Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume III

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/32

BC–25

SWC–3

Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the 13th Session of the Supreme War Council, Held in M. Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Friday, February 7, 1919, at 3:30 p.m.

Paris, February 7, 1919, 3:30 p.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • President Wilson
    • Hon. R. Lansing
    • Mr. A. H. Frazier
    • Mr. L. Harrison
  • British Empire
    • Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
    • Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.
    • Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. G. B.
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau
    • M. Pichon
    • M. Leygues
    • M. Dutasta
    • M. Berthelot
    • M. de Bearn
  • Italy
    • H. E. M. Orlando
    • H. E. Baron Sonnino
    • Count Aldrovandi
  • Japan
    • Baron Makino
    • H. E. M. Matsui

Also Present During First Part of Meeting

• America, United States of
  • Gen. John J. Pershing, Commanding A. E. F.
  • Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, Military Representative.
  • Admiral W. S. Benson, Naval Adviser.
  • Capt. F. H. Schofield, U. S. N.
  • Com. A. F. Carter, U. S. N.
• British Empire
  • Admiral Sir R. Wemyss, G. C. B., C. M. G., M. V. O., 1st Sea Lord & Chief of the Naval Staff.
  • Maj. Gen. W. T. Thwaites, C. B. Director of Military Intelligence.
  • Maj. Gen. The Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C. M. G., Permanent Military Representative.
  • Maj. Gen. Sir F. H. Sykes, K. C. B., C. M. G., Chief of the Air Staff.
• France
  • M. Loucheur
  • Marshal Foch, O. M., G. C. B.
  • Gen. Weygand, K. C. B.
  • Gen. Belin
  • Admiral De Bon
  • Colonel Mercier
  • Major Lacombe
  • Capt. [Lt.?] Odend’hal
  • Captain Levavasseur
• Italy
  • H. E. Gen. Diaz
  • Gen. Cavallero
  • H. E. Admiral Thaon di Revel
  • Admiral Grassi
  • Commander Ruspoli
• Japan
  • Admiral Takeshita
  • General Tanaka
  • Colonel Sato
  • Commandant [Captain?] Nomura
  • Commandant [Captain?] Yamamoto

• Secretariat
  • America, United States of
    • Colonel U. S. Grant.
  • British Empire
    • Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
  • France
    • Captain A. Portier.
  • Italy
    • Major A. Jones.
  • Japan
    • M. Saburi

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Renewal of Armistice With Germany: Proposed Amendments to Military Clauses: (a) Statement by Marshall Foch 1. M. Clemenceau, having declared the meeting opened, stated that the question of the occupation of the enemy’s territory by the forces of the Allied and Associated Powers had been studied by a Committee, with M. Loucheur as Chairman, and by Marshal Foch. Their reports were now ready, and he asked Marshal Foch to make a statement in this regard.

Marshal Foch read the following note:—

“The meeting of the Commanders in Chief at Marshal Foch’s, which was ordained by the Supreme Council of the Allies on January 24th,¹ was held on January 26th. The object of this meeting was to determine, with the greatest possible accuracy, the situation of the Allied Armies on March 31st, 1919, such as will result from the measures taken by each Government for demobilisation and repatriation, and also to consider what further provisions could be made, given these measures.

The French Army, on April 5th, will still have under the colours 2,257,000 men, of which 1,350,000 in the Armies of the North and North-East. It will comprise a minimum of 46 divisions, each with 4 regiments up to fighting strength, (and sufficient men in reserve for their maintenance during 3 to 4 months of operations) and 6 Cavalry Divisions.

No measure has yet been decided upon to be carried out after this date (April 5).

The British Army, according to the measures decided upon by the British Government on January 23rd, will comprise 900,000 men for the whole of the Empire.

The arrangements made will render it possible to have in France, on April 1st, 10 strong divisions and 2 cavalry divisions, (Infantry divisions up to 10 battalions of 900 men). To this should be added, for an indefinite period, 2 or 3 divisions from the Dominions.

These forces in France amount to a total of 552,000 men, the fighting force of which will be 212,000 men.

It will be possible to maintain this situation for a period of several months.

The American Army, on April 1st, will have in France:

• 10 Divisions in the zone of the Armies,
• 5 Divisions near the embarkation ports.

These forces amount from 1,380,000 to 1,400,000 men, with a fighting strength of 680,000.

On May 1st, the American Army in France will comprise:

• 10 Divisions in the zone of the Armies,
• 5 Divisions near the embarkation ports.

If, on this date, the Peace Preliminaries are not signed, the American Command considers, but without making any definite agreement on the subject, that during May and June sufficient troops and war material will be left in France to provide for home transportation, and this without encroaching upon the above mentioned 10 divisions, in such a way that on July 1st, there may remain in France 10 divisions amounting to 380,000 men.

The Italian Army has actually, in the war zone in Italy, 1,540,000, with a fighting strength of 1,020,000 men. Up to April 1st, four classes (each of 100,000 men) will probably be mustered out, that is to say a total of 400,000 men, 225,000 of which from the war zone, 1,315,000 men will therefore remain in the war zone.

On April 1st, the Italian Army will comprise:

• 31 Divisions (including those of Dalmatia, but exclusive of the two divisions forming the 2nd Army Corps),
• 3 divisions in Albania,
• 1 division in the Balkans.

The table, given in Appendix “A” summarizes the situation of the Allied Armies facing Germany on April 1st.

This situation shows that there are sufficient resources to oppose Germany up to April 1st on the Western Front.

It also shows that after this date, and if the Peace Preliminaries are not signed, the Future can only be ensured by maintaining the above mentioned resources in stopping the process of demobilization.”

(b) Report of M. Loucheur’s Committee M. Loucheur then gave a summary of the report of the Commission appointed by the Supreme War Council at the meeting of the 24th January, 1919. (For full text of report, see Appendix “B” of with its annexures 1 to 5 inclusive).

M. Loucheur added that his Committee considered that the control over the manufacture of arms and munitions in Germany could be easily established with a force of 200 officers, and that this control could be in operation by the end of March, provided the proposed new Armistice clauses were duly signed on 20th February next, on which date the present Armistice period would expire. Moreover, by April 5th, sufficient material would have been surrendered to justify the continuance of demobilisation, if Germany carried out her agreement with sufficient good-will. According to Marshal Foch’s estimate, there would still be 51 Divisions and 10 cavalry divisions in the French Army.

President Wilson said that he understood the proposal to contemplate very serious and extensive additions to the original armistice conditions. Whenever this was attempted it was always possible that the armistice would not be renewed, and if renewed, that the Allies would [not?] be prepared to enforce the new conditions. He would like to ask Marshal Foch two questions, namely, whether in the latter’s opinion these new conditions would be accepted, and, if so, whether it would be necessary to undertake any serious measures to ensure their enforcement.

Marshal Foch replied that he did not think the Germans would accept the new conditions without pressure. When he met the German delegates he would say: “Accept those conditions or the armistice will be broken”. He could not enter into negotiations with the Germans.

