint note by the Allied and Associated
Admirals containing the draft of a reply as regards the Naval clauses
(Appendix VII).
(After the Note had been read, it was approved.)
(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General
for the information of the Editing Committee.) Naval
Clauses: Reply to the German Note
14. The Council had before them the draft of a reply7 to the German Note on the subject of
Prisoners of War prepared by the appropriate Commission.
(It was agreed that this Note was unduly long and should be shortened.)
Prisoners of War. Reply to the German
Note
[Page 355]
(M. Mantoux was instructed to communicate with M. Cahens
accordingly.)
15. M. Orlando said that he had received the
resignation of two Italian Ministers. He also had information that
socialists were preparing some trouble.
M. Clemenceau said this was the case in France
also. The Situation in Italy
Mr. Lloyd George said that he had seen someone
who had seen Mr. Ramsay MacDonald.8 The latter had reported that socialist trouble
was brewing in Italy and had said that he, himself, had discouraged
it.
M. Orlando said he was less pre-occupied with
the internal situation than with the crisis in his Government. There was
some trouble due to high prices and that in a recent riot in Spezia, one
person had been killed and two wounded.
Mr. Lloyd George said that he was advised there
would be no limit to the high prices unless the Inter-Allied Purchasing
Commissions were maintained. Otherwise, there would be competition not
only between one Ally and another, but the Germans who were half
starving would enter the market and send prices still higher.
M. Orlando agreed. He viewed with dismay the
prospect of the abolition of the wheat executive.
President Wilson said that this question would
have to be considered as part of the general economic question.
M. Orlando said he must now leave as he might
have to go to Italy in the evening.
16. The Council had before them a draft reply to the German Note on the
question of responsibilities prepared by the appropriate Commission
(Appendix VIII).
After the document had been read, M. Clemenceau
expressed the view that it was a weak document. Responsibilities. Reply to the German Note
Mr. Lloyd George thought a much stronger
document was required.
Baron Makino pointed out that the points had
been correctly made. This view was generally accepted.
Mr. Lloyd George undertook to invite Mr. Philip
Kerr to redraft the reply.
17. President Wilson read the Report of the
Military Representatives at Versailles on the situation in the Baltic,
after which M. Mantoux read the Report of the Baltic Commission. The Situation in the Baltic
Mr. Lloyd George expressed the view that the
Germans ought to be cleared out of the Baltic.
[Page 356]
President Wilson agreed in principle but did
not see how they were to be got out.
Mr. Lloyd George said that the Armistice gave
power to order their withdrawal. If this right were not exercised, the
Germans would establish themselves there. We had information that they
were colonising Courland and he had even read a telegram that settlers
were coming there from the Saar Valley.
Mr. Lloyd George undertook to discuss the
question that evening with General Sackville-West, the British Military
Representative, in order to ascertain whether it was necessary to see
the experts on the following day.
Villa Majestic,
Paris
, 12 June,
1919.
Appendix I to CF–62
M–190A
[Telegram From the Council of Allied
and Associated Powers to Admiral Kolchak]
The Allied and Associated Powers wish to acknowledge receipt of
Admiral Koltchak’s reply9 to their note of May 26th.10 They welcome the tone of that reply, which
seems to them to be in substantial agreement with the propositions
which they had made, and to contain satisfactory assurances for the
freedom, self-government, and peace of the Russian people and their
neighbours. They are therefore willing to extend to Admiral Koltchak
and his associates the support set forth in their original
letter.
- D. Lloyd George
- Woodrow Wilson
- G. Clemenceau
- V. E. Orlando
- N. Makino
June 12, 1919.
[Appendix II to CF–62]
WCP–953
Draft Reply
Alsace Lorraine
The Clauses concerning Alsace and Lorraine are but the application of
the 8th of the 14 Points which Germany, at the time of the
[Page 357]
Armistice, accepted as the
basis of Peace; “the injustice committed by Prussia towards France
in 1871, as regards Alsace and Lorraine, which has disturbed the
peace of the world for nearly 50 years must be repaired, in order
that peace may again be assured in the interest of all”.
