Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/58
CF–58
Notes of a Meeting of the Council of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des
Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, June 11, 1919, at 4 p.m.
Paris, June 11, 1919, 4 p.m.
- Present
- United States of America
- British Empire
- The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
- France
- Italy
| Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. |
} |
Secretaries. |
| Count Aldrovandi. |
| Prof. P. J, Mantoux.—Interpreter. |
[1.] The Council had before them a re-draft of the proposed reply
incorporating the alterations agreed to at the morning’s meeting.
(Appendix I.)1
Mr. Lloyd George read the following paragraph
proposed by Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith as an alternative to the second
paragraph on page 6.—1a
Reparation: The Reply to the German Note (WCP–950
revise)
“The resumption of German industry is of interest to the Allied
and Associated Powers as well as of interest to Germany. They
fully recognise this fact, and they have no intention whatever
of pursuing any policy based on the withholding from Germany of
the commercial intercourse without which the resumption of her
industries cannot take place. Subject to the paramount necessity
of safeguarding their essential economic interests and of
ensuring the revival of their own industrial life, which has so
grievously suffered during the war, the Allied and Associated
Powers have no desire or intention to put hindrances in the way
of German trade or to close to Germany any markets or sources of
supply”.
Continuing, he said that Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith had reported to him
that the present Draft was capable of being construed to mean what was
not intended, and he considered it very dangerous.
President Wilson pointed out that Sir Hubert
Llewellyn Smith’s redraft was a mere negation.
[Page 302]
Mr. Lloyd George said that his point was that
every country without exception had arrears to make up.
President Wilson suggested that Sir Hubert
Llewellyn Smith had probably not seen the latest draft.
Mr. Lloyd George undertook to show him the
latest draft and ask his view.
Sir Maurice Hankey said that Lord Sumner had
objected to the words “the commercial facilities” in the paragraph under
discussion. He had pointed out that the Germans might insist that this
gave them the right to send commercial travellers and open accounts etc.
Lord Sumner had less objection, however, if the word “the” was omitted,
but he himself had not felt justified in making this alteration without
the approval of the Council.
President Wilson pointed out that if Peace were
signed, it would be impossible to keep out commercial travellers,
although they might not find a welcome and might prefer to stay
away.
Mr. Lloyd George said he was under the
impression that both Great Britain and the United States had legislated
rather stiffly against Aliens during the next few years. At M.
Clemenceau’s request he re-read the paragraph.
It was generally agreed that the position was sufficiently safeguarded by
the existing phraseology and particularly by the words “subject to
conditions and within limits which cannot be laid down in advance and
subject also to the necessity for having due regard to the special
economic situation created for Allied and Associated countries by German
aggression and the war”.
At a later stage of the meeting President Wilson suggested the addition
at the beginning of this paragraph of a phrase indicating the need of
the German people for food supplies.
This was accepted and it was also agreed to omit the word “the” before
“commercial facilities”.
The final text of this paragraph therefore was agreed to in the following
terms:—
“The Powers will, however, make a declaration on another point as
follows:—the resumption of German industry involves access by the German people to food supplies and by
the German Manufacturers to the necessary raw materials
and provisions for their transport to Germany from overseas. The
resumption of German industry is an interest of the Allied and
Associated Powers as well as an interest of Germany. They are
fully alive to this fact and therefore declare that they will
not withhold from Germany commercial facilities without which
this resumption cannot take place, but that subject to
conditions and within limits which cannot be laid down in
advance, and subject also to the necessity for having due regard
to the special economic situation created for Allied and
Associated countries by German aggression and the war, they are
prepared to offer to Germany facilities in these directions for
the common good”.
[Page 303]
2. President Wilson then brought forward some
further verbal criticisms by the United States Delegation, and the
following alteration in addition to the one mentioned above, was
accepted. Page 4, paragraph 22—omit the words “in writing”
after “arguments”.