As to the second question, it would evidently be necessary to take measures to insure fulfillment of the new condition, and to establish control. Whether the control proposed would be effective he did not know; but it did not guarantee anything. The officers who went to Germany would only see what they were allowed to see, and if later they discovered that the terms of the armistice had been violated they would so report; but meanwhile demobilisation would have progressed. The demobilisation was to progress on the assurance given by this control, and if the terms agreed to were violated, it would then be too late to do anything about it. He, therefore, thought it futile to base the demobilisation plans on promises of this kind, fulfilment of which could not be insured.

M. Clemenceau then inquired if Marshal Foch could suggest any more effective method of control.

Marshal Foch said they might occupy all the factories, but he considered that to be an impracticable solution. Or, they might occupy one or two factories, such as Essen; but to occupy Essen alone it was estimated seven divisions would be required, so that the burden to be borne would be enhanced thereby rather than diminished. The hoped-for relief would in reality merely mean an additional burden.

M. Clemenceau asked whether Marshal Foch had any other suggestion to make.

Marshal Foch replied in the negative. It would be impossible to prevent a country like Germany from doing what she wished at home. She would always be able to manufacture arms. The Allies could not stop all their industries.

President Wilson expressed his appreciation of the clear and frank reply made by Marshal Foch, and he called attention to the fact that what was desired was to find means for reducing the Allied forces; while it seemed that the occupation of the factories might call for a further increase.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired whether the application of that part of M. Loucheur’s report which demanded the surrender of guns, rifles and machine guns, would not make Germany impotent, at least during the duration of the armistice.

Marshal Foch agreed that it would weaken Germany, but by how much and for how long he did not know; nor did he know how long the armistice would last.

Mr. Lloyd George expressed the view that it would take a certain period of time to replace all the equipment Germany was to be asked to surrender, and he enquired from M. Loucheur whether he could say what that period would probably be.

M. Loucheur replied that with all her available resources it would take Germany at least two years.

Mr. Lloyd George next enquired whether Germany could manufacture all those arms unless the Allies allowed the necessary raw material to go through to Germany.

M. Loucheur replied that the producing power of Germany in iron and steel had already been reduced 40% by the occupation of Alsace-Lorraine by Allied troops.

Mr. Lloyd George said it would therefore take Germany more than two years to turn out the immense armament proposed to be surrendered; and he certainly did not think that it could be manufactured without the knowledge of the Allies’ inspecting officers who would be present in the country.

M. Loucheur agreed that this would be quite impossible, and he was prepared to take full responsibility for this statement.

Mr. Lloyd George thought that if Germany were told that unless she assented to these terms, the supply of raw materials and needed food would be refused, that she would undoubtedly consent. It would also be advantageous to Germany to reduce her army to the maximum [minimum?] figure required for the maintenance of order, if by so doing she assured a proportionate reduction of the armies of the allies.

M. Loucheur and Marshal Foch agreed.

Mr. Lloyd George, continuing, said: “Supposing the disarmament of Germany were made one of the conditions of peace”, (and he could not conceive the omission of such a condition), “would it be easier to impose this condition at that time, say in July, rather than now?”

Marshal Foch did not know what peace conditions would be imposed; but the question now before the Conference relating to the surrender of the armament still possessed by Germany was so vague and indeterminate that the experts themselves had never been able to agree on the number of guns Germany still possessed. The experts had only been able to say that Germany should surrender various items of war material in excess of certain given figures.

M. Loucheur said that his Committee had in their report adopted the figures supplied by the Intelligence Services of the different armies, and it had called for the surrender of three-fourths of the total number given.

Marshal Foch interposed that he could not assume any responsibility for those figures—they were necessarily unreliable.

President Wilson asked what the Allies would do if Germany promised the surrender of these materials and did not give them up. How would they get them?

Marshal Foch replied that there would be only one way, viz: “By War”. But, instead of pursuing a question so indeterminate as the size of Germany’s armaments, which could never be accurately known, there were other methods of exercising pressure, which should be considered. Besides the resumption of hostilities by means of the Armies of Occupation, there were the maintenance of the blockade and the stoppage of supplies. Germany needed food and raw materials, and if those three instruments (Armies of Occupation, supplies, blockade), were centralised under a single military control, with powers to open and close the channels of supply according to the observance of Germany, he thought that the fulfilment of the conditions which it was proposed to impose could be attained.

Mr. Lloyd George asked whether Marshal Foch could doubt that, if the surrender of these guns were made a condition for the renewal of the armistice, Germany would not do so rather than renew hostilities.

Marshal Foch replied that he did not know, but, if the proposition were made and refused, the armistice would have to be broken.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired whether the Germans would face a continuance of the blockade rather than surrender their guns, which after all were not of the slightest use to them except for offensive purposes.

Marshal Foch thought it would be unwise to speculate on the answer to that question.

Mr. Lloyd George asked M. Loucheur if, in his opinion, it would be necessary to occupy all the factories. On a previous occasion he (M. Loucheur) had stated that there were two or three essential factories, which, if taken over, would practically mean the disarmament of Germany.

M. Loucheur replied that if the factories in the area of Westphalia, such as Essen, Bochum up to Duisburg were held, it would mean a diminution of 75% of the effective means of production of Germany.

(At this stage the military, naval and technical advisers withdrew.)

(c) President Wilson’s Proposal to Appoint a Civil Commission To Negotiate Disarmament Terms President Wilson said that the last time the armistice conditions had been discussed, he had thought it his duty to oppose any addition to the armistice terms. He thought that the council should have known what it was doing when the armistice was drawn up, and that it was not sports-manlike to attempt to correct now the errors that had then been made. It was quite clear to him that the Allies were running a grave risk of bringing about a situation when, having made a threat, they might be challenged to carry it out. He understood that the Allies already controlled in the occupied districts of Germany 26,000,000 out of 32,000,000 tons of the iron production of Germany. He was afraid that the control of the factories by officers, as proposed, would prove insufficient, and that it would become necessary to occupy more territory, with the result that the military commanders would require more troops. It had already been suggested by Mr. Lloyd George that, as Germany was paying for the Army of Occupation, it would clearly be to her interest to reduce this burden. It must also be remembered that if the demobilisation of the German Army were imposed on a large scale, Germany would have forced on her a large body of unemployed, who would add to the element of unrest and be a danger to Germany and to the Allies. It was, therefore, to the interest of the latter to give Germany the means of renewing her economic life, not only for the purpose of reducing the number of unemployed, but also to enable her to pay the reparations which the Allies had a right to expect. He, therefore, proposed the institution of a civil commission to meet a similar German commission, to negotiate with them and to say—that if Germany would reduce her forces and yield a proper proportion of her mischievous equipment, the Allies would reduce their army of occupation, reducing the charges therefor; they would at the same time relax the blockade to allow the passage of sufficient raw materials, except for armaments, to enable her to renew her economic life.