Fifty years ago, the injustice consisted in “the annexation of a
French country against the will of its inhabitants, as unanimously
expressed at Bordeaux by their elected representatives, reiterated
in the Reichstag in 1874 and many times since by the election of
protesting deputies and finally confirmed during the war by the
special measures which Germany had to take against Alsatians and
Lorrainers both civilians and soldiers. To repair an injustice is to
replace things, so far as possible, in the state in which they were
before being upset by the injustice. All the Clauses of the Treaty
concerning Alsace and Lorraine have this object in view. They will
not, however, suffice to wipe out the sufferings of two Provinces
which, for nearly half a century, have been for the Germans but a
military glacis and according to the expression of Herr von
Kühlmann, a means of “cementing” the unity of the Empire.
The Allied and Associated Governments could not therefore admit a
plebiscite for these Provinces. Germany, having accepted the 8th
Point and signed the Armistice which places Alsace and Lorraine in
the position of evacuated territories, has no right to demand that
plebiscite. The population of Lorraine and Alsace has never asked
for it. On the contrary it protested for nearly 50 years, at the
cost of its own tranquillity and its own interests, against the
abuse of strength of which it was the victim in 1871. Its will is
not therefore in doubt, and the Allied and Associated Governments
mean to ensure respect for it.
The arguments, based on history and language, once more brought
forward by Germany, are formally contested by the Allied and
Associated Governments and do not modify their point of view.
The legal objections derived from the “ante-dated cession” are also
inadmissible. Germany recognised this when she signed the Armistice.
Besides Alsace and Lorraine by throwing themselves into the arms of
France, as into those of a long-lost mother, themselves fixed the
date of their deliverance. A Treaty founded on the right of
self-determination of peoples cannot but take note of a people’s
will so solemnly proclaimed.
In all its Clauses, whether they concern nationality, debts or State
property, &c. this Treaty has no other object than to put
persons and things back in the legal position in which they were in
1871. The obligation of repairing the injustice then committed
admits of no other alternative and Germany herself has accepted that
obligation
[Page 358]
in subscribing
to the 14 Points. It should be added that it is very easy to justify
the exception made in favour of France to the general principle
admitted in the draft Treaty, according to which the State receiving
territory takes over part of the public debt of the ceding State and
pays for the property of the said State in the ceded territory. In
1871, Germany, when she seized Alsace and Lorraine, refused to take
over any part of the French debt; she paid nothing for any French
State property and Herr von Bismarck boasted of this in the
Reichstag on May the 25th, 1871. Today the Allied and Associated
Powers mean France to recover Alsace and Lorraine under exactly the
same conditions and consequently that she should take over no part
of the German debt nor pay for any State property. This solution is
just, for if German State property includes railways, the French
owners of which Germany compensated in 1871 by sums drawn from the
War indemnity, and if these railways have been developed since 1871,
Germany on the contrary not having, at that time, assumed liability
either for that portion of the French debt which belonged to Alsace
and Lorraine nor for the State property, the liability (capital and
interest) imposed on France under this head exceeds the sum to which
Germany makes a claim.
As regards the local debt of Alsace and Lorraine and of the public
institutions of those Provinces which existed before August the 1st,
1914, it has always been understood between the Allied and
Associated Governments that France should accept liability for
them.
Appendix III to CF–62
[Report by the Council of Foreign
Ministers]
The Council of Foreign Ministers met on June 12th at 10 a.m. to
consider the four points which have been submitted for its
consideration by the Supreme Council.
I.—The Supreme Council thinks that some enquiry should be made as to
why the frontiers between Roumania and Hungary, which were approved
at a meeting of the Council of Ten on May 12th,11 were never communicated
to the representatives of Roumania or presumably the other states
concerned.
The Council of Foreign Ministers begs to point out that the decisions
of the Territorial Commissions have never been communicated to the
States concerned before the plenary secret meetings held to that
effect on the eve of the day on which the conditions of Peace were
to be handed to the Enemy Delegations.
[Page 359]
The only exception to this rule has been made in favour of Belgium
who has received direct from the Supreme Council communication of
her future frontiers. The Council of Foreign Ministers therefore
considers that there is no occasion for an enquiry as the procedure
followed by them with regard to Roumania and other States concerned
in the fixation of the Hungarian frontiers was in accordance with
precedents.