3. M. Clemenceau said that he himself was
opposed to the idea of a Plebiscite, but to meet his colleagues he had
accepted it. Upper Silesia: The Question of a
Plebiscite
President Wilson said that he also did not
think in principle that a Plebiscite was necessary. No. 13 of the 14
points was quite explicit on the point. There might be a part of the
area in which a Plebiscite ought to be considered and this was why he
had been willing to agree to the Plebiscite. There were, however, two
distinct sides to the question, and only that afternoon Mr. White of the
American Delegation had called at his house and left him a message to
the effect that he had evidence that the German Roman Catholic priests
were exercising the strongest influence in that region against the
Poles.
Mr. Lloyd George said that the Poles, like the
Irish, were specially good at propaganda. The Allies were only hearing
one side of the case. Wherever Mr. White had obtained his information he
was sure he had not heard the German side. When he had talked to the
Poles about the Jews they had given the impression that they were
treating them like angels of light although it was notorious how they
really treated them. He had no wish to act on one-sided information. At
present we only had the information of violent partisans. If the Germans
should break off negotiations on this point he would not feel justified
in ordering British soldiers to fight simply because a Plebiscite had
been refused, and he would have to say so. He did not believe the troops
of other nations would fight either in such circumstances.
M. Clemenceau said that was one of the reasons
which had induced him to assent to the Plebiscite.
President Wilson said that Mr. White obtained
his information from American citizens who had been in Upper Silesia
before and during the war. As a matter of fact the Germans were far more
subtle propagandists than the Poles. No one could induce him to believe
that the Poles who were in no political position would be better
propagandists in Upper Silesia than the Germans, who were. As against
the Germans he was pro Pole with all his heart.
Mr. Lloyd George said he was apprehensive of
the troops not being willing to advance simply because a Plebiscite had
not been taken.
President Wilson pointed out that the reply to
the Germans on reparation had been whittled down so that all sacrifice
by the Allies
[Page 304]
had been
abandoned. Now it was proposed to place the sacrifice on the Poles.
Mr. Lloyd George said he could not admit either
of these statements. The only point in regard to Upper Silesia was that
he did not wish to put a population under the Poles against their will.
He could not forget that up to the last moment of the war the Poles had
been fighting against us. Were we, he asked, to sacrifice our soldiers
in order to force under Polish sovereignty peoples who did not desire it
without even ascertaining their desires? He was convinced that all the
trouble with Germany would relate to the Eastern front. He did not want
to belittle any particular nation, but for the moment there was no doubt
that the Germans had a higher civilization than the Poles. As a matter
of fact they rather despised the Poles. To force a race of that kind
against their will under a race that they regarded as inferior was not
to promote peace. He was afraid of prolonging the war for unjustifiable
reasons. If we said to the Germans “You must clear out to make way for
the Poles” he was convinced they would refuse. If, however, we said
“Clear out because we want to hold a Plebiscite” he did not believe they
would refuse.
President Wilson pointed out that the
Commission were unanimous in their belief that Allied troops would have
to be put into Poland during the period preceding the Plebiscite. The
serious aspect of this was that the Germans would say “your troops would
bias the Plebiscite”.
Mr. Lloyd George said there was a great
difference between Polish or German troops and Allied troops.
M. Clemenceau said that there were 350,000
Germans at present in Upper Silesia. They were concentrating there even
from Dantzig. Probably this was not for the purpose of fighting, but in
order to show that they had no intention of evacuating.
President Wilson asked if Mr. Lloyd George
thought British troops would fight for a Plebiscite.
Mr. Lloyd George thought they would.
M, Clemenceau, in reply to Mr. Lloyd George,
said that French troops would not fight to drive the Germans out of
Upper Silesia when they demanded a plebiscite, but the question would
never be posed in that way. Either the Germans would sign, or they would
not sign, and there would be other considerations besides Upper
Silesia.