He thought in that way the Allies would avoid doing the improper thing of exacting terms, without running the risk of renewing war and of bringing about an intolerable state of affairs.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he did not think they were necessarily bound either as an obligation of honour, or as sportsmen, to renew the Armistice for ever or on exactly the same terms. He did not know how long the Armistice would last, but he felt that he and his colleagues were under obligation to the world and to their people to protect them against a renewal of hostilities. The terms of the Armistice did not contain any undertaking either to feed Germany or to furnish raw materials; but these things were now being considered. The alterations were not, therefore, all on one side; and if the terms could be changed in favour of the Germans, they could also be changed in favour of their own people. He had been very much impressed by a conversation he had held with Sir Douglas Haig. Field Marshal Haig had expressed views similar to those held by President Wilson, namely, that the number of infantry did not matter. But he had also called attention to the fact that Germany still had the materiel and armament, which would enable her within a short period of time to call back three or four million men, fully equipped for war. By that time most of the American and British troops would have gone home and be out of reach, and the French would have scattered over the country. If Germany should therefore mean mischief, she could call together millions of well-trained men, with full complement of officers and non-commissioned officers, thousands of the best guns in the world, and fifty thousand machine guns. A fit of anger might come over her. It was impossible to say how long the present government would last, and a change of government might mean a change of policy. A tailor named Ebhardt [Elbert] was Chancellor, Scheidemann was one of the leaders; but neither were men of real power. It was impossible to say who would be on top in six weeks’ time. Germany herself was being endangered by having this temptation left at her door. Consequently, nothing unfair would be done by imposing the proposed conditions. The only question to be settled was how those conditions should be imposed. It might be fair to do this on the lines suggested by President Wilson by making clear that the Allies would not help Germany unless these conditions were accepted. Nothing with reference to the supply of food or raw materials appeared in the Armistice. Consequently, they were fully entitled to refuse to supply these things to Germany. He thought there was a good deal to be said in favour of appointing a civilian commission; but the question would have to be settled at the time of the renewal of the Armistice. This arrangement would be best both for the Germans and for the Allies.

President Wilson agreed that the Allies were under no moral obligations to furnish food. He was proud as a moral man that on humane grounds it was not intended to let the people of Germany starve. There was also no obligation to furnish raw materials, and the price which the Allies had in their mind to exact for these concessions was not extravagant. But, if they were prepared to assist Germany to renew her commercial life, they had a right to ask guarantees for their own safety: and it would be both honourable and reasonable to impose such conditions. He thought that there would be a great moral advantage in approaching the German delegates through a civilian commission, which would not threaten them. He would also like to see the negotiations begun immediately so as to be completed before the date fixed for the renewal of the Armistice.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that he had forgotten to mention one most important point. According to Marshal Foch’s report, the Allied forces would by April next be very greatly reduced. At the present moment sufficient men were available and, therefore, the question should, he thought, be discussed at once before further demobilisation took place.

M. Clemenceau regretted that he was not in accord with President Wilson in this matter. France would be placed in a position of great danger if a firm attitude were not adopted. When the terms of the Armistice had been discussed he had said that only what was necessary should be inserted, in order not to risk a refusal of the terms. But, each time it had been agreed to renew the Armistice for a period of one month only, and this was done with the express object of having an opportunity of imposing new terms, adapted to the changing situation. The right to impose new terms, or new conditions, could not therefore be contested either on juridical or any other grounds; and the Germans themselves had made no objection to the occupation of Kehl and other places. But he had one other thing to say. The present moment was decisive, not because it was a question of winning the war, but because there was danger of losing the fruits of victory. It was essential to act quickly. The forces at the call of the Allies had not yet diminished appreciably. In the last few weeks the Germans had become insolent, and recently an incident had occurred. Marshal Foch had been forced to use constraint to bring the German delegates to a meeting. If now ambassadors were to be sent and negotiations were to be begun, much valuable time would be lost; and April would come and find our forces partially scattered. The American and Australian troops would have returned to their homes, and France and Great Britain would be left alone to face the Germans, who, seeing the Allies always giving way, would in turn become more arrogant. He knew the German people well. They became ferocious when any one retires before them. Was it forgotten that they were still at war; that the Armistice was a status of war? The Germans had not forgotten it. He called attention to the case of Poland. The Poles had stopped the further advance of their troops at the request of the Allies; but the Germans had treated a similar request with a blank refusal. The terms of the refusal were well-known.² The Allies would be exposed to great danger unless they menaced the Germans now. There was need of a strong Poland. Furthermore, President Wilson had, as one of his fourteen points, assumed the obligation of reconstituting Poland. The League of Nations was a very fine conception, but it could not be constituted without nations. As one of the nations concerned, Poland was most necessary as a buffer on the East just as France formed a buffer on the West. If the Germans were formally told that any attack by them on the East would mean an advance by the Allies on the West, he knew that such language would be understood by the Germans and would command immediate compliance. Instead of this, it was proposed to buy the good will of the Germans by offering them food and raw materials. A state of war still existed, and any appearance of yielding would be construed as an evidence of weakness. At any rate, personally he could not accept President Wilson’s proposition. He did not wish to starve the Germans, but the blockade must be maintained. If he so far forgot the interests of his country and of Europe as to consent to this proposal, the Chamber would undoubtedly dismiss him, and it would be acting right in doing so.

(d) Mr. Lloyd George’s First Draft Resolution Regarding Appointment of a Civilian Commission To Enforce Conditions Contained in M. Loucher’s Report Mr. Lloyd George said that he had never suggested raising the blockade. It had but [been?] agreed to let some food through, and the question of permitting the passage of some raw materials was being considered. But it would not be to the interest of the Allies to starve Germany, or to have Germany completely unemployed—a pool breeding infection throughout Europe. He therefore proposed the following resolution.

“The Supreme War Council agree—

(1) That a Civilian Commission shall be appointed at once to negotiate an agreement with the Germans on the following lines:—that food and raw materials, other than those required for the manufacture of material of war, shall be allowed to enter Germany on the following conditions: (M. Loucheur’s Committee to insert the conditions in their report.)

(2) That the Commission shall be instructed to complete the negotiations before the next renewal of the Armistice in order that if necessary, Marshal Foch may put pressure on the enemy to comply as a condition of the renewal of the Armistice.

(3) That the Commission be authorized by Marshal Foch to commence the negotiations at once and to complete them before the next renewal of the Armistice in order that, if necessary, Marshal Foch may put pressure on the enemy to secure compliance.[”]

M. Clemenceau expressed his inability to accept this proposal. He objected to it after long reflection. He had no objection to offer to civilians being attached to Marshal Foch’s Commission; but he felt convinced that as long as a state of war existed it was for soldiers to confer with soldiers. He proposed that a new clause should be drafted to be included in the Armistice, reversing the sequence of ideas contained in Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal. Their demands should, in the first place, be stated, followed if necessary by a statement to the effect that the Allies would be ready, as an act of grace, to consider the question of relaxing the blockade with a view to the supply of certain quantities of food and raw materials.