The Council of Foreign Ministers feels that they must in future
continue to abide by the usual principle of non-communication,
unless the Supreme Council deems it advisable to issue instructions
to the contrary in any particular case.
II.—The Supreme Council asked whether M. Bratiano had thought that
the proposed frontiers were acceptable or not and whether he offered
any criticism on the subject.
M. Bratiano contested the whole of the line that was shown to him.
But he stated that he was not in a position to express a final
opinion, even a personal one, before he had received instructions
from his Government, which would mean another ten or twelve days
delay.
M. Misu, one of the Roumanian Plenipotentiaries left yesterday for
Bukarest and is to bring back with him the Government’s reply.
The Council of Foreign Ministers has besides the honor to suggest to
the Supreme Council to maintain the frontier adopted on May 12th by
the Council of Ten, in accordance with the conclusions of the
territorial Commission that had conducted a thorough enquiry
regarding all the historical, geographical, ethnographical,
political and military elements of the question.
III.—The Supreme Council asked the Council of Foreign Ministers to
express its recommendations as to the alterations in the frontier
asked for by the Czecho-Slovach Delegation.
- a)
- —The Council of Foreign Ministers considers that there is no
ground for establishing the Czecho-Slovach State on the Southern
Bank of the Danube opposite Pressburg, the river constituting
the best frontier possible between the two riparian states in
that region.
- b)
- —The Council of Foreign Ministers considers that the
acceptance of the Czecho-Slovach claim on the whole of the
Komaron–Kalonda–Losoncz railway would involve the assignment of
too high a number of Magyars to the Czecho-Slovach State.
However the Council notes that by leaving to Hungary the junction of
the Komaron–Kalonda railway with the Korpona branch-line, the
present frontier deprives the important regions supplied by this
branch line of all railway communications with the remainder of the
Czecho-Slovach territory and renders this branch-line quite
unserviceable to the Czecho-Slovach State.
The Council has therefore the honor to recommend that the Supreme
Council should alter the frontier adopted on May 12th in the
following
[Page 360]
manner which
would involve but an insignificant displacement of population.
“The frontier will cut across the angle formed by the course of
the Eipel somewhere about Ypolysag, so as to include in the
Czecho-Slovach territory the junction of the Korpona railway
with the Komaron–Losoncz railway-line.”
The Council of Foreign Ministers also recommend that a provision
should be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary which will
ensure to the Czecho-Slovach State the right of passage for its
trains over the sections included in Hungarian territory of the
Komaron–Csata–Losoncz railway.
IV.—The Supreme Council asked the Council of Foreign Ministers to
offer its recommendation on the proposals of General Pellé.
The Council of Foreign Ministers consider that as the armistice line
proposed by General Pellé coincides with the maximum claim of the
Czecho-Slovach Delegation there would be a risk of arousing the most
serious misunderstandings in Hungary.
Besides they consider from a general point of view that any armistice
line distinct from the final frontier would afford serious political
difficulties. They beg to recommend to the Supreme Council that the
Hungarian Government should be informed as to the frontier drawn by
the Supreme Council between the Czecho-Slovach State and Hungary and
be requested to withdraw its troops on this side of the line.
Appendix IV to CF–62
WCP–944 (revise)
german counter-proposals
Conclusions of the Committee on the
Political Clauses of the Treaty Relating to Countries Outside
Europe
(Approved by the Council of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers on June 12th, 1919)
No concessions can be made in regard to the Clauses of the Treaty
which concern the former German Colonies and German rights outside
Europe.
I
In requiring Germany to renounce all her rights and claims to her
overseas possessions, the Allied and Associated Powers placed before
every other consideration the interests of the native populations
advocated by President Wilson in the fifth point of his Message of
the 8th January, 1918.
Reference to the evidence from German sources previous to the war of
an official as well as of a private character, and to the formal
[Page 361]
charges made in the
Reichstag, especially by MM. Erzberger12
and Noske,13 will suffice to throw full light
upon the German colonial administration, upon the cruel methods of
repression, the arbitrary requisition, and the various forms of
forced labour which resulted in the depopulation of vast expanses of
territory in German East Africa and the Cameroons, not to mention
the tragic fate of the Hereros in South West Africa which is well
known to all.