President Wilson thought that if American
soldiers were told that Germany had refused the decision of the
Conference, they would march.
Mr. Lloyd George implored his colleagues not to
put themselves in a situation where they might have trouble with their
troops. As
[Page 305]
an indication of
opinion in Great Britain he mentioned that even the Northcliffe press,
which was attacking him personally, and for that reason exaggerated the
proposals that he was alleged to have made, said that a Plebiscite for
Upper Silesia was right.
(At this point there was an adjournment upstairs to meet the Experts of
the Polish Commission.)
Villa Majestic,
Paris
, 11 June,
1919.
Appendix to CF–58
WCP–950 (revised)
reparation
Reply to German Counter
Proposals
Approved by the Council of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers, 11th June, 1919 [11 a.m.]
The Allied and Associated Governments, consistently with their policy
already expressed, decline to enter into a discussion of the
principles underlying the Reparation Clauses of the Conditions of
Peace, which have been prepared with scrupulous regard for the
correspondence leading up to the Armistice of November 11th, 1918,
the final memorandum of which dated 5th November, 1918, contains the
following words:—
“Further, in the conditions of Peace laid down in his address
to Congress of the 8th January, 1918, the President declared
that the invaded territories must be restored as well as
evacuated and freed, and the Allied Governments feel that no
doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision
implies. By it they understand that compensation will be
made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian
population of the Allies and their property by the
aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the
air.”
To the extent that your reply deals with practical phases of the
execution of the principles enunciated in the Conditions of Peace,
you appear to proceed on the basis of a complete misapprehension,
which is the more difficult to understand as the inferences you draw
and the statements which you make are wholly at variance with both
the letter and the spirit of the Treaty Clauses For purposes of
clarification, however, and in order that there may be no possible
ground for misunderstanding, the Allied and Associated Governments
submit the following observations:—
The vast extent and manifold character of the damage caused to the
Allied and Associated Governments in consequence of the war, has
created a reparation problem of extraordinary magnitude and
complexity, only to be solved by a continuing body, limited in
personnel and invested with broad powers to deal with the problem in
[Page 306]
relation to the
general economic situation. The Allied and Associated Powers,
recognising this situation, themselves delegate power and authority
to a Reparation Commission. This Reparation Commission is, however,
instructed by the Treaty itself so to exercise and interpret its
powers as to ensure in the interest of all, as early and complete a
discharge by Germany of her reparation obligations as is consistent
with the due maintenance of the social, economic and financial
structure of a Germany earnestly striving to exercise her full power
to repair the loss and damage she has caused.
The provisions of Article 241 by which the German Government is to
invest itself with such powers as may be needed to carry out its
obligations, are not to be misconstrued as giving the Commission
power to dictate the domestic legislation of Germany. Non does
Paragraph 12 (b), of Annex II, give the
Commission power to prescribe or enforce taxes or to dictate the
character of the German budget, but it is to examine the latter for
two specified purposes. This is necessary in order that it may
intelligently and constructively exercise the discretion accorded it
in Germany’s interest particularly by Article 234, with regard to
extending the date and modifying the form of payments. The
provisions of Article 240 with regard to the supply of information
are similar in character and purpose and there should be little
occasion for the exercise of these powers when once the amount of
the liability of Germany is fixed, if Germany is in a position to,
and does, comply with the schedule of payments which then will have
been notified to her and with the specific provisions of the several
Annexes relative to reparation in kind It is further to be observed
that the power of modification accorded by the said Article 234 [234] is expressly designed to permit of a
modification in Germany’s interest of a
schedule of payments which events may demonstrate to be beyond
Germany’s reasonable capacity The Allied and Associated Powers
vigorously reject the suggestion that the Commission, in exercising
the power conferred by Article 240 and by Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of
Annex IV, might require the divulgence of trade secrets and similar
confidential data.