President Wilson wished respectfully to submit that M. Clemenceau’s proposal was open to strong objection. A demand was first put forward, and then followed an offer of concession. He thought, the concession would nullify the threat. M. Clemenceau had said that Germans could be handled only by threats, and he might be right. But, if what they wanted could be got by negotiations, with the idea in the mind of the Germans that a threat might follow, threats could still ultimately be resorted to. But if they began with threats and then offered concessions, the force of the threat would be reduced.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he had tried in drafting his resolution to reconcile the ideas of President Wilson and M. Clemenceau. As a matter of fact, his sympathies were entirely with M. Clemenceau. It would be impossible to reduce the allied forces until the conditions now proposed had been accepted. On the other hand, the Allies could not continue to maintain their big forces until peace was signed.

President Wilson reminded his colleagues that as far as Marshal Foch’s opinion was concerned, it would not be possible before April to know whether the conditions, if accepted, were being carried out, and, there would be no safety in reducing the Allied forces between now and April. No Government was going to reduce its forces below the point of safety. Certainly the United States would not do so. If he saw any good prospect of bringing about a reduction of forces by the proposals made, he would be more impressed by them, but it seemed to be Marshal Foch’s opinion that these forces could not safely be reduced until peace was signed.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he saw no safety even then, unless the Germans were compelled to surrender these thousands of guns. The situation on the signing of peace would be the same as now.

M. Clemenceau said that Marshal Foch was not a military Pope; he was sometimes mistaken. He was a great General and all were prepared to do him honour as such; but as a matter of fact he had always been opposed to the idea of imposing disarmament on Germany. When asked what means could be taken to enforce disarmament he had proposed strengthening the blockade. In this he was directly opposed by President Wilson. He (M. Clemenceau) was as deeply impressed as anyone by the seriousness of the situation, and dreaded as much as anyone a renewal of the war. But he knew the Germans; and today they must be spoken to firmly. The German people wanted economic advantages, and he did not object to their being eventually granted. But it was a sine qua non that they should in the first place accept the Allies’ demand as a matter of right. He would not consent to Ambassadors being sent to Germany to negotiate with offers of concessions when the Allies had a right to demand. He felt confident this was wholly a psychological question. He would merely ask the Council to consider the Germans’ reply to the Allies’ request for a cessation of hostilities against the Poles. The German reply would have to be answered. Should the answer be: “If you stop attacking Poland, we will give you bread, sugar and other supplies?” No. The Germans must be told that if they attacked the Poles, the Allied troops would march into Germany. That argument would appeal to the Germans and, after due compliance with the Allies’ demands, sugar, butter and supplies could then be granted.

Baron Sonnino thought that Marshal Foch’s statement had not been quite correctly interpreted. The Marshal had concurred in the opinion that the disarmament of Germany would be advantageous. He merely did not consider that disarmament would by itself give complete assurance of safety.

M. Orlando thought that Marshal Foch had a basic idea, which explained any inconsistencies in his statements. He wanted to have at his disposal the greatest number of troops he could get. His idea was a sound one, for he could count on the troops under his orders, but he could make no certain estimate of the strength of the enemy’s forces. On the other hand, civilians were obliged to consider things in a more complicated manner. This question of demobilisation was a difficult one. President Wilson had said, that should the necessity arise American troops would be retained, and Italy, no doubt, would be prepared to do the same. But demobilisation once begun was very difficult to stop. Italy’s soldiers had now been under arms for four years and were tired. The progress of demobilisation could be slowed down, but it could not be stopped. It is for that political reason that it would be impossible to count on being able to stop demobilisation. It could be done; but it would be most undesirable to have to do so. At a previous meeting it had been decided that it would be more difficult to stop demobilisation than to insist upon a reduction in the enemies’ force. The present proposal was a consequence of the decision then taken.

In regard to President Wilson’s contention that they were under an obligation not to insert new conditions on renewal of the armistice, he thought that M. Clemenceau’s point was just, namely, that the armistice had deliberately been made renewable at given intervals of time so that new conditions might be made, if necessary. The Allies had signed two important armistices—one with Austria which was for an indefinite period; the other with Germany which provided periodic renewals, and so implied the possibility of changes and additions. As far as the psychological question was concerned, he begged President Wilson to believe that he also knew the Germans well. If the Allies were willing to accept less than was contained in M. Loucheur’s report, let them reduce their demands; but whatever was wanted must be demanded in the form of an order and in a loud tone of voice. If a German thought that the one having the mastery showed any signs of hesitation, or failed to look him straight in the eyes, he would concede nothing. The victors must speak to the Germans as to the vanquished. It would be undesirable to have to face a refusal. Therefore, if necessary, the conditions might be reduced, but whatever was agreed to must be demanded as an order.

M. Clemenceau said that the present moment was particularly favourable because there was practically no government in Germany now. In three months’ time the situation might be quite different and unfavourable to the Allies.

(e) Mr. Lloyd George’s 2nd Draft Resolution Regarding Appointment of a Civilian Commission To Enforce Demands Contained in M. Loucheur’s Report Mr. Lloyd George said that he was anxious for a unanimous decision. All he wanted was to get the guns away from the Germans, so that it might not be necessary to maintain huge armies. He did not contemplate making Europe an armed camp for ever, and the way to prevent this disarm Germany. If it was possible to blend President Wilson’s suggestions with the French proposals and get the guns, concerted action might become possible. With this object in view he offered the following draft resolution:—

The Supreme War Council agree:

(1) That a Civilian Commission of the Allied and Associated Powers shall be attached to Marshal Foch on the occasion of the next renewal of the Armistice and in connection with the Marshal’s negotiations shall endeavor to arrange with the Germans that controlled quantities of food and raw materials other than those required for the manufacture of material of war shall be allowed to reach Germany. That it shall be an essential part of the above arrangement that the demands set forth in M. Loucheur’s Report be complied with.

M. Clemenceau regretted that he could not accept this resolution. He had two objections to it. First, he could not take any obligation in the matter of supplies without having: consulted his experts. Secondly, this proposal had the vice of first discussing the reward, while in his opinion the demand should be made first. Otherwise, there would be endless discussion about the kinds and classes of supplies required. The discussions would last for months and the favourable moment would be lost. He wanted the military conditions agreed to first, and the diplomatic negotiations might then follow.

President Wilson considered the recommendations contained in the Loucheur report to be a panic programme. The report not only called for the surrender of big guns, which in his opinion should be given up, but it also went into details of aircraft and factory production. He was in favour of controlling factories by regulating the raw material that went to them; but he thought that if officers were sent there they would get into trouble and would have to be supported by military forces.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed, but thought that the output of factories must be supervised.

M. Sonnino thought that the Allies’ demands could be reduced to three or four important items, such as big gung and machine guns.

