Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/43
CF–43
Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay,
Paris, on Saturday, May 31, 1919, at 5:30 p.m.
Paris, May 31, 1919, 5:30 p.m.
- Present
- United States of America
- British Empire
- Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
- France
- Italy
| Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.—Secretary. |
| Count Aldrovandi.—Secretary. |
| Prof. P. J. Mantoux.—Interpreter. |
1. Attention is drawn to the Acta relating to—
- The proposed Roumanian march on Budapest.
- League of Nations. Drafting Correction to Article 24.
- Omission of an Article on the Assling triangle from the draft
Treaty of Peace with Austria.
- Invitation to the Grand Vizier of Turkey to come to
Paris.
- Carinthia. Cessation of fighting between Austrians and
Jugo-Slavs.
- (Appendix I.)
2. M. Orlando drew attention to the following
sentence in the Preamble of the draft Treaty of Peace with Austria:—
“Whereas, by the free action of the peoples
of the with former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, this
Monarchy has now ceased to exist and has been replaced in
Austria by a Republican Government, and”Preamble of the Treaty of Peace With
Austria
He said that the words underlined1
would be displeasing to Italian public opinion, as it would be taken as
underrating the Italian Military effort.
(It was agreed to omit the words underlined, as well as the words “this
Monarchy”, and that the clause should read as follows:—
“Whereas, the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has now ceased to
exist and has been replaced in Austria by a Republican
Government, and”)
3. M. Orlando also suggested that the clause in
the Preamble following the above, in which it was stated that the
Czecho-Slovak State
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and the
Serbo-Croat-Slovene State have been recognised should be omitted. He
said that Italy had not recognised these States. He added that he had no
knowledge of the instruction to the Drafting Committee, on which this
Preamble was stated to have been based.
President Wilson suggested that the clause
should begin as follows:—
“Whereas the majority of the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers have already recognised etc”.
He pointed out that Poland was not included.
(The Drafting Committee were then sent for, and were introduced.)
During the discussion which followed, the Council were reminded that the
presentation of the full powers of the Croats and Slovenes to the
Germans had been regarded as tantamount to recognition.
M. Orlando then withdrew his objection, and the
paragraph was left unchanged.
4. (After some discussion, it was agreed that no alteration should be
made in the provisions of the Draft Treaty of Peace with Austria in the
clauses relating to Rights of Minorities, as proposed on the same
afternoon at the Plenary Conference.) Right of
Minorities: Proposals Made for Altering the Draft Treaty of
Peace
(M. Jules Cambon entered.)
5. (The attached Article of the Draft Treaty of Peace with Austria,
relating to the frontiers between Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, which had
been drawn up by the experts under M. Jules Cambon, in consequence of
remarks made by the Czecho-Slovak Delegation at the Plenary Conference
the same afternoon, was approved and initialled by the four Heads of
States). (Appendix II.) Frontier Between Austria and
Czecho-Slovakia
Sir Maurice Hankey communicated the Article direct to the Drafting
Committee.
(M. Jules Cambon withdrew.)
(M. Dutasta was introduced.)
6. M. Clemenceau said he had received a letter
from Herr Renner, the Head of the Austrian Delegation, who had asked to
talk with him. Subject to the consent of his colleagues, he proposed to
reply that it had been agreed that there should be no conversations, but
that if Herr Renner liked to send a confidential note, he would
undertake to show it only to the four Heads of States. Communications With the Austrian Delegation
(This was agreed to.)
(M. Dutasta withdrew.)
7. With reference to C. F. 42, Minute 7,2
Sir Maurice Hanket
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stated that he now had the
Articles of the Treaty to which M. Kramarcz’s observations referred, and
which had not been available on the previous day. Austrian Treaty: Proposal by M. Kramarcz
(In view of the discussion at the Plenary Conference that afternoon,2a it was
decided not to discuss the question.)
(M. Tardieu entered.)