The observations of the German Delegation present a view of this
Commission so distorted and so inexact, that it is difficult to
believe that the clauses of the Treaty have been calmly or carefully
examined. It is not an engine of oppression or a device for
interfering with German Sovereignty. It has no forces, which it
commands; it has no executive powers within the territory of
Germany; it cannot, as is suggested, direct or control the
educational or other systems of the country. Its business is to fix
what is to be paid; to satisfy itself that Germany can pay; and to
report to the Powers, whose Delegation it is, in case Germany makes
default. If Germany raises the money
[Page 307]
required in her own way, the Commission cannot
order that it shall be raised in some other way; if Germany offers
payment in kind, the Commission may accept such payment, but, except
as specified in the Treaty itself, the Commission cannot require
such a payment. The German observations appear to miss the point
that the Commission is directed to study the German system of
taxation for the protection of the German people no less than for
the protection of their own. Such study is not inquisitorial, for
the German system of taxation is not an object of curiosity to other
Powers, nor is a knowledge of it an end in itself. If any plea of
inability which the German Government may advance, is to be properly
considered, such a study is necessary. The Commission must test
whether a sincere application is being given to the principle,
accepted in the observations, “that the German taxation system
should impose in general on the taxpayer at least as great a burden
as that prevailing in the most heavily burdened of the States
represented on the Reparation Commission.” If the German resources
are to be properly weighed, the first subject of inquiry, and
perhaps the first ground for relief, will be the German fiscal
burden.
It is understood that the action necessary to give effect to the
provisions of Annex IV, relative to reparation in kind, will be
taken by Germany on its own initiative, after receipt of
notification from the Reparation Commission.
The provisions of the Treaty are in no wise incompatible with the
creation by Germany of a Commission which will represent Germany in
dealings with the Reparation Commission and which will constitute an
instrumentality for such co-operation as may be necessary. The
Treaty specifically and repeatedly provides opportunities for the
German Government to present facts and arguments with respect to
claims and modes of payments, within the limits of the principles
and express provisions of the Treaty. This may be done through a
commission and no reason is perceived why such a commission could
not work in harmony with the Reparation Commission. Certainly this
is greatly to be desired. The Allied and Associated Powers are
therefore ready to agree to such a procedure as the following:—
Immediately after the Treaty is signed, Germany may present and the
Allied and Associated Powers will receive and examine such evidence,
estimates, and arguments in writing, as she may think fit to
present. Such documents need not be final but may be presented
subject to corrections and additions.
At any time within four months of the signature of the Treaty,
Germany shall be at liberty to submit, and the Allied and Associated
Powers will receive and consider such proposals as Germany may
choose to make. In particular, proposals will be acceptable on the
[Page 308]
following subjects and
for the following purposes: Germany may offer a lump sum in
settlement of her whole liability, or in settlement of her liability
under any of the particular categories which have been decided upon
and laid down. Germany may offer to undertake to repair and
reconstruct part or the whole of any damaged district, or certain
classes of damage in each country or in all the countries which have
suffered. Germany may offer labour, materials or technical service
for use in such work, even though she does not undertake to do the
work herself. She may suggest any practicable plan, category by
category, or for the reparations as a whole, which will tend to
shorten the period of enquiry and to bring about a prompt and
effectual conclusion. Without making further specifications, it may
be said in a word that Germany is at liberty to make any suggestion
or offer of a practical and reasonable character for the purposes of
simplifying the assessment of the damage, eliminating any question
or questions from the scope of the detailed enquiry, promoting the
performance of the work and accelerating the definition of the
ultimate amount to be paid. Suitable facilities for inspecting the
damage done will be afforded to Germany’s agents at reasonable
times. Three conditions and three only are imposed upon the tender
of these proposals. Firstly, the German authorities will be expected
before making such proposals to confer with the representatives of
the Powers directly concerned. Secondly, such offers must be
unambiguous, and must be precise and clear. Thirdly, they must
accept the categories and the reparation clauses as matters settled
beyond discussion. The Allied and Associated Powers will not
entertain arguments or appeals directed to any alteration. The
Allied and Associated Powers have to remark that in the Observations
submitted the German Delegation has made no definite offer at all
but only vague expressions of willingness to do something undefined.