(f) Mr. Lloyd George’s Proposal Regarding Appointment of a Committee To Decide on Equipment To Be Surrendered by Germany Lord Milner agreed. In his opinion if the demands were reduced as suggested by M. Sonnino, and a certain number of factories were watched, the desired result would be obtained.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that a Committee be committee be appointed consisting of one member representing each of the Great Powers having armies on the Western Front, to examine and determine the items of war material to be surrendered by Germany with a view to her disarmament.

This was agreed to. The following representatives were nominated:—

United States of America	Mr. Lansing
Great Britain	Lord Milner
France	M. Tardieu

It was further agreed that the report should be submitted at the next meeting to be held on Saturday, February 8th, at 3.30 p.m.

Paris, 8 February, 1919.

Appendix “A”³

Allied Forces Still Confronting Germany at Combat Strength on April 1, 1919

Belgium

United States

France

Great Britain

Total

Number of Divisions

Number Div.

Combatants

Total Effectives

Number Div.

Combatants

Total Effectives

Number Div.

Combatants

Total Effectives

Of Divs.

Of Combatants Not Including the Belgians

*

†

‡

12

15 D.I

337,000

1,340,000

{

51 D.I

}

1,050,000

1,350,000

{

10 D.I

}

212,000

552,000

88

1,639,000

6 D.C

2 D.C

Of which there are in the Rhineland

4 D.I

8 D.I

{

19 D.I

10 D.I

41

3 D.C

2 D.C.

5 D.C.

* Besides 5 in the region of the ports of embarkation.

† Not including 575,000 men in the interior and the forces in the Orient and North Africa.

‡ Not including 2 to 3 Divisions from the Dominions.

Italian Army

Number of Divisions	31.
Combatants.	990,000 men.
Total Effectives	1,400,000 men.

Appendix B

1557

Report by the Committee Appointed by the Supreme War Council at the Meeting of the 24th January, 1919 (morning)

The Committee consisting of

Monsieur Loucheur	as President	(France)
Marshal Foch	Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces.
General Bliss		(America)
General Sir Henry Wilson (Acting for Mr. Winston Churchill)		(Great Britain)
General Sir Frederick Svkes		(Royal Air Force)
H. E. General Diaz	Chief of the Staff, Italian Army,

assembled on the 27th January, 2nd and 5th February.

From an examination of the Reports⁴ made by the sub-Committees and from the discussion which followed it appeared that—

1. There is some uncertainty regarding the strength of the existing German Army, and the resources in war material of all kinds at its disposal, but both are still considerable.

2. There is similar uncertainty regarding the war material and stocks of munitions in the interior of Germany, both in proof and in course of manufacture, also regarding the means of production of such materials, but these stocks and the means of production also are certainly still considerable in quantity.

Any serious reduction in the effective strength of the Allied Army of Occupation must depend on the carrying out of certain necessary measures, the execution of which must be controlled. To this end the Committee recommends the following arrangements:—

War material actually in possession of the German Armies.

An approximate estimate of such war material is set forth in Annex No. 1.

The Committee therefore considers that the Allied Governments should fix definitely the number of troops and the amount of war material of certain categories to be left in the hands of the German Armies, which it proposes should be reduced to a strength of 25 Infantry Divisions and 5 Cavalry Divisions, and recommends that all material in excess should be handed over.

All the war material to be surrendered by the Germans, all stock of asphyxiating gas and gas masks, must be given up at places selected by agreement, to Committees of Allied officers who will carry out the removal, or the destruction, or the putting out of action of the surrendered war material, according to circumstances.

As regards destruction and putting out of action, certain detailed measures have been considered; these will be carried out by the above-mentioned Allied officers if the general principles are accepted.

Manufacture of War Material.

Similarly it is necessary that the German Government should pledge itself not to continue the manufacture of war material during the period of the armistice, in order that she may not re-arm in secrecy.

The most certain method of ensuring the correct execution of the above undertaking would consist in controlling certain German munition factories but not necessarily all of them and in removing or destroying special machinery as indicated in the Report of the Technical Sub-Committee (Annex 2). This control could be exercised by a comparatively small number of Allied experts.

It is, however, necessary to provide for the possibility that, after the Allies have reduced the Army of occupation, Germany may put obstacles in the way of such control and resume the production of war material.

The Committee, therefore, calls attention to the fact that a form of guarantee less comprehensive, but sufficiently efficacious, provided that the delivery of existing material has taken place, could be found in the establishment of absolute control by military occupation of the area extending to the east of the Rhine for an average depth of about 50 kilometres from Cologne to 15 kilometres to the north of Duisburg, in such a way as to embrace Essen and the principal Krupp establishments, the greater part of the Rheinish-Westphalian coalfields and the metallic industries which depend on these. A map has been sent to Marshal Foch showing this zone.

The importance of this region from the point of view of war in industries is so great that it would be practically impossible for Germany once disarmed to take up arms if she had not free disposal of it.

Further, the prevention of exportation to the unoccupied German territories of the general products of this area, would have the most serious consequences from an economic point of view. If the general munition control is interfered with or if unauthorised production is found to be going on, trade between the occupied territory and the unoccupied territory would be prohibited.

These results can be looked for as a consequence of negotiating with the enemy, of they can be enforced upon him as a condition of the renewal of the armistice. In the latter case the text of the agreement might be that of the appended draft.

General Bliss has drawn up a Note (Annex 3) dealing with certain reservations he wishes to make on the subject matter of the above paragraphs.

General Diaz brought to notice the importance, in case German Austria should be joined to Germany, of foreseeing the necessity of taking analogous measures as regards factories in which war material is manufactured in that region, where there are many of importance.

(Attached is an additional clause to the Armistice conditions compiled in accordance with the above mentioned idea).

To this Report are annexed the following documents:—

• Annex 1. Report dated 1st February, 1919 of the Military Sub-Committees.
• Annex 2. Report dated 2nd February 1919 of the Technical Sub-Committee.
• Annex 3. Memorandum by General Bliss, United States Army.
• Annex 4. Paper by General Groves⁵ devoted to aeronautics.
• Annex 5. Normal allowance of arms for German units.

Additional Clause to the Armistice Conditions

1. It is hereby agreed that provided Germany renounces definitely any intention to resume hostilities and carries out the following conditions as a guarantee of such renunciation, the Allied and Associated Governments will reduce the financial burden imposed upon Germany by the Allied occupation.

2. The reduction of the burden of occupation must be preceded by the adoption of the measures mentioned below, the execution of which will show clearly the wish of Germany not to resume hostilities and to cease the manufacture of war material.

3. Germany undertakes to reduce the effective personnel of her Armies to such numbers as are strictly necessary for the garrison of their frontier and the maintenance of order in the interior, that is to say

• 25 Divisions^*
• 5 Cavalry Divisions^*

4. Germany consequently undertakes to reduce the quantity of war material to be maintained to the following figures:—

Note General Weygand wishes to give further consideration to these figures before accepting them.