Germany’s dereliction in the sphere of colonial civilisation has been
revealed too completely to admit of the Allied and Associated Powers
consenting to make a second experiment and of their assuming the
responsibility of again abandoning thirteen or fourteen millions of
natives to a fate from which the war has delivered them.
Moreover, the Allied and Associated Powers felt themselves compelled
to safeguard their own security and the Peace of the world against a
military imperialism, which sought to establish bases whence it
could pursue a policy of interference and intimidation against the
other Powers.
II
The Allied and Associated Powers considered that the loss of her
Colonies would not hinder Germany’s normal economic development. The
trade of the German Colonies has never represented more than a very
small fraction of Germany’s total trade: in 1913 one-half per cent
of her imports and one-half per cent of her exports. Of the total
volume of the so-called colonial products imported by Germany, such
as cotton, cocoa, tobacco, jute and copra, only 3% came from her
Colonies. It is obvious that the financial, commercial and
industrial rehabilitation of Germany must depend on other
factors.
For climatic reasons and other natural causes the German Colonies are
incapable of accommodating more than a very small proportion of the
excess German emigration. The small number of colonists resident
there before the war is conclusive evidence in this respect.
III
The Allied and Associated Powers have drawn up, in the matter of the
cession of the German Colonies, the following methods of procedure,
which are in conformity with the rules of International Law and
Equity:—
(a) The Allied and Associated Powers are
applying to the German Colonies the general principle in accordance
with which the transfer of sovereignty involves the transfer under
the same conditions to the
[Page 362]
State to which the surrender is made of the immovable and movable
property of the ceding State.
They see no reason for consenting in the case of the Colonies to any
departure from that principle which may have been admitted as an
exceptional measure in the case of territory in Europe.
(b) They are of opinion that the Colonies
should not bear any portion of the German debt, nor remain under an
obligation to refund to Germany the expenses incurred by the
Imperial administration of the Protectorate. In fact, they consider
that it would be unjust to burden the natives with expenditure which
appears to have been incurred in Germany’s own interest, and that it
would be no less unjust to make this responsibility rest upon the
Mandatory Powers which, in so far as they may be appointed Trustees
by the League of Nations, will derive no benefit from such
Trusteeship.
IV
The Allied and Associated Powers considered that it would be
necessary in the interest of the natives, as well as in that of
general peace, to restrict the influence which Germany might seek to
exert over her former Colonies and over the territories of the
Allied and Associated Powers.
- A.
- They are obliged for the reasons of security already mentioned
to reserve to themselves full liberty of action in determining
the conditions on which Germans will be allowed to establish
themselves in the territories of the former German Colonies.
Moreover, the control to be exercised by the League of Nations
will provide all the necessary guarantees.
- B.
- They require Germany to subscribe to the Conventions which
they may conclude for the control of the traffic in Arms and
Spirits and for the modification of the General Acts of Berlin
and Brussels. They do not think that Germany has any ground to
consider herself humiliated or injured because she is required
to give her consent in advance to measures accepted by all the
Powers in regard to questions of such great importance to the
welfare of the native populations and to the maintenance of
civilisation and peace.
V
The Allied and Associated Powers consider that all the possessions
and property of the German State in the territory of Kiaochow must
be treated on the same footing as State property in all the other
German overseas possessions, and be transferred without
compensation. In this connection they recall the fact that Kiaochow,
which was unjustly torn from China, has been used by Germany as a
military
[Page 363]
base in pursuance
of a policy which in its various manifestations has constituted a
perpetual menace to the peace of the Far East. In these
circumstances they see no reason why Germany should be compensated
for the loss of works and establishments and in general for public
property which in the hands of this Power have for the most part
been used merely as a means of carrying out its policy of
aggression.
In so far as concerns the Railway and the Mines that go with it,
referred to in Article 156, Para. 2, the Allied and Associated
Powers held that these should be considered as public property. They
would, however, be prepared, in the event of Germany adducing proof
to the contrary, to apply to such private rights as German nationals
may be able to establish in the matter, the general principles laid
down in the peace conditions in respect of compensation of this
character.