8. Mr. Lloyd George read a telegram he had
received from General Allenby, indicating that the situation in Syria
would be extremely grave unless the Commission of the Peace Conference
should come to Syria. (Appendix III.) He said that General Wilson had
also received a private letter from General Allenby, dated May 17th,
1919, which fully confirmed the message in the telegram. Hence, he felt
that the moment had come to decide whether the Commission was to be sent
out. Personally, he would prefer that the Commission should proceed at
once. The United States Commissioners had already left for Syria. He
himself, did not wish to send out British Commissioners unless the
French also sent Commissioners, but in this case, he must inform General
Allenby. The situation was so serious that he could not postpone action.
Turkey: The Proposed Commission to Syria,
Mesopotamia, etc.
M. Clemenceau said his position was as he had
stated a few days before, namely, that he was willing to send French
Commissioners as soon as the relief of British troops by French troops
was begun. As long as Syria remained entirely in British military
occupation, and Mr. Lloyd George’s latest proposals held the field it
was useless to send French Commissioners. Nevertheless, he would
undertake not to send any more French troops against the wishes of the
British Government. He was sending some troops to Silesia [Cilicia?], although there was not much object in
this from the French point of view, if Silesia [Cilicia?] was to go to the United States. As soon as General
Allenby would let him know that the replacement of British troops by
French could commence, so that the people of Syria knew that they were
not exclusively under British force, he would send Commissioners.
Mr. Lloyd George said he had thought it right
before taking action, to let his colleagues know exactly what he
proposed to do. He would not send Commissioners if the French did not.
General Allenby showed clearly that if French troops went to Syria now,
there would be very serious trouble. He himself was not in a position to
judge of the matter, but General Allenby was a very reliable man, and
was the British representative on the spot, and he could not afford to
neglect
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his advice. Mr. Lloyd
George then read a copy of the telegram he proposed to send to General
Allenby. At M. Clemenceau’s request he agreed to alter one passage in
order to make it clear that the French were not willing to send
Commissioners until the relief of British troops by French troops had
been arranged.
M. Clemenceau said he would make no comment
beyond asking for the above alteration.
Mr. Lloyd George promised to send M. Clemenceau
a copy of General Allenby’s despatch.
M. Orlando said he would not send Commissioners
until the British and French Governments sent them.
9. M. Orlando presented several proposed
alterations in the Financial Clauses in the Draft Treaty of Peace with
Austria which had been signed by the representatives of the four States
on the Drafting Committee of the Financial Commission. Proposed Alteration to Financial Clauses in the Draft
Treaty With Austria
President Wilson was reluctant to initial these
alterations without having some explanation as to their meaning.
(The question was reserved.)
Villa Majestic,
Paris
, 31 May,
1919.
Appendix I to CF–43
council of the principal allied
and associated powers
Acta
The following action has been taken between Meetings during May 30th
and 31st, 1919.
1. On the initiative of M. Clemenceau, it has been agreed, and
General Franchet d’Esperey has been informed on Friday, May 30th,
that the Roumanian proposal that their Army should march on
Buda-Pesth must not be carried out. The Roumanian Delegates in Paris
were to be informed by the French Government. Proposed Roumanian March on Budapest, May 30th
2. During the Plenary Session of the Conference on Saturday, May
31st, the following resolution was approved and initialled, and
subsequently handed to the Drafting Committee. League of Nations: Drafting Correction to Article 24, May
31st
“The Drafting Committee is instructed to amend the French
text of Article 24 of the Covenant of the League of Nations,
in order to make it identical with the English text, in
which language the said Article was originally
drafted.”