Heavy Guns	1,000
Field Guns	1,575
Machine Guns	3,825
Automatic Rifles	4,500
Rifles	412,500
Aeroplanes	See para: 5 bis.
Trench Mortars	1,400

5. Consequently all war material of the above natures in excess of these figures will be delivered at places to be fixed by agreement, either in occupied or non-occupied portions of Germany or outside Germany, to Commissions of Allied officers who will be appointed for this purpose. These surrenders will apply to the whole of the war material existing either with the Armies or in the interior in parks, depots, factories, etc., whether finished, under proof or in course of construction or repair. The Allied officers will carry out according to circumstances the removal or the destruction or the putting out of action of the war material so surrendered.

5. bis. Aircraft. With regard to aircraft, Germany to surrender the following:—

(a) 5,000 engines of types to be selected by the Allies.

(b) 450 German marine aircraft (i. e. Aeroplanes, seaplanes and flying boats) to be selected by the Allies.

(c) 15 Airships to be selected by the Allies.

(d) All aircraft will be complete with all war equipment and armament and to be flown by German personnel to places to be specified by the Allies before a date to be fixed by the Allies.

(e) 6 rigid airship sheds over 800 feet long, with the complete hydrogen-producing plant for each of the airship-sheds, will also be surrendered in an efficient condition.

Note It is considered important that the question of the ultimate destination or destruction of all aircraft and aircraft material surrendered by Germany shall be settled by the Supreme War Council when a decision as to the amount to be delivered has been arrived at.

6. All tanks, (all gas masks) and stocks of mustard and arsenical gases with projectors and cylinders will be surrendered.

7. Germany will, in addition, bind herself expressly to stop all manufacture of war material of every kind, except that strictly necessary for the upkeep of material of which the existence is authorised.

8. To ensure the loyal and complete execution of the pledges undertaken by Germany as laid down in paras. 1, 3, 4, 5, 5 bis, 6 and 7, the Allied Governments will maintain in Germany a Mission of technical experts and officers who will control the factories, workshops and building yards engaged in the manufacture of the classes of war material mentioned in pars. 4, 5 bis, and 6 and munition parks and magazines of all kinds.

This mission shall be authorised to inspect factories and to remove or destroy such specialised machinery engaged in the production of the above mentioned claims of war material as they may consider necessary to ensure the cessation of output as aforesaid.

The civil and military German authorities will supply these experts with the whole of the information which they will need to carry out their mission and will furnish them with all the necessary material means, and all the necessary authorisations to complete it, without allowing any obstacle to be placed in their way.

9. In the event of Germany not agreeing to the foregoing proposals, or in the event of her not carrying them out after having agreed to them the Allied Governments will proceed to the military occupation of the Westphalian basin on the right bank of the Rhine, the territory painted red on the map which is annexed.⁶

General . . . . .⁷
C. I. G. S.

Military Section, British Delegation, 5 February 1919.

annex i

(Translation)

General Weygand’s Report

Notes on the Estimates of Resources in Men and Materials in the German Army on February 1, 1919

General Thwaites, of the British Army,

General Nolan, of the American Army &

General Weygand, of the French Army,

having assembled the actual resources in men and material in the German Army during Conferences held on the 29th January and 1st February, compared papers produced on this subject by the British, American and French Armies.

Having examined together the information from various sources in their possession, and having estimated the respective value of each of them, these General Officers are in agreement on the average figures which it is useful to adopt to estimate the military forces of Germany at the present time.

These figures are as follows:—(the accuracy of these estimates should be taken with reserve).

(1) Personnel serving with the Colours of the German Army at the end of January:

From 600,000 to 700,000 men (at least).

(2) Various war materials existing with the fighting troops: (exclusive of material in depots, factories, & arsenals).

(a) Machine guns of all types:
50,000 (A minimum).

(b) Field guns (including anti-aircraft guns):
8,000

(c) Heavy guns (including super-heavy artillery):
2,500 of which nearly all is good modern material.

(d) Trench Mortars.

The estimates vary between 4,000 (the figure furnished by the English Army) and 6,000 (the figure furnished by the American and French Armies).

(e) Rifles.

1,300,000 for the fighting line troops (according to British and American information), 3,500,000 to 4,000,000 (for the total existing at the Front, in the Interior and in Arsenals).

(f) Aviation.

It is very difficult to estimate the value of Aviation material remaining in the hands of the Germans. The Squadrons stationed on the different Fronts at the time of the Armistice contained about 3,000 machines (not including those in Army Parks and on lines of communication, nor those of the Fleet), but on account of the intensity of production, and of the necessity for frequently replacing service aeroplanes, this number only represents a fraction of the machines existing in Germany, (just as in France there were from 10,000 to 12,000 aeroplanes for 3,000 in service).

It follows that, although Germany has surrendered a large part of the machines belonging to Squadrons at the Front, she may have made up since then her air force: we do not know the number and the position of the aircraft factories which have continued to function since the 11th November.

The Naval aircraft (estimated by the British as amounting to 450 machines), is still intact; and so are the dirigibles. Nearly all the engines are produced at 3 Factories, namely, the Benz, the Mercedes and the Maybach.

In the above estimates no account has been taken of the material taken from the Allied Armies on the Western Front during the whole war, nor of the considerable quantity of Russian material which remains in German hands, which would constitute an important augmentation of these estimates.

annex ii

Report to Main Committee

Conclusions of the Sub-Committee on the Limitation of German Armaments (Naval Armaments Excluded)

The Technical Sub-Committee was constituted as follows:—

United States.	Brigadier-General Rice.
Great Britain.	Major-General Thwaites.
	Mr. Layton.
France.	Colonel Mercier.
	Commandant Aron.
Italy.	Colonel Malvani.

The Sub-Committee met on the 27th January, 1919, at 3 p.m. on the 31st January, 1919, at 3 p.m. and on the 1st February, 1919, at 2:15 p.m., to decide on the terms of the procès verbal. The conclusions arrived at by the Committee are as follows:—

Object To prevent the German Government from being in the possession of a number of guns, machine guns, etc., greater than those decided on.

The Sub-Committee considers that it will be necessary first for the Military Authorities to fix the quantity of the following items of war material which Germany will be allowed to maintain:

• Heavy Guns,
• Field Guns,
• Machine Guns, Automatic Rifles & Rifles,
• Aircraft (including airships),
• Tanks,
• Asphyxiating Gas,
• Gas Masks.

The Sub-Committee does not consider it necessary to extend the limitations to other articles, a resumption of hostilities being impossible provided that the total supply of the arms above mentioned remains insufficient.

As regards explosives, the Sub-Committee considers that as set forth hereafter, supervision to a certain extent is desirable.

Means of Execution.

The limited quantities having been fixed under each category, it is necessary in the first place to take steps to ensure that the materials in excess existing in Germany should be made useless. On this point the Committee wish to emphasize the fact that by the words “material in excess” are understood not only the completed material existing in the armies, in the parks or in the depots, but also the materials existing with the manufacturers or in course of fabrication. The measures hereafter mentioned should be applied to all the materials. To control the execution of these measures it is agreed that technical experts, English, American and French, should assess the amount of materials manufactured or in course of fabrication now existing on the enemy’s country.