Appendix V to CF–62
WCP–945
committee on military
clauses
Suggested Answers to the German
Counter-Proposals
I. The Military Clauses in the Treaty of Peace are intended to avert
the danger of war in Europe. The Allied and Associated Powers have
estimated that in order to arrive at this it is essential in the
first instance to force Germany to give up military methods in the
application of her politics.
It is only when this first condition shall have been realised that
the Allied & Associated Powers will be able in their turn to
examine the limitations of their own armaments.
II. Whilst demanding the reduction of Germany’s armed forces and the
limitation of her armaments, the Allied and Associated Powers refuse
to bind themselves to any definite undertaking in regard to their
Armies.
III. With due regard to these points therefore, the Allied and
Associated Powers cannot agree to any alteration in principle of the
conditions laid down in Articles 159–180, 203–208, and 211–213 of
the present Peace Treaty.
Germany must consent unconditionally to disarm in advance of the
Allied and Associated Powers; she must agree to immediate abolition
of universal military service; a definite organisation and scale of
armament must be enforced, in her case, subject to future rulings by
the League of Nations. It is essential that she should be subjected
to special control as regards the reduction of her armies and
armament, the dismantling of her fortifications, and the reduction,
conversion or destruction of her military establishments.
[Page 364]
IV. Whilst the Allied and Associated Powers regard the strict
maintenance of these principles as a sacred duty and refuse in any
way to depart from them, they are nevertheless willing in the
interests of general peace and the welfare of the German people to
permit the following modifications of the Military Clauses, Articles
159–180 of the present Treaty:—
(a) Germany to be allowed to reduce her Army
more gradually than at present stipulated, i. e. to a maximum of
300,000 men within 3 months, and that at the end of that 3 months
and every subsequent 3 months a Conference of Military experts of
the Allied & Associated Powers shall fix the strength of the
German Army for the coming three months, the object being to reduce
the German Army to the 100,000 men stipulated in the Treaty as soon
as possible, and in any case by the expiration of the Law of the
Reichswehr, i. e. 31st March 1920.
(b) The number of formations, officers or
persons in the position of officers, and civilian personnel shall be
in the same ratio to the total effectives laid down in (a) above as that laid down in the present
Treaty.
Similarly, the number of guns, machine guns, trench-mortars, rifles,
and the amount of ammunition and equipment shall bear the same ratio
to the total amount allowed in (a) above as
that laid down in the present Treaty.
(c) No deviation from the organisation in
Armament laid down in the present Treaty can be permitted, until
Germany is admitted to the League of Nations, which may then agree
to such modifications as seem desirable.
(d) All the remaining German war material
shall be handed over in the period fixed by the Treaty of Peace.
The periods laid down in the Treaty of Peace for the demolition of
fortifications shall be modified as follows:—
“All fortified Works, fortresses and Land Forts situated in
German territory west of a line traced 50 kilometres east of
the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled.
Those Fortresses which are situated in territory not occupied
by the Allied Armies shall be disarmed in a period of 2
months, and dismantled in a period of 6 months.
Those which are situated in territory occupied by the Allied
Armies shall be disarmed and dismantled within the time
limits which shall be fixed by the Allied High Command;
the necessary labour being furnished by the German
Government.”
V. With the amendments and modifications enumerated in paragraph IV
above, the Military Clauses (Articles 159–180) and those affecting
the carrying out of the terms therein laid down (Articles 203–208,
and 211–213) are to remain in effect, provided that the German
Government be informed that after its solemn acceptance of all the
conditions of the Treaty, and after her complete and loyal execution
of the Military, Naval and Air terms without any resistance
[Page 365]
thereto of any kind, the
question of her admission at that time into the League of Nations
will be voted upon by the Assembly of the League.
VI. No verbal negotiations can be allowed.
| Members of Committee on
Military Clauses |
| Signed by |
For |
Tasker H. Bliss,
General |
The United States of America |
Sir H. Wilson,
General |
The British Empire |
Desticker,
General |
France |
V. Cavallero,
General |
Italy |
Nara,
Lieut.-General |
Japan |
Appendix VI to CF–62
WCP–945 (revise)
committee on military
clauses
(Reply to the German
Counter-Proposals)
(Approved by the Council of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers, on June 12th, 1919)
I. The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that their
proposals in regard to German armaments were not made solely with
the object of making it impossible for Germany to resume her policy
of military aggression. It is also the first step towards that
general reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to
bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war, and
which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to
promote.