3. At the Plenary Session of the Conference on Saturday, May 31st,
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the following
resolution was approved, initialled and subsequently handed to the
Drafting Committee:—
Article 6 of Section II of Part III of the Treaty with
Austria, dealing with the Assling triangle should be
suppressed, inasmuch as in other Articles of the Treaty,
Austria accepts any disposition which may be made of
territories lying outside her frontiers, as drawn in the
Treaty of Peace, agreed upon by the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers. Draft Treaty of Peace
With Austria, Assling Triangle: Omission of Draft
Article 6 of Section II, Part III, May 31st
4. With reference to C. F. 42, Minute 2,3 the following telegram was approved and
initialled by the four Heads of States and handed to M. Clemenceau
at 2.30 p.m. on Saturday, May 31st (by Captain Abraham of Sir
Maurice Hankey’s staff), for communication by him on behalf of the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the Turkish Government:—
Turkey: Invitation to Grand Vizier To Come to
Paris, May 31st
“The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers
have received the request of the Grand Vizier for permission
to send to Paris a Delegation to speak on behalf of the
Ottoman Sovereign, Government and people. In reply they
declare their willingness to receive this delegation and
have given instructions to their representatives to make the
necessary arrangements for its safe conduct to
Paris.”
5. With reference to C. F. 42, Minute I,4 the following telegram was approved and
initialled by the four Heads of States and handed to M. Clemenceau
at 2.30 p.m. on Saturday, May 31st (by Captain Abraham of Sir
Maurice Hankey’s staff) tor communication by him on behalf of the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers to Belgrade, and to the
Serbo-Croat Delegation in Paris:— Carinthia:
Cessation of Fighting Between Austrians and Jugo-Slavs, May
31st
British Delegation
Paris.
Draft Telegram to Allied Ministers at
Belgrade.
Please communicate following immediately to Jugo-Slav
Government.
We desire to call the attention of the Government of the
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to the situation
in Carinthia where the hostilities suspended in January last
have been resumed.
The Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers
understand that whereas the Austrian Government have offered
to negotiate an armistice and to submit all matters at issue
to the decision of the Conference, the Jugo-Slav forces are
still continuing their hostile operations and have shown no
disposition to accept the proffered armistice.
The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers
desire
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it to be
understood that such independent action on the part of the
Jugo-Slav forces, leading, as it does, to useless bloodshed
and to the perpetuation of disorder and suffering in the
region affected, cannot but prejudice the cause of those
responsible for the continuance of these hostilities.
They accordingly request that immediate and explicit
instructions be issued to the local Jugo-Slav commanders to
cease all hostile operations in this area, and withdraw
their troops behind the frontier laid down by the Conference
and communicated to the Serb, Croat and Slovene Delegation
today, as temporarily the southern boundary of the
Klagenfurt basin, the control of which is to be ceded by
Austria to the Allied and Associated Powers for a period of
six months. The Austrian armies are being required to
withdraw to the north of the boundary of the said Klagenfurt
Basin.
Appendix II to CF–43
frontiers of austria
Article 1
5. With the Czechoslovak
State.
Point 226, between Poysdorf and Herrenbaumgarten, indicated for the
delimitation of the frontier north of the Hohenau–Laa railroad, is
not to be found on the 1:75,000 General Staff map. Point 218 should
be inserted for delimitation of the frontier.
In the delimitation of the frontier from point 611 up to a point 1
Km. 500 above the railroad bridge of Gmünd on the Lainsitz, point
622 should be indicated before point 583.
In order to avoid all possible doubts in the delimitation of the
frontier on the spot between the city of Gmünd and the branching of
the railroads Gmünd-Budweiss and Gmünd-Wittingau, part of a sentence
should be inserted so that the paragraph in question should read as
follows:
- A
- . . . . . . . . . .
“A line to be fixed on the ground passing West of
Heidenreichstein and Schrems, through points 622 and
583, and between the city of Gmünd (to Austria) and
the railroad branching of Gmünd-Budweiss and
Gmünd-Wittingau through the
extreme Southeast of the railroad bridge (to
the Czechoslovak State).”
- B
- . . . . . . . . . .
The Commission charged with determining the frontiers of the
Czechoslovak State is in favor of accepting the above proposal of
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the Czechoslovak
Delegation relating to the last paragraph of the present note (from
A through B).