With this object the Sub-Committee suggests that:—

The German Government should be told to furnish on its own responsibility all the information necessary regarding all the materials mentioned below.

Artillery Material.

All the material in excess must be delivered at place to be designated to officers who will be instructed to take delivery.

These officers will be required to ensure the rendering useless, or better still the destruction, or the removal of these materials. The removal of breech blocks and of sights is insufficient; only destruction by blow-pipes or by explosion can be considered efficacious.

Machine Guns and Automatic Rifles.

The excess arms will be given up to officers of the Allies as mentioned above.

Rifles.

These will be treated in the same way as machine guns.

Aircraft.

Machines in excess will be given up as mentioned above.

Tanks.

Tanks to be handed over if considered necessary.

Gas Masks.

To be handed over (owing to the resulting moral effect which will be thereby produced in the German armies).

Limitation of Fabrication.

As regards all the materials enumerated above, the Committee considers that Germany should be placed in such condition as to make a resumption of manufacture on a large scale impossible. To this end, the Committee considers that it will suffice to control the items enumerated below.

As the penalties fixed by such control can only be enforced by the judicious employment of the troops of occupation, the Committee considers that the period during which the measures should be applied should be the same as that of the military occupation of Germany by the Allies.

Generally speaking, as regards all the special gear which could not be used by Germany for work unconnected with war, the Allied experts of whom mention will be made later, will carry out its removal, or its destruction, unless they consider that control over its use by periodical inspection would suffice.

Heavy Guns.

Control should be limited to the two operations of rifling and of shrinking. As regards rifling and boring machines the experts sent for the purpose will specify what machines or parts of machines are to be disposed of as above.

Field Guns.

Control will be limited to the factories where gun tubes are made.

Machine Gum, Automatic Rifles a/ad Rifles.

Control will be limited to the principal assembling plants. The delivery also will be demanded of all the gauges and jigs and fixtures used for their manufacture.

Explosives.

On the understanding that control over manufacture in Germany will only last for a limited period (under eight months) the Sub-Committee considers that it would be of no particular advantage to control explosive factories owing to the large stocks which exist. But in case control should last more than eight months, as an additional guarantee, the Sub-Committee considers that it would be necessary to control all the fabrication of synthetic ammonia in Germany, whether it is made by the Haber or by the Cyanamide process.

Aircraft.

The sub-committee considers that all aircraft, for whatever purpose built, can be easily turned into military machines. Therefore if it is decided to limit the number of German military aeroplanes, the Sub-Committee considers that it would be indispensable to control the whole of the factories in which aircraft are made, but excluding factories where engines, magnetos, etc. are manufactured.

Tanks.

All manufacture of tanks to be stopped. Control to be applied to assembling works.

Asphyxiating Gas.

Control will on principle be limited to the production of yperite and to arsenical gas, but might be extended to every other product of which Germany may be understood to be studying the employment. With this object, a periodical control of gas manufactories will be made.

Organization of Control.

The Sub-Committee considers that the whole organisation of control, both in the occupied and unoccupied portions of Germany could with advantage be entrusted to an inter-Allied Committee, composed of experts appointed for the purpose.

This Committee would appoint sub-Committees in the principal industrial centres in unoccupied Germany.

Every sub-committee would be charged with the control of a district as determined by the parent Committee.

Every sub-committee would send out experts allotted to them for this purpose, to carry out tours of inspection of the factories mentioned below, and such other factories as may be considered important.

The British and French representatives suggest that in case the German authorities, either official or industrial refuse to afford to the experts of the Allies the facilities which are necessary, or should the orders given by the control officers not be obeyed, a strong measure of coercion would be provided by the military occupation of the bridgehead of Duisburg, to include the whole of the Krupp factories at Essen, and the greatest part possible of the mining district, owing to the industrial importance of this region.

The American and Italian representatives consider that this question is beyond the scope of the sub-Committee.

Naval Armaments having been dealt with by the Naval Armistice Commission, the subject has not been considered here, for which reason the sub-committee has added the following words to the title of the procès verbal: “Naval Armaments Excluded”.

List of Principal Factories To Be Controlled

• Guns and Munitions
  • Spandau
  • Essen (Westphalia)
  • Stieburg
  • Deutz (Cologne)
  • Magdeburg-Buckau
  • Yolstadt [Ingolstadt]
  • Oberndorf sur Neckar
  • Düsseldorf
  • Dantzig
  • Dresden
• Small Arms
  • Spandau
  • Erfurt
  • Danzig
  • Amberg
• Machine Guns
  • Berlin
  • Nuremburg
  • Sömmerda
  • Spandau
  • Erfurt
  • Suhl
• Explosive Factories
  • Spandau
  • Gneschwitz
  • Hanau
  • Ingolstadt

annex iii

[Memorandum by General Bliss, United States Army]

The report of the Committee is based on the assumption that any serious reduction in the effective strength of the Allied Army of Occupation calls for:

1. The fixing of the strength of the German Army.

2. The surrender of all war materials in Germany not required by the German Army whose size is thus regulated.

3. The control of all factories, shops, building yards, engaged in the manufacture of war material.

Under (1) the strength recommended for the German Army is 25 divisions of infantry and 5 cavalry divisions, it being assumed that these divisions are sufficient for the garrisoning of the frontiers and the maintenance of order in the interior. The infantry and cavalry divisions would be organised and armed as at present. The total arms needed for this force is given as:

Heavy guns	1,000
Field guns	1,575
Machine guns	3,825
Automatic rifles	4,500
Rifles	412,000

Under (2) it is proposed that Germany turn over to the Allies everything in excess of the war material listed in the above paragraph. Subtracting the above amounts from the material listed in the report of the sub-committee, it would appear that the following would be turned over to the Allies:

Heavy Guns	1,500
Field Guns	6,425
Machine Guns	41,675
Rifles	838,000

In addition to the above the report calls for the surrender of all war material in the interior of Germany both in proof and in course of manufacture, including all stocks of asphyxiating gas and gas masks. The amount of this material is unknown, but it is believed to be considerable in amount.

Under (3) it is proposed that the Allies maintain in Germany technical experts and officers who will control the factories, workshops, and building yards engaged in the making of the war material discussed above.

It is proposed in the new armistice terms (para. 9) “in the event of Germany not agreeing to the foregoing proposals or in the event of her not carrying them out after having agreed to them, the Allies will proceed to the military occupation of the Westphalian Basin on the right bank of the Rhine.”

The paragraph quoted above (para. 9) negatives in a large degree the idea that the Allies by negotiation reach an agreement with Germany in regard to the above demands.