II. They must point out, however, that the colossal growth in
armaments of the last few decades was forced upon the nations of
Europe by Germany. As Germany increased her power, her neighbours
had to follow suit unless they were to become impotent to resist
German dictation or the German sword. It is therefore right, as it
is necessary, that the process of limitation of armaments should
begin with the nation which has been responsible for their
expansion. It is not until the aggressor has led the way that the
attacked can safely afford to follow suit.
[Page 366]
III. The Allied and Associated Powers cannot agree to any alteration
in principle of the conditions laid down in Articles 159–180,
203–208, and 211–213 of the present Peace Treaty.
Germany must consent unconditionally to disarm in advance of the
Allied and Associated Powers; she must agree to immediate abolition
of universal military service; a definite organisation and scale of
armament must be enforced, in her case, subject to future rulings by
the League of Nations. It is essential that she should be subjected
to special control as regards the reduction of her armies and
armament, the dismantling of her fortifications, and the reduction,
conversion or destruction of her military establishments.
IV. Whilst the Allied and Associated Powers regard the strict
maintenance of these principles as a sacred duty and refuse in any
way to depart from them, they are nevertheless willing in the
interests of general peace and the welfare of the German people to
permit the following modifications of the Military Clauses, Articles
159–180 of the present Treaty:—
(a) Germany to be allowed to reduce her Army
more gradually than at present stipulated, i. e. to a maximum of
200,000 men within 3 months, and that at the end of that 3 months
and every subsequent 3 months a Conference of Military experts of
the Allied & Associated Powers shall fix the strength of the
Germany Army for the coming three months, the object being to reduce
the German Army to the 100,000 men stipulated in the Treaty as soon
as possible, and in any case by the expiration of the Law of the
Reichswehr, i. e. 31st March 1920.
(b) The number of formations, officers or
persons in the position of officers, and civilian personnel shall be
in the same ratio to the total effectives laid down in (a) above as that laid down in the present
Treaty.
Similarly, the number of guns, machine guns, trench-mortars, rifles,
and the amount of ammunition and equipment shall bear the same ratio
to the total amount allowed in (a) above as
that laid down in the present Treaty.
(c) No deviation from the organisation in
Armament laid down in the present Treaty can be permitted, until
Germany is admitted to the League of Nations, which may then agree
to such modifications as seem desirable.
(d) All the remaining German war material
shall be handed over in the period fixed by the Treaty of Peace.
The periods laid down in the Treaty of Peace for the demolition of
fortifications shall be modified as follows:—
“All fortified Works, fortresses and Land Forts situated in
German territory west of a line traced 50 kilometres east of
the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled.
Those Fortresses which are situated in territory not occupied
by the Allied Armies shall be disarmed in a period of 2
months, and dismantled in a period of 6 months.
[Page 367]
Those which are situated in territory occupied by the Allied
Armies shall be disarmed and dismantled within the time
limits which shall be fixed by the Allied High Command;
the necessary labour being furnished by the German
Government.”
With the amendments and modifications enumerated in paragraph IV
above, the Military Clauses (Articles 159–180) and those affecting
the carrying out of the terms therein laid down (Articles 203–208,
and 211–213) are to remain in effect.
Appendix VII to CF–62
WCP–942
Joint Note by the Admirals for the
Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers
German Counter-Proposals.—Reply as
Regards the Naval Clauses
The Admirals have already stated their views in a Joint Note dated 3
June.
They now, in pursuance of the resolution of the Council of the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers, dated 4 June (W. C. P.
