[Enclosure]
The Food Administrator (
Hoover
) to the French Minister of
Provisioning (
Boret
)
My Dear M. Boret: In personal conferences and
communications which I enjoyed with members of the various Food
Ministries in Europe, it was recognized that the pressure of the
submarine warfare
[Page 696]
would drive
the burden of the Allied food supply upon North America, and that it
became of pre-eminent importance as a matter of safety of the entire
Allied cause that the stimulation of the production of foodstuffs in the
United States should be carried to the utmost. In accordance with these
decisions, since demonstrated so correct, the United States Government
undertook large policies of expansion in production. Price assurances
were given and these were formulated upon a much lower basis than the
prices then being paid by the Allied Governments, but at a level
necessary to secure the production. These policies naturally ripened
into direct soil for the harvest of 1918 and in the increase of animal
life parallel therewith. The undertakings were so eminently successful
that it would have been possible to have carried the burden of Allied
supplies from North America during the year 1919 had hostilities
continued, which would have been of vital necessity, and the greatest
satisfaction has been repeatedly expressed in Allied countries at this
security to safety.
No guarantees of any character have ever been at any time required to
produce foodstuffs for the supply of the American people and all
guarantees have been solely for the purpose of creating surpluses for
the European Allies. These guarantees not only apply to the existing
food supplies but also extend to next year’s wheat crop.
With the change produced by the Armistice, however, the markets of the
Southern Hemisphere naturally open themselves to the Allied world and
the restriction of marketing from that quarter over four 3’ears has
necessarily produced a slightly lower range of prices than has been
necessary to assure in advance the securing of the increase of
production from the United States. Naturally, the Allies desire to seek
the Southern Hemisphere markets with a view to securing the cheaper
foodstuffs. The result of this, however, is to leave the United States
with surpluses of certain commodities beyond the present demands of the
Allied countries.
Viewing the world’s food situation as a whole, there is manifestly no
surplus, even of American production, if the import of food into enemy,
neutral and liberated countries were released upon a normal scale. There
would, in fact, be a shortage in some commodities.
This increase in food production in the United States is, therefore,
still of the highest importance, for it becomes the supply through which
the very life of many countries must be sustained, and the American
people wish it used in a sympathetic manner for these purposes. With
literally hundred of millions of underfed human beings in the world, the
spoilage and waste of a large quantity of food in the United States
cannot for a moment be entertained, either by the American public or by
the Allies. Many of the American surpluses are of
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perishable character, and instant action
is necessary to prevent waste as well as hunger.
These foodstuffs, however, cannot at present reach many of these new
areas freely, where they are so sorely needed, because of the blockade
restrictions of many descriptions. The surpluses of American supplies
are backing up and there is thus created a very threatening economic
situation. Any failure to find solution to this position within the next
few days would possibly precipitate financial difficulties in the United
States, which would injure the hope of continued economic assistance to
the Allies for a long time to come.
The American people are most desirous of safeguarding the supplies to the
Allies and wish to extend to them the full need for which they may call.
Our present surpluses, however, in wheat, flour, barley, rye, pork
products, condensed milk and cotton seed oils and various seed meals,
are above the demands of the Allied Governments between now and the next
harvest. Other surpluses will develop later.
Therefore, I am directed to inquire if you will not recommend to your
Government:
- (a)
- That you indicate as nearly as may be the amounts of these
commodities which will safeguard your position from January 1st
to the end of our crop year—July 1st, 1919.
- (b)
- That all restrictions upon neutral trading be at once removed
in these commodities.
- (c)
- That no objection be raised by the Allied Governments to
direct or indirect sale and transportation to enemy countries or
to the necessary financial transactions involved.
It is our view that private trading will contribute materially to relieve
the food situation in many parts of Europe, will relieve our various
administrations of much responsibility, and effect its own solution of
shipping and finance and, as such trading must be the ultimate solution
of all these problems, we should advance it as rapidly as possible.
The United States of course wishes to fully cooperate in these matters
and would, of course, coordinate with the Allied Governments in
directing distribution to the various centers of need and would exert
this through the control over its exports.
The President has directed me to present these recommendations as matter
of the utmost urgency and the key to many settlements which are to be
presently attempted.
Faithfully yours,