Previous to the negotiation of the original armistice with Germany my position was that Germany should be required to completely demobilise except such forces as were needed for the maintenance of order and to surrender her arms. These terms were at the time considered too harsh, and milder terms were offered Germany which she accepted in the original armistice conditions. I do not find it consistent with my sense of right to go beyond the terms of the original armistice agreement except as a penalty for Germany’s wilful failure to comply with these conditions. To my mind to proceed now to a military occupation of the Westphalian basin on the right bank of the Rhine in the event of Germany not agreeing to the foregoing new proposals would be on the part of the Allies and the United States a breaking of the Armistice agreement. If it did not lead to a resumption of hostilities the Allies could be readily accused of violating their own agreement and justly so. If it led to the grave consequence of the resumption of the war due to this act the responsibility would belong to the Allied Governments and the Government of the United States.

I regret that I find myself unable to agree to the report of this Committee to the Supreme War Council recommending the addition of clauses to the original armistice agreement which are based on the threat of forcible occupation of further German territory unless our proposals are agreed to.

annex iv

[Paper by General Groves, Deputy Chief of the British Air Staff]

Matters Which Are of Special Importance in Regard to the Future Air Power of the Enemy Nations

1.

1. As to both Sea and Land Air Services it would be desirable that the proper authority in each enemy country should be forced to supply complete lists giving full particulars of all the various types (including experimental types) of seaplanes (which terms shall include flying boats) aeroplanes and engines in existence or under construction at the time of signing Peace, from which the Allied Governments will signify the numbers in the various types of seaplanes, aeroplanes and engines respectively required to be handed over to the Allies. The particulars desired to include:—

(a) Name of manufacturer.

(b) Number and type of seaplane or aeroplane.

(c) Number, type, horse-power and revolutions of engines fitted to such aeroplane or seaplane.

(d) Number, type, horse-power and revolutions of each engine not fitted to a seaplane or aeroplane.

(e) Number of each type of seaplane, aeroplane or engine available at the date of signing the Armistice, and the number produced per week since that date.

(f) Location of each seaplane, aeroplane or engine at the date of signing the Armistice and the location at the date of signing Peace.

(g) Photographs of the seaplane, aeroplane or engine taken from at least two positions to enable subsequent identification to be made.

2. All fittings and equipment of a purely military value except such as in the opinion of the Allies may be reasonably necessary for police purposes and internal defence shall be handed over to the Allies in a complete and efficient condition. These would include, for example, bomb gears, bomb sights, machine guns, aircraft torpedoes, aircraft ammunition and bombs.

Note. The following details are applicable to Germany only, but it is assumed that the Powers more immediately interested will deal with Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey, to whom the same principles should be applied.

2. german air service (sea)

1. The following numbers of machines of the types collected by the Allies from the lists of seaplanes and aeroplanes referred to in para. 4 (1), complete with all equipment, including engines, armament, bomb or torpedo carriers or release gears, wireless equipment, full navigational instruments etc., in an efficient condition, should be flown to places to be specified and before a date to be fixed by the Allies and handed over to the Allies:

2. A minimum total of 450 seaplanes and aeroplanes of the various types, the numbers in each type to be selected by the Allies.

3. In addition a number of seaplanes and aeroplanes of these types, not less in the aggregate than 50 per month from the 11th November 1918 up to the date of signing Peace.

3. german air service (land)

1. The following numbers of engines of the types selected by the Allies from the list of engines referred to in paragraph 1 (1) complete and in an efficient condition should be handed over to the Allies at a place to be specified and before a date to be fixed by the Allies:

2. A minimum total of 5,000 engines of various types, the numbers in each type to be selected by the Allies.

3. In addition a number of engines of these types not less in the aggregate than 600 engines per month from the 11th November 1918 up to the date of signing Peace.

Note. In view of the fact that the aeroplanes so far handed over to the Allies have not, with the exception of single seater fighters, been of their latest types, it is desirable that a certain number of the latter should be called for.

4. airships

1. All rigid airships in existence and under construction at the time of signing Peace, complete with all equipment and armament to be delivered in flying condition to Air Stations designated by the Allies. Those which cannot be made capable of flying to be destroyed in Germany under the supervision of the Allies within three months of the signature of the Peace Treaty.

2. Six rigid airship sheds over 800 feet long, with the complete hydrogen-producing plant for each of the airship sheds, should also be surrendered in an efficient condition.

annex v

Normal Allowance of Arms for German Units

• Infantry Division.
  • 12,000 Rifles.^*
  • 108 Heavy Machine Guns.
  • 144 Light Machine Guns.
  • 45 Trench Mortars.
  • 48 Field Guns and field howitzers.
  • 332 Heavy guns.
• Cavalry Division.
  • 6, 000 Rifles or Carbines.
  • 72 Heavy Machine Guns.
  • 12 Field Guns.

Note. In the calculations pencilled in para. 4⁸ 25% has been added in the case of every category of war material e. g.

25×12000	rifles	=	300,000
5× 6000	“	=	30,000
	Total		330,000
	Add 25%		82,500
			412,500

Appendix “C” to SWC–3

No. 956.

From Allied General Headquarters, February 3, 1919.

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, to the President of the Council, Minister for War

In continuation of the letter from the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference, dated February 1st, which you transmitted to me in Schedule No. 1561.D., and received by me on February 2nd at Noon, I have the honour to inform you that I have addressed to General Nudant, President of the International Armistice Commission, the following telegram:

“Please to make the following communication without delay, to the High German Command:

“Marshal Foch informs the German Military Authorities that the Associated Powers are sending to Poland a Commission which has full powers to allay all disorders there in so far as is possible. For this purpose the Commission has been instructed to urge the Polish Authorities to abstain altogether from the use of force against the German forces. The Marshal is communicating to the German Authorities in German Poland the injunction of the Associated Powers that they should henceforward abstain from any use of force in that province and from all interference in its public life, pending the completion of the. labours of the Peace Conference.”

I enclose herein copy of the telegram which I have received on this subject from General Nudant.

Foch

[Enclosure]

Telegram From General Nudant to Marshal Foch, February 3rd, 1919, 2.45 p.m.

No. 431.PG.

(1) I communicated this morning to the German Commission telegram No. 934 of February 2nd, in regard to the despatch of an Inter-Allied Commission to Poland.

(2) The President of the German Commission immediately asserted the absolute right of the German Government to ensure the protection of their subjects within their own territory. He added that present events necessitated a rapid intervention so as to reestablish order in view of the assassination of German subjects and of Pogroms against the Jews. This point of view will undoubtedly be confirmed to me shortly by the German delegates.

1. See BC–A9, p. 704.

2. A correction issued on February 11 reads as follows:

   For “The terms of the refusal were well known”, substitute “The terms of the refusal are given in Appendix ‘C’.” [For Appendix “C,” see p. 924.]

3. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
4. See annexes I and II, infra.
5. Brig. Gen. Robert M. Groves, Deputy Chief of the British Air Staff.
6. The establishment of a Division is shown in Annex 5. [Footnote in the original.]
7. The establishment of a Division is shown in Annex 5. [Footnote in the original.]
6. No map accompanies the minutes.
7. No signature indicated on file copy.
8. General Weygand desires to reserve these figures. [Footnote in the original.]
8. Of the proposed “Additional Clause to the Armistice Conditions,” p. 912.