Appendix III to CF–43
1. Telegram From General
Allenby
Memorandum
On May 30th Mr. Balfour received a telegram from General Allenby at
Cairo, transmitting two telegrams from the Emir Feisal.
The first telegram reports that there comes from Beirut a rumour that
it has been decided no international commission is going to Syria,
but that General Garron is to arrive in command of a big French
Army. The Emir feels therefore justified, seeing that this operation
will not only wound national feeling but will also create agitation
through the country, in informing General Allenby that—if the French
force is increased even by one soldier—he declines to be held
responsible for the consequences.
The second telegram is from the Hedjaz representative in Paris to the
Emir: announcing that the future of Turkey is now being considered
by the Allies; that the Mission has been stopped; and that British
troops are to be withdrawn from Syria. The Emir says to General
Allenby that, supposing this to be true, and that the news reaches
the people, a great upheaval must be expected in all Arabian
countries, and that his own position will immediately become very
critical. He begs therefore for any authentic news and for an answer
within 24 hours.
He cannot accept any decision except that of the liberty of nations
and parties by sending the Commission. He protests that his people
must not be divided like cattle; and he adds that, if this news be
true, the responsibility of shedding innocent blood must rest with
the Peace Conference.
The Political Officer at Damascus (who forwarded this second
telegram) adds that the situation at once becomes most dangerous if
Feisal’s interpretation of the decision of the Peace Conference be
correct: namely, that the British troops are to be withdrawn from
Syria in favour of France, without consulting Syria’s wishes.
“Joyce” agrees with him that Feisal is in deadly earnest and that,
even if willing, he will be unable to prevent bloodshed on a large
scale; indeed, he will probably identify himself with any rising
unless this news is contradicted.
General Allenby concludes his telegram by stating that in his opinion
an extremely grave situation has arisen. It is certain that Feisal
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will raise the Arabs
against the French and ourselves unless he (Feisal) can be
officially reassured that the Commission is going out to decide the
future of the country.
If this rising under Feisal should take place, General Allenby says
that it will not only endanger the position of British troops in
Syria, but that it will also seriously jeopardise the whole
situation in Palestine and Syria. Feisal has only to make a sign,
and all the warlike Bedouins east of the Jordan will be arrayed
against us—tribes upon whose friendly attitude depends not only the
security of Allenby’s long line of communication, but the safety of
Palestine itself. Moreover, such a rising of Bedouins would
certainly bring out against us the tribes of the Peninsula of Sinai,
and would cause serious trouble to break out in the Soudan and
Egypt; trouble with which the General declares the troops now at his
disposal would be totally unable to deal.
II. Paraphrase of a Telegram to General
Allenby
In regard to telegram received from you No. E. A. 2484, you are
authorised to make it known that the Commission appointed to enquire
into the questions dealing with the political future of the
inhabitants of Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine, are due to arrive
in the East almost at once. The representatives of America are
already on their way. We have been anxious to send our Commission
for some time, and it has long since been prepared. Until
arrangements have been made for the French to relieve the British
troops in Syria, the French Government will not send out their
Commissioners. As agreement on this question cannot be reached,
French representatives will not proceed. Under such conditions we
deem it inadvisable for our representatives to proceed. You are
authorised to state to the Americans on their arrival, that the
greatest weight and consideration will be given by the British
Government to the advice and recommendations made to the Council of
the Heads of the Principal Allied States by the American
Commissioners. It is the desire of His Majesty’s Government that the
Commissioners should receive every facility in the execution of
their enquiries, and rely upon you to see that this is done. The
American, French and Italian Governments have been informed of this
decision.
In further reply to telegram received from you No. E. A. 2484, you
seem to be under the impression that the future of the different
ex-Turkish territories is to be decided by this Commission; but this
is not the case. They are not empowered to make any decision. When
they have completed their examination of the various problems they
will be asked to give their advice to the Council of the Heads of
the Principal Allied States, by whom the final decision will be
taken.