A sum of £5,000,000,000 is indeed mentioned, and this is calculated
to give the impression of an extensive offer, which upon examination
it proves not to be. No interest is to be paid at all. It is evident
that till 1927 there is no substantial payment but only the
surrender of military material and the devolution upon other Powers
of large portions of Germany’s own debt. Thereafter a series of
undefined instalments is to be agreed, which are not to be completed
for nearly half a century. The present value of this distant
prospect is small, but it is all that Germany tenders to the victims
of her aggression in satisfaction of their past sufferings and their
permanent burthens.
Within two months thereafter the Allied and Associated Powers will,
so far as may be possible, return their answer to any proposals that
may be made. It is impossible to declare in advance that they will
be accepted, and if accepted, they may be subject to conditions,
[Page 309]
which can be discussed and
arranged. The Allied and Associated Powers, however, declare that
such proposals will be seriously and fairly considered; no one could
be better pleased than they, if, in the result, a fair, a speedy,
and a practical settlement were arrived at. The questions are bare
questions of fact, namely, the amount of the liabilities, and they
are susceptible of being treated in this way. Beyond this, the
Powers cannot be asked to go.
The Powers will, however, make a declaration on another point, as
follows: The resumption of German industry involves access for
German manufacturers to the necessary raw materials and provision
for their transport to German factories from overseas. The
resumption of German industry is an interest of the Allied and
Associated Powers as well as an interest of Germany. They are fully
alive to this fact and therefore declare that they will not withhold
from Germany the commercial facilities without which this resumption
cannot take place, but that, subject to conditions and within
limits, which cannot be laid down in advance, and subject also to
the necessity for having due regard to the special economic
situation created for Allied and Associated countries by German
aggression and the war, they are prepared to afford to Germany
facilities in these directions for the common good.
Even if no settlement were arrived at, it must be evident that the
early production of the German evidence would greatly abbreviate the
enquiry, and accelerate the decisions. The information at present at
hand comes from one side only. The German Authorities have had long
occupation of a large part of the damaged areas and have been over
the ground, forwards and backwards, within the last twelve or
fifteen months. Their information must be extensive and exact. The
Allied and Associated Powers have as yet had no access to this mass
of material. The mere comparison of the evidence forthcoming on the
one side and the other must greatly narrow the field of dispute and
may eliminate dispute altogether. It is obvious that, if the class
of damages done in the devastated areas can be dealt with in this
fashion, the liability under the other categories can be quickly
established, for it depends on statistics and particulars of a far
simpler character. By giving a satisfactory covenant to execute the
work of rebuilding themselves, the Germans could at once dispose of
the only difficult or long subject of inquiry.
Meanwhile, the draft Treaty must be accepted as definitive and must
be signed. The Allied and Associated Powers cannot any longer delay
to assure their security. Germany cannot afford to deny to her
populations the peace which is offered to them. The Reparations
Commission must be constituted and must commence its task. The
[Page 310]
only question open will be
how best to execute the provisions of the Treaty.
The foregoing should suffice to demonstrate the reasonableness of the
conditions under which Germany is to discharge her reparation
obligations, and how utterly unfounded are the criticisms of the
German reply. These are, indeed, explicable only on the theory that
the German plenipotentiaries have read into the Conditions of Peace,
in clear defiance of their express terms, an intent which it would
be not unnatural to see evidenced by victorious nations which have
been the victims of cruelty and devastation on a vast and
premeditated scale. The burdens of Germany undeniably are heavy, but
they are imposed under conditions of justice by peoples whose social
well-being and economic prosperity have been gravely impaired by
wrongs which it is beyond the utmost power of Germany to repair.