917),14 submit these views in
a form suitable for incorporation in the Memorandum which the
Council propose to send to the German Delegates.
| Signed by |
For |
| Admiral Benson |
The United States of America |
| Rear-Admiral Hope |
The British Empire |
| Vice-Admiral Ronarc’h |
France |
| Rear-Admiral Grassi |
Italy |
| Vice-Admiral Takeshita |
Japan |
[Enclosure]
German Counter-Proposals.—Draft Reply Dealing
With Naval Matters
i. naval clauses
The conditions and proposals of the German Delegates relative to the
Naval Clauses cannot be entertained. All these Articles have been
carefully framed and must be accepted unconditionally. They are
based on the desire for a general limitation of the armaments of all
nations and at the same time leave to Germany the requisite naval
force for self-protection and police duties.
[Page 368]
No negotiations are necessary with regard to this portion of the
Treaty, prior to its signature. All details can be settled by the
Naval Commission to be appointed subsequently in accordance with
Section IV of Part V.
There are no financial measures contemplated by the Allied and
Associated Powers in connection with the surrender of any of the
warships mentioned in the draft Treaty; they are required to be
handed over unconditionally.
ii. heligoland
As regards Heligoland, in conceding the dismantling of the
fortifications, the German Delegates observe that—
the measures which are necessary for the
protection of the coast and of the harbour must continue in
force in the interests of the inhabitants of the island as
well as of peaceful navigation and the fishing industry.
A Commission will be appointed by the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers, after the signature of the Treaty, to supervise the
destruction of the fortifications. This Commission will decide what
portion of the works protecting the coast from sea erosion can be
allowed to remain and what portion must be destroyed as a precaution
against the refortification of the island.
The only harbours it is proposed to destroy are the naval harbours
within the positions given in Article 115; the fishing harbour is
not within this area, and the naval harbours are not used by fishing
vessels. The Article must accordingly be accepted
unconditionally.
Appendix VIII to CF–62
WCP–954
Memorandum Submitted to the
Council of Principal Allied and Associated Powers by the
Committee on Responsibilities in Order To Justify the Articles
of Conditions of Peace
The Committee on Responsibilities is of opinion that no concession
should be made to the enemy as regards Part VII of the Conditions of
Peace, relative to penal sanctions; it is impossible to yield or to
compromise on questions of justice.
A. It is important to understand Article 227 aright and it is
essential to explain the method of arraignment set up thereby
against the German ex-Emperor, otherwise the meaning and import of
the Article might be distorted from its true sense.
The public arraignment which the article frames against the German
ex-Emperor has not a juridical character as regards its substance,
[Page 369]
but only in its form.
The basis of this public arraignment is in fact a supreme offence
against international morality, the violation of the sanctity of
treaties and of the essential rules of justice. It is a question of
high international policy. But in order to give guarantees to the
accused the Allied and Associated Powers have desired that judicial
forms, a judicial procedure and a regularly constituted tribunal
should be set up in order to make its judgment a most solemn
one.
Without entering further upon a discussion of its juridical basis, it
is sufficient to say that the arraignment of the German ex-Emperor,
as provided for by Article 227, represents a minimum of what is
demanded in respect of the violation of international morality, the
sanctity of treaties and the most essential rules of justice.
The judicial procedure set up by the above-mentioned article
established in the accused’s favour a guarantee such as has not
hitherto been known to international law; it is in order to ensure
him the most complete rights and liberty as regards his defence that
the Allied and Associated Powers have consented to set up this
procedure.
It is not the common law that should be taken at the present time as
a guide; special and exceptional measures have been contemplated
arising from the acts with which the German ex-Emperor is charged
and the entirely new circumstances under which such acts took
place.
B. It cannot be admitted for a moment that the duty of trying persons
guilty of violations of the laws and customs of war should be
entrusted to the national tribunals of the enemy.
Such a course, if adopted, would confuse the principles which apply
to the recognition of jurisdiction as regards penal matters in
international law in time of peace, and in time of war. The
Conditions of Peace (Article 228) only require the enemy to
acknowledge the right which at the present moment belongs to the
Allied and Associated Powers.
It is, indeed, a standing principle of international law that the
persons guilty of violations of the laws and customs of war fall
within the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the enemy.
C. The basis of jurisdiction being thus determined in connection with
the laws and customs of war, there can be no question of recognising
tribunals composed of representatives of countries which have taken
no share in the war as having any right of jurisdiction.
Ernest M. Pollock
,
ChairmanJames Brown Scott
F. Larnaude
Gustave Tosti
S. Tachi